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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to review the Tax Court's Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Final Order and Judgment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3)0.* 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-53-315 (plenary authority in county executive to settle "all 
lawsuits and other actions") 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-601 ("trial de novo" in the Tax Court) 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1321 (county legislative body vested with power to refund 
erroneously collected taxes upon sufficient evidence produced) 
Utah Const, art. XIII § 6(4)(legislative authorization for tax courts to determine 
"any matter" decided by the Tax Commission) 
Utah Const, art. XIII § 7(2)(county boards vested with power to "adjust and 
equalize" assessments) 
1
 The Tax Commission invokes this Court's jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Court Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(3)(e)(ii), which vests the Supreme Court with jurisdiction over final orders of 
"the State Tax Commission." This is plainly incorrect because none of the parties before 
the Tax Commission in the 1995-1996 valuation case and the 1997-1999 valuation case 
appealed to the Supreme Court, although they could have filed such an appeal. Instead, 
the parties petitioned for a review by "trial do novo" in the Tax Court, pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §59-1-601. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Alliant Techsystems, Inc. ("Alliant") believes the issues on appeal, and the 
appropriate "standards of review" are more properly framed as stated below, rather than 
as referenced in the Briefs of Appellants Lee Gardner and Granite School District, and 
the Brief of Appellee Utah State Tax Commission. 
ISSUE NO. 1 
Was the Tax Court correct in upholding and enforcing a Settlement Agreement3 
voluntarily consummated in good faith between the Salt Lake County Board of 
Equalization (the "Board") and Alliant, and which the Salt Lake County Commission, as 
the County's duly constituted legislative and executive body ratified, adopted and 
approved, to settle protracted litigation over property tax disputes for the years 1995 
through 1999 inclusive? 
Although the Tax Commission and Alliant are both designated as 
"Defendants/Appellees," perhaps implying some mutuality of interest, the Tax 
Commission was an aggressive adverse party to Alliant in the Tax Court, so much so that 
Tax Court Judge Lynn W. Davis warned the Tax Commission, "A contestation of the 
facts by the Tax Commission may cross the line into an advocacy role, may suggest 
partiality of the State Tax Commission, and would hopelessly weaken or destroy its 
jurisdictional arguments based upon an exhaustion of administrative remedies' theory." 
Tax Court Ruling dated September 7, 2001 at 6; R. 001954, 001949, Appendix G. 
3
 A copy of the Settlement Agreement, dated December 5, 2000, is attached as 
Appendix A. A copy of the Tax Court's Findings/Conclusions and Judgment, from 
which the Assessor and Granite filed this appeal, dated June 30, 2003, is attached as 
Appendix B. A copy of the Tax Court's Decision dated September 20, 2001 is attached 
as Appendix C. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
The standard of review for Issue No. 1 is whether there is "substantial evidence" 
to support the Tax Court's undisputed findings of fact that the Settlement Agreement was 
achieved in good faith, because the law vesting authority in the County Executive to 
settle "all lawsuits and other actions" was statutorily, and therefore conclusively, resolved 
in Alliant's favor on December 6, 2000 when the Salt Lake County Commission 
ratified/approved the Settlement Agreement. A brief explanation for this statement is 
necessary since Appellants have completely mischaracterized the underlying issues on 
appeal as legal, rather than factual. Appellants' mischaracterization is so egregious the 
Court may be perplexed as to whether the parties are discussing the same case. 
Appellants' mischaracterization results from either disregard or ignorance of the 
controlling Utah statute that vests the County Executive with authority to settle litigation. 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-53-315(l)(a)(2001), formerly Utah Code Ann. § 17-5-24, 
provides, "the county executive may control and direct the prosecution, defense, and 
settlement of all lawsuits and other actions." (Emphasis added.) This statute is 
unambiguous and was in effect when the Salt Lake County Commission adopted and 
approved the Settlement Agreement appellants challenge. Therefore, the only 
conceivable theoretical circumstances where this statute would not control are: (1) if the 
statute is unconstitutional; or (2) the County Executive (in this case the Salt Lake County 
Commission) acted outside the scope of delegated authority given the facts and 
circumstances of this case. 
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Under established case law, Appellants' view on either a constitutional challenge 
to Utah Code Ann. § 17-53-315 or the County Executive's potentially alleged ultra vires 
actions, whatever they may theoretically be, are now "off the table," because neither 
Appellant4 even cites this controlling statute, much less mounts a challenge to its 
constitutionality or enforceability. Appellants cannot do so in a reply brief. See, e.g., 
Romrell v. Zions First Nafl Bank, 611 P.2d 392 (Utah 1980) (as a general rule, an issue 
raised initially in a reply brief will not be considered on appeal). Neither does the Tax 
Commission's "Brief of Defendant/Appellee" cite Utah Code Ann. § 17-53-315. 
Oblivious to the existence of the very statute controlling the outcome of this case, the Tax 
Commission "asks this Court to establish a procedure for use by the Tax Commission and 
the district courts to determine whether a property tax settlement involving multiple years 
satisfies the constitutional standard of taxation 'at a uniform and equal rate in proportion 
to its fair market value.'" Tax Comm'n Brief at 8. Given its desire to have this Court 
establish procedure, the Tax Commission should at least have identified what it believes 
is deficient with the procedure the legislature established in Utah Code Ann. § 17-53-315 
to settle "all lawsuits and other actions." Inexplicably, the Tax Commission's brief does 
not raise this question. Neither does it argue whether Utah Code Ann. § 17-53-315 must 
4
 The Board, which "attempted to invalidate and reject its own detailed language" of the 
Settlement Agreement, [Findings of Fact f 21; R. 002874, Appendix B] is here 
designated as a "Defendant/Appellee," and chose not to file a brief. The Board is an 
awkward dilemma. On the one hand, the Board advocated rejection of its own Settlement 
Agreement once the County form of government changed from a Commission to a 
Council. On the other hand, if the Board succeeds in its apparent desire to invalidate the 
Settlement Agreement, it will have necessarily undermined its statutorily vested authority 
as the "County Executive" to settle "all lawsuits and other actions." 
be construed to exclude property tax litigation to its otherwise explicit coverage for "all 
lawsuits and other actions." Instead, the Tax Commission asks this Court to "establish a 
procedure" for settling property tax litigation, which is indisputably the legislature's 
prerogative. At a minimum, the Tax Commission and Appellants should have 
acknowledged Utah Code Ann. § 17-53-315 in their respective briefs, including all 
arguments, from their viewpoints, why this statute is impotent to settle "all lawsuits and 
other actions," including property tax litigation, when the very language of the statute 
confers such settlement authority as its express purpose. 
Appellants' failure even to cite the controlling statute undermines a rational 
discussion of the issues, and renders the fundamental underpinnings of their arguments 
simply beside the point, off-target and superfluous. As referenced above, Appellants may 
not attack the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 17-53-315 for the first time in a reply 
brief. It should further be noted that the Tax Commission, as a Defendant/Appellee, is 
not entitled to file a reply brief. 
Given the undisputed statutory authority of the County Executive to settle "all 
lawsuits and other actions," Appellants' primary legal issue (i.e., whether the County 
Executive is vested with plenary authority to settle litigation) and the primary policy 
issue (i.e., whether the County Executive ought to have such authority despite the Tax 
Commission's preference for having this Court, rather than the legislature, "establish 
[settlement] procedures") have been conclusively resolved in favor of the Settlement 
Agreement. Thus, the "ball game is over." Unless words are ignored or parsed, "all 
lawsuits and other actions" obviously means and must include this litigation. The only 
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remaining conceivable basis for challenging the Settlement Agreement in this case, 
therefore, turns on the facts—whether the Settlement Agreement is unenforceable or void 
because of, inter alia, fraud, undue influence, mistake, or other such factors that could be 
a basis for invalidating any contract. See generally 15A Am. Jur. 2d Compromise and 
Settlement §§ 39-46, at 754-759 (2000). 
Here, Tax Court Judge Lynn W. Davis' specific findings of fact are conclusive: 
'There is no evidence of repudiation, retraction or withdrawal by any of the parties to the 
Settlement Agreement^]' Findings of Fact f 22, R. 002874, Appendix B; "There is no 
evidence that the parties to the Settlement Agreement entered into the agreement based 
upon inadvertence, improvidence, excusable neglect, inequity, disadvantage, injustice, 
overreaching, or against sound public policy[,]" Findings of Fact f 23, R. 002874, 
Appendix B; "The Settlement Agreement was negotiated and entered into in good 
faith..." Findings of Fact \ 36, R. 00287, Appendix B; and, 'The intent of the parties to 
settle its property tax disputes arising from 1995 through 1999 inclusive is unequivocal." 
Findings of Fact, f 37, R. 002871, Appendix B. 
This Court reviews findings of fact under a "substantial evidence" standard, which 
means the trial court's factual findings will be upheld if they "are supported by 
substantial evidence based upon the record as a whole." See, e.g., Zissi v. State Tax 
Comm'n, 842 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah 1992). "Substantial evidence" is "that quantum and 
quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a 
conclusion." Salt Lake City S. R.R. Co v. Utah State Tax Comm'n., 987 P.2d 594, 597 
(Utah 1999). 
For an appellant to prevail under a "substantial evidence" standard, the appellant 
must "marshal the evidence," which means "one challenging the verdict must marshal the 
evidence in support of the verdict [or trial court findings] and then demonstrate that the 
evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." See, e.g., 
Neeley v. Bennett, 51 P.3d 724, 726 (Utah App. 2002); Morgan County v. Holnam, Inc. 
29 P.3d 629, n. 8 (Utah 2001) (dismissing Morgan County's argument that Holnam's 
purchases of machinery and equipment were not made in the ordinary course of business 
because the County failed to marshal the evidence to the contrary); Young v. Young, 
1999 UT 38,115, 979 P.2d 338 (The challenging party "must marshal the evidence in 
support of the [trial court's] findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the 
trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the 
evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous."); Moon v. Moon, 1999 UT App 12, f 24, 
973 P.2d 431 (the court of appeals does not review the trial court's factual findings where 
the party challenging those findings fails to marshal the evidence. Instead, the court of 
appeals must "assume that the record supports the findings of the trial court"). 
Though the Tax Commission is here designated as a "Defendant/Appellee," it 
nonetheless carries the same burden of marshaling the evidence against the presumptive 
application of Utah Code Ann. § 17-53-315(1) because it strenuously argued against the 
validity of the Settlement Agreement before the Tax Court. See, e.g., Tax Comm'n's 
Reply Memo in Opposition to the Motion to Approve Settlement, R. 001826. The Tax 
Commission was and indisputably is "one challenging the verdict." 
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Neither Appellants, nor the Tax Commission, attempt to meet their burden of 
marshaling the evidence. None of the opposing briefs discusses the evidence supporting 
the Tax Court's finding, for instance, that the Assessor was a party to the Settlement 
Agreement. Nor do the opposing parties demonstrate why the evidence the Tax Court 
relied upon is not substantial. Having failed to marshal the evidence supporting the Tax 
Court's findings, and having further failed to demonstrate why such evidence is 
insubstantial, Appellants' primary argument—that the Settlement Agreement is invalid 
and/or does not bind the Assessor — must likewise fail. 
ISSUE NO. 2 
Did the Tax Court have jurisdiction to enter its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Final Order and Judgment that the Settlement Agreement is legal, constitutional 
and enforceable against the parties in the litigation? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Subject matter jurisdiction presents issues of law, to which this Court applies a 
correction of error standard. See, e.g., State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995) 
("questions of law are reviewed for correctness, and the trial court's factual findings are 
reversed only if clearly erroneous.")- Although jurisdiction is a question of law, the 
facts and circumstances supporting the Tax Court's exercise of jurisdiction are issues of 
fact. This Court applies a substantial evidence standard in deference to the Tax Court's 
findings, unless there is no evidence to support them. See, e.g., Neeley v. Bennett, 51 
P.3d 724, 726 (Utah App. 2002). Neither the Assessor nor Granite has marshaled the 
evidence, which convinced the Tax Court to conclude it had jurisdiction, nor have 
/CA/MIO 1 8 
Appellants shown why the evidence the Tax Court considered, though overwhelming, is 
nonetheless from Appellants' perspective, insubstantial. Having failed to marshal the 
evidence supporting the Tax Court's findings, and then failed again to demonstrate why 
such evidence is insubstantial, the Assessor's and Granite's assertions that the Tax Court 
lacked jurisdiction must also fail. 
ISSUE NO. 3 
Was the Tax Court correct in finding Salt Lake County Assessor Lee Gardner was 
covered by the Settlement Agreement and bound to uphold its terms? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Determining the parties to and the fulfillment of the Settlement Agreement (a 
contract), including its breach, is a matter fact, not a matter of law, as the Assessor 
contends. See, e.g., Peterson v. Sunrider Corp. 48 P.2d 913, 924 (Utah 2002) ("if the 
contract is not an integration or is ambiguous [because it is disputed who and who is not 
bound] and the trial court proceeds to find facts respecting the intentions of the parties 
based on extrinsic evidence [as in this case], then our review is strictly limited.") 
(emphasis added). This Court reviews findings of fact under a "substantial evidence" 
standard, recognizing Appellants' obligation to "marshal the evidence," as explained 
above. 
The Assessor's brief makes no attempt whatsoever to meet these burdens. The 
Assessor's brief fails to marshal the evidence supporting the Tax Court's finding that the 
Assessor was a party to the Settlement Agreement, nor does the Assessor show why the 
evidence the Tax Court relied upon is not substantial. Having failed to marshal evidence 
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supporting the Tax Court's findings, and having failed again to demonstrate why such 
evidence is insubstantial, the Assessor's arguments, that the Settlement Agreement is 
invalid and/or the Assessor is not bound by the Settlement Agreement, must necessarily 
fail Here again, it is too late for the Assessor to attempt to marshal the evidence in a 
reply brief. See, e.g., Atlas Steel, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 61 P.3d 1053, 1062 
(Utah 2002)("[The] eleventh-hour attempt to marshal the evidence and challenge the 
sufficiency of the evidence in the reply brief is too late."). 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
On December 5, 2000, Plaintiff Alliant Techsystems Inc., and the Salt Lake 
County Board of Equalization entered into a written stipulation and settlement agreement 
(the "Settlement Agreement") to refund $5 million to Alliant in complete settlement and 
satisfaction of all pending and contested litigation over the property tax assessments and 
valuations of Alliant's taxable, tangible real and personal property in Salt Lake County 
for the years 1995 through 1999 inclusive. At a duly called and constituted public 
hearing on the matter convened December 6, 2000, the Salt Lake County Commission 
heard testimony from all parties favoring and disfavoring the Settlement Agreement, 
specifically including Appellants Lee Gardner and the Granite School District. The Salt 
Lake County Commission discussed and evaluated that testimony, and then unanimously 
ratified/approved the Settlement Agreement. On December 15, 2000, Salt Lake County 
and Alliant filed a Stipulation for Settlement and Joint Motion for Approval and Entry of 
an Order Approving Settlement ("Joint Motion") with the Honorable Lynn W. Davis, as a 
Tax Court Judge, and with the Utah State Tax Commission. 
*•r\ A *<\f\ r% i l l 
All parties, including AUiant, the County, the Assessor Lee Gardner, the Utah 
State Tax Commission, and Granite School District subsequently filed memoranda 
contending for their respective positions on the Joint Motion. On March 13, 2001, the 
Court heard oral argument on the Joint Motion. 
Based upon the arguments and memoranda of counsel for the respective parties, 
and the Court being fully advised of the premises, the Court entered a written "Tax Court 
Decision" dated September 20, 2001, [R. 001987, Appendix C] which held the 
Settlement Agreement was legal, enforceable and constitutional, but could not be 
implemented by the Court because, at the time, jurisdiction over the five years covered by 
the settlement was divided between the Tax Court (tax years 1995 and 1996) and the Tax 
Commission (tax years 1997, 1998 and 1999). Lacking jurisdiction over some of the 
years being settled, the Court declared it "has no option but to reluctantly disapprove the 
Settlement Agreement." Tax Court Decision dated September 20, 2001, R. 001963, 
Appendix C. 
Following the Tax Court's decision, the Tax Commission heard and rendered its 
decision on the valuation of AUiant's properties in Salt Lake County for tax years 1997, 
1998 and 1999. Both AUiant and the Board sought review of the Tax Commission's 
ruling in a "trial de novo" before the Tax Court, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-601. 
Once jurisdiction over all property tax litigation for each of the years 1995 through 1999 
(years included in the Settlement Agreement) was vested in the Tax Court, AUiant 
requested that the Tax Court reconsider its prior "reluctant" disapproval of the Settlement 
Agreement. Following another round of extensive memoranda from all parties, and re-
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argument, the Tax Court entered its "Ruling Respecting the Legal Effect of Bluth v. Utah 
State Tax Commission on this Court's Decisions" on May 20, 2003, reaffirming several 
prior rulings that it had jurisdiction [R. 0028954, Appendix E].5 Thereafter, the Tax 
Court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Order and Judgment on 
June 20, 2003 (the "Judgment") [R. 002881-002865, Appendix B] finding the Settlement 
Agreement was "legal, enforceable and constitutional" against all parties. It is from the 
Tax Court's Judgment that Defendants-Intervenors Assessor Lee Gardner and Granite 
School District took the present appeal. 
Tax Court's Findings of Fact 
The Tax Court's Findings of Fact as specified in the Judgment are critical to the 
proper disposition of this appeal and so are reproduced in their entirety for the Court's 
easy reference.6 
1. On March 7, 2001, the Tax Commission denied Alliant and the County's 
Joint Motion for Approval of Settlement. 
5
 As referenced in the Tax Court's Findings/Conclusions, the Settlement Agreement 
includes two groups of valuation cases, one for 1995-1996, and another for 1997-1999, 
and an independent action Alliant filed against the County challenging imposition of a 
privilege tax against Alliant for its use of federal property. In its May 20, 2003 Ruling, 
the Tax Court held that this Court's ruling in Bluth v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2002 UT 
91, and Nebeker v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2001 UT 74, which require exhaustion of 
administrative remedies, did not apply to the "independent action." The Tax Court held it 
would be "completely senseless, indeed impossible" to require exhaustion of the federal 
1983-constitutional issue in NIROP when the Tax Commission has no jurisdiction to 
decide it." R. 002848, Appendix E. The Tax Court's decision on various dispositive 
motions in the independent action for the years 2000 and thereafter, which the parties 
reargued on April 20, 2004, is expected anytime. 
6
 The Tax Court's citations to the Tax Court Decision dated September 20, 2001, R. 
001987, Appendix C, are deleted for ease of reading. 
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2. The Tax Commission held a Formal Hearing on April 23, 2001 through 
April 27, 2001, to determine the fair market value for the property in question for the 
years 1997 through 1999. The Tax Commission determined that the fair market value for 
Alliant's property was $215,210,000, $212,559,000 and $232,650,000 for the years 1997 
through 1999 respectively. 
3. On September 21, 2001, Alliant filed a Petition for Judicial Review in the 
Third District Court, seeking "review by trial de novo" under Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-601 
of the Tax Commission's Final Decision in Alliant Techsystems v. Board of Equalization 
of Salt Lake County, et al, Appeal Nos. 98-0452, 9&-0608 and 99-019. These 
consolidated cases protest the County's assessments of Alliant's real property for the 
years 1997, 1998 and 1999 (the "1997-1999 Valuation Case"). Under regular 
administrative procedures, the 1997-1999 Valuation Case was designated Case No. 
010908307 and assigned to the Honorable Ronald E. Nehring, sitting as a Tax Court 
Judge. 
4. Judge Ronald E. Nehring disqualified himself from the case by Minute 
Entry dated October 9, 2001. 
5. The 1997-1999 Valuation Case was thereupon assigned to Judge Pat B. 
Brian, sitting as a Tax Court Judge. 
6. Filed simultaneously with its Petition for [R]eview in the 1997-1999 
Valuation Case was Alliant's Motion to Transfer the case to the Honorable Judge Lynn 
W. Davis, a designated "Tax Court Judge" in the Tax Division of the Utah District 
Courts. 
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7. Alliant filed a Motion to Transfer the 1997-1999 Valuation Case to this [the 
District] Court. No less than six other related cases involving the same parties, properties 
and taxes are pending before the Court. The first of the six pending Alliant v. Salt Lake 
County cases was filed February 6, 1998, and was initially assigned to Judge Dennis 
Frederick (980901298). This first case was termed the "Independent or NIROP Action," 
and involves Alliant's statutory and constitutional challenge to the County's assessment 
of federal property that Alliant operates under the direction and control of the United 
States Navy (the Naval Industrial Reserve Ordnance Plant or "NIROP"). The Complaint 
in the Independent or NIROP Action seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against 
defendant Salt Lake County for the years 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 and future years. 
The Complaint also requests relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the County for having 
taxed Alliant in violation of Article VI of the United States Constitution. 
8. There being no opposition, Judge Frederick assigned the Independent or 
NIROP Action to a "Tax Court Judge," who, by random rotation, was the Honorable 
Lynn W. Davis. 
9. The other five pending Alliant v. Salt Lake County, et al, cases are appeals 
that either Salt Lake County or Alliant filed from a Final Decision the Utah State Tax 
Commission ("Tax Commission") issued November 16, 1999 on the consolidated appeals 
of the County's 1995 and 1996 tax assessments of Alliant's real property (the "1995-
1996 Valuation Case"). The Clerk of the Third Judicial District initially assigned the 
various appeals of the 1995-1996 Valuation Case respectively to Judges Nehring 
(990912695), Hanson (00090065 AA), Lewis (00901301), Medley (000901449 AA), and 
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Memmott (00070001). Again with agreement from all parties, the 1995-1996 Valuation 
Case was consolidated and reassigned to the Honorable Lynn W. Davis because he was 
the assigned "Tax Court Judge" for the Independent or NIROP Action. 
10. By Order dated November 6, 2001, Judge Pat B. Brian transferred the 
19974999 Valuation Case to this [the District] Court. 
11. On December 5, 2000, the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization and 
Alliant entered into a Settlement Agreement, whereby all property tax disputes between 
the parties for the years 1995 through 1999 inclusive were compromised and settled. On 
December 6, 2000, the Salt Lake County Commission, as the County's duly elected 
legislative body, adopted and approved the Settlement Agreement. 
12. On September 27, 2001, Alliant filed a Notice of Withdrawal and 
Voluntary Dismissal of the 1995-1999 personal property tax appeals with the Tax 
Commission, dismissing all its pending appeals with the Utah State Tax Commission 
with respect to personal property tax assessments from 1995 through 1999 inclusive. 
13. As a result of the foregoing actions and events, now pending before this 
[the District] Court are all cases and controversies that exist between Alliant and Salt 
Lake County relating to property tax matters for the years 1995 through 1999 inclusive; 
to-wit, the Independent or NIROP action, the 1995-1996 Valuation Case, and the 1997-
1999 Valuation Case. The personal property tax matters have been dismissed. 
14. Parties to the Settlement Agreement entered into the agreement while some 
matters covered by the Settlement Agreement, specifically property tax disputes 
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involving Alliant and some of the Defendants, were pending before this Tax Court and 
the Tax Commission. 
15. The Settlement Agreement is conditioned upon the approval of the Tax 
Commission and this Court. 
16. Prior to the formalization and approval of the Settlement Agreement, a draft 
or proposal was circulated that clearly indicated Salt Lake County, "Assessors," etc., as 
parties to the action. While the Settlement Agreement deletes the word "Assessors," as 
approved and executed, it states that Salt Lake County, and its "officers" are parties to the 
Settlement Agreement. 
17. The executed Settlement Agreement bears the signature of Karl 
Hendrickson, Deputy District Attorney for and on behalf of Salt Lake County, its officers 
and attorneys, and the signature of Maxwell Miller for and on behalf of Alliant. The 
Settlement Agreement was an offer of settlement presented by the attorneys/agents of the 
parties to the Settlement Agreement. 
18. Defendant Lee Gardner, as the duly elected Salt Lake County Assessor, is 
an officer of Salt Lake County and a nominal party to the Settlement Agreement. 
19. The actions of the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization in extending and 
agreeing to the Settlement Agreement were ratified/approved by the Salt Lake County 
Commission. 
20. In reaching settlement, consideration was given to the risk of liability to 
Salt Lake County and taxing entities within Salt Lake County, together with the costs and 
trouble of protracted litigation, a review of depositions and appraisals, and at least some 
discussion relative to the merits of the respective claims. 
21. The Settlement Agreement was drafted by Salt Lake County, which later 
attempted to invalidate and reject its own detailed language based upon statutory, 
constitutional and pragmatic arguments. 
22. There is no evidence of repudiation, retraction or withdrawal by any of the 
parties to the Settlement Agreement. 
23. There is no evidence that the parties to the Settlement Agreement entered 
into the agreement based upon inadvertence, improvidence, excusable neglect, inequity, 
disadvantage, injustice, overreaching,, or against sound public policy. 
24. This Settlement Agreement was proposed initially by the Salt Lake County 
Board of Equalization and then was adopted/ratified by the Salt Lake County 
Commission. 
25. The Settlement Agreement addresses but does not set or fix valuations 
based upon fair market value. 
26. The Settlement Agreement does not address the divisibility/severabihty of 
the $5 million settlement amount to separate years. The Settlement Agreement spans 
multiple tax years and multiple jurisdictions. 
27. The Settlement Agreement binds "Salt Lake County, its officers and 
attorneys," who, "in good faith and acting in concert with Alliant" shall "seek to secure 
an appropriate order from the Third District Court and the Utah State Tax Commission 
approving the settlement agreement and the stipulation in an expeditious manner." 
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28. The Settlement Agreement further provides that "In the event any party 
breaches the foregoing conditions of settlement, the non-breaching party is entitled to 
attorney's fees or costs incurred in enforcing the settlement agreement." 
29. The Salt Lake County Board of Equalization did not affirmatively seek to 
secure approval of the Settlement Agreement, nor did it object to approval of the 
Settlement Agreement; instead it acted in "benign neutrality" with re&pect to the approval 
process. 
30. Defendant Lee Gardner, in his role of Salt Lake County Assessor, 
advocated the defeat of the Settlement Agreement and invited the Court to void the 
agreement on a variety of statutory, factual and constitutional grounds, which the Court 
rejected. 
31. Defendant Lee Gardner, in his capacity as Salt Lake County Assessor, is a 
party to the Settlement Agreement because he is, at least nominally, an "officer" of Salt 
Lake County. 
32. Defendant Lee Gardner, in his capacity as Salt Lake County Assessor, 
breached the Settlement Agreement by seeking to defeat the Settlement Agreement rather 
than seeking to secure its approval. 
33. Other Defendants who are not parties to the Settlement Agreement are not 
bound by the attorneys' fee provision of the Settlement Agreement. 
34. While the Settlement Agreement is a blanket settlement for all property tax 
disputes between the parties for 1995 through 1999 either pending before this Court or 
before the Tax Commission, the Settlement Agreement did not address future valuations. 
18 
35. The Independent or NIROP Action involves Alliant's challenge to the 
County's assessment of federal property that Alliant operates under the direction of the 
United States Navy (the Naval Industrial Reserve Ordnance Plant or NIROP). The 
Complaint in the independent or NIROP actions seeks declaratory and injunctive relief 
against defendant Salt Lake County for the years 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 and 
further years. In addition, the Complaint also requests relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
against the County for having taxed Alliant in violation of Article VI of the United States 
Constitution. The Settlement Agreement expressly covers tax years 1995-1999, clearly 
including the NIROP action. But the Settlement Agreement does not cover future years 
(beyond the scope of the Settlement Agreement) where Alliant claims continued unlawful 
assessment of NIROP. Therefore, portions of the NIROP claims are expressly covered 
by the Settlement Agreement and portions, future claims, were expressly excepted, never 
addressed in the Settlement Agreement. The Settlement Agreement does not bar post-
settlement NIROP claims. The NIROP claims are separate from the other related 
valuation cases. 
36. The Settlement Agreement was negotiated and entered into in good faith 
and anticipated a refund of $5 million to Alliant. 
37. The intent of the parties to settle its property tax disputes arising from 1995 
through 1999 inclusive is unequivocal. 
38. The Tax Commission's rejection of the Settlement Agreement did not focus 
on constitutional difficulties and problematic implementation of the Settlement 
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Agreement, but primarily upon the Settlement Agreement's failure to include a potential 
intervenor. 
39. The Tax Commission's factual basis for rejecting the Settlement 
Agreement does not exist here because an intervenor does not become a party to an 
action until the motion to intervene has been filed, briefed, noticed, argued and ruled 
upon. Defendant Granite School District filed its Motion to Intervene on December 7, 
2000, whereas the Salt Lake County Commission ratified the Settlement Agreement on 
December 6, 2000. 
40. Alliant's request for attorneys' fees is reasonable and appropriate in the 
amount of $30,000. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
On December 5, 2000, the Board and Alliant entered into a Settlement Agreement 
whereby Salt Lake County agreed to refund $5 million to Alliant in settlement of all 
pending property tax litigation and disputes involving real and personal property for tax 
years 1995 through 1999 inclusive. Significantly, on December 6, 2000 in a public 
hearing, the Salt Lake County Commission, as the governing executive and legislative 
body of Salt Lake County, considered, ratified, adopted and approved the Settlement 
Agreement for the stated purpose of settling the protracted property tax litigation and 
disputes between the parties for the years 1995 through 1999 inclusive. The Tax Court, 
after considering the basis for and the facts and circumstances surrounding the Settlement 
Agreement, ruled that the Settlement Agreement was "legal, enforceable and 
constitutional" because the governing executive and legislative body of a county can 
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always negotiate and settle litigation that it deems to be in the county's best interests. 
The Tax Court's holding is consistent with and supported by Utah Code Ann. § 17-53-
315, which vests authority with the County Executive to settle "all lawsuits and other 
actions," certainly including property tax Utigation. The Tax Court's holding is further 
supported by Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-601, which vests the Tax Court with appeal 
authority to consider and reverse the Tax Commission's disapproval of the Settlement 
Agreement in an "original," and "independent" action, brought as a "trial de novo."7 
Though neither Appellants nor the Tax Commission cite to these statutes, both are 
important in promoting and upholding the settlement of disputes that county officials 
achieve in good faith. Public policy favors the good faith and equitable settlement of 
disputes between contesting parties in the absence of fraud, overreaching or impropriety. 
This is particularly true in property tax litigation where settlements are common, if not 
routine, as members of the Salt Lake County Commission recognized in uncontested 
statements Commission members made on the record when approving the Settlement 
Agreement on December 6, 2000. R. 001687, 001685. In view of all the facts, 
considerations, competing interests and risks to the parties, including the risks, costs and 
expenses associated with continuing protracted litigation, Alliant and Salt Lake County 
determined the settlement amount of $5 million, in good faith, to be fair and reasonable 
under the circumstances. On this basis, the Tax Court examined, approved and upheld 
the Settlement Agreement, noting that "As a general rule, a court ought not to substitute 
7
 For the Court's convenience, a copy of Utah Code Ann. §§ 17-53-315 and 59-1-601 are 
reproduced in Appendix D, complete with annotations and legislative history. 
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its judgment for that of duly elected officials." Tax Court Decision dated September 20, 
2001, R. 001972. On the same basis, this Court should uphold the Tax Court below and 
sustain the Settlement Agreement. 
ARGUMENT 
L AS FOUND BY THE TAX COURT, THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IS 
LEGAL, ENFORCEABLE AND CONSTITUTIONAL TO RESOLVE AND 
SETTLE PROTRACTED LITIGATION INVOLVING ALL PROPERTY 
TAX DISPUTES BETWEEN SALT LAKE COUNTY AND ALLIANT FOR 
THE YEARS 1995 THROUGH 1999 INCLUSIVE. 
Both the Assessor and Granite argue against approval of the Settlement 
Agreement because each claims (1) the Settlement Agreement does not necessarily 
mandate that Alliant's property is being valued and taxed at its fair market value under 
Utah Code Ann. §§59-2-301 and 59-2-102 for each of the years in dispute; and 
(2) parties affected have the right to intervene in appeals taken from the Board of 
Equalization. Assessor's Brief at 18-19; Granite's Brief at 15. Although these 
statements may be correct, neither has any bearing upon the Salt Lake County 
Commission's authority to settle litigated disputes in the County's best interests. 
Statutorily, the Assessor has a duty to assess property at fair market value, as 
numerous cites in his brief identify. However, that duty is not unique to the Assessor. 
The Board likewise has a duty to ensure that property is assessed at fair market value 
under the Utah Constitution and statutory law. Utah Const, art. XIII, § 2(1); Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-2-103(1). Significantly, and in opposition to the logical extension of the 
Assessor's arguments, there is no statutory or constitutional authority that the Assessor's 
view on what constitutes fair market value should prevail over the Board's determination. 
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In fact, just the opposite is true because the Board has supervisory authority over the 
Assessor with express power to affirm, reverse or modify the Assessor's original 
assessments. Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-2-1002, 59-2-1003. 
Moreover, achieving "fair market value" is constitutionally subordinate to the 
Board's duty to equalize assessments so that all taxpayers, including Alliant, are treated 
equitably and fairly. See, e.g., Harmer v. State Tax Comm'n, 452 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 
1969) ("While absolute equality and uniformity in the assessment of property is not 
practicable, a requirement of reasonable uniformity and equality is essential."); Rio 
Algom Corp. v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184, 194 (Utah 1984) ("Where it is 
impossible to achieve perfectly both the standard of true value and the standard of 
uniformity and equality, the latter standard should prevail."). 
As a result, neither the Assessor nor Granite has veto power over the Board's 
decision to settle disputed litigation, which is consonant with its power to equalize values 
so that taxpayers are fairly and equitably assessed. Neither can such authority be derived 
from the Assessor's right to appeal the Board's adjudication of fair market value, nor the 
Assessor's and/or Granite's right to intervene in this proceeding. If the Assessor and/or 
Granite's assertions are correct, settlement and mediation of property tax cases is illegal 
and unconstitutional—a radical and absurd result given the long history of property tax 
dispute mediation and settlement in this state and elsewhere. 
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A. The Board's authority to settle tax disputes is founded upon the Utah 
Constitution, Utah statutes, and public policy favoring settlements. 
Pursuant to Utah Const, art. XIII, § 7(2), Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1000 et seq. and 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-53-315, the Board and the County Commission have plenary 
authority to settle cases. Article XIII authorizes the Board to "adjust and equalize the 
valuation and assessment of real and personal property within their respective counties." 
Sections 59-2-1000 et seq. vests the Board with authority to perform administrative and 
ministerial acts necessary to adjust and equalize assessments. Section 17-53-315 vests 
the County Executive (in this case the Salt Lake County Commission) with express 
authority to settle litigation and other actions. Under Utah case law and general 
principles of administrative law, the Board's adjustment and equalization authority and 
the County Commission's plenary authority to settle litigation also includes the 
prerogative to evaluate litigation risks and likely costs, and to choose or compromise 
between conflicting appraisals, as the Board and the County Commission did in this case. 
There are supporting Utah cases directly on point. In Logan City v. Allen, 44 P.2d 
1085 (Utah 1935), the Utah Supreme Court upheld what was then designated as the 
Board of County Commissioners' decision to lower and settle a property tax dispute over 
the objections of another government entity. In Logan City, plaintiff Logan City sought 
personal judgment against the county board and the Tax Commission for having 
compromised and reduced the assessed property tax liability on the William Budge 
Memorial Hospital in Cache County. Under the laws then extant, this Court found that 
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the county board and the Tax Commission had authority, as a matter of discretion, to 
compromise the amount of tax, interest, penalty and costs assessed against the hospital 
property. Said the Court: "This being a matter within their discretion, it follows the 
individual defendants cannot be held personally liable for a mistake in exercising such 
judgment, if it be a mistake, in the absence of fraud, bad faith, or collusion." Id. at 1089. 
Responding to Logan City's allegations of bad faith in the settlement, the Court 
pointed out the Tax Commission had concluded the charitable status of the hospital 
"involved a controversial question which could be definitely settled only by the courts. 
To avoid expense and delay incident to further litigation, the commission approved the 
acceptance of the offer of the hospital to pay [reduced taxes]/' The Court continued 
"[w]hether or not the tax commissioners were correct in their analysis of this court's 
[prior] decision [relating to the hospital's charitable character] or in reaching the 
conclusion they did is of no moment here. It is apparent to us the board of 
commissioners and the State Tax Commission acted in the utmost good faith, and in the 
belief the settlement effected was for the best interest of the state, county, and the city." 
Id. at 1089. Notably, the Court cited no constitutional restraint against the county board 
effecting a compromise and settlement of the tax liability, regardless of the property's 
assessed value. 
The statutes at issue in Logan City and the nature of the action are different than 
those involved here. The important point is that the Utah Constitution is virtually 
8
 In Snyder v. Merkley, 693 P.2d 64, 1984 Utah Lexis 951 (Utah 1984), this Court cites 
Logan City v. Allen for the proposition that "A discretionary duty is one that requires the 
exercise of judgment or requires choice of alternatives in its performance." Id. at 65. 
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identical in all material aspects. The proposition for which Alliant cites Logan City, that 
there is no constitutional impediment against the compromise and settlement of property 
tax cases, is therefore applicable and unassailable under any reasonable analysis. 
The holding in Logan City is consonant with the Utah Supreme Court's more 
recent decisions affirming settlement agreements on public policy grounds, both in 
administrative and judicial cases. For example, in Millard County v. Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 823 P.2d 459 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court recognized that "[a]s a 
general proposition, §§59-12-204(5) and 59-12-118 authorize the Commission to 
determine the amount of a taxpayer's sales tax liability and, in appropriate cases, to 
compromise and settle disputes with taxpayers." (Emphasis added.) The same general 
policy applies to other administrative bodies. See also Utah Department of 
Administrative Services v. Public Service Comm'n, 856 P.2d 601, 613-14 (Utah 1983) 
(stating that the agency is "not an automaton" and has the authority, under general 
principles, to settle controversies if it determines settlement is in the public interest). 
The Supreme Court's preference for compromise and settlement of controversies 
reflects the general principle that "[p]ublic policy favors the resolution of controversies 
and uncertainties through compromise and settlement rather than through litigation, and it 
is the policy of the law to uphold and enforce such contracts if they are fairly made and 
not in contravention of some law or public policy." 15A Am. Jur. 2d Compromise and 
Settlement § 5 (2000). 
The Assessor claims Logan City is inapplicable because the Utah statutes there 
involved were dissimilar (a point conceded), while he simultaneously ignores the more 
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important principle for which Logan City is cited - that the Utah Constitution does not 
preclude property tax settlements. The Assessor missed the point. Again shooting wide 
of the mark, the Assessor argues "the general rule" that governmental bodies, such as a 
Board of Equalization, cannot lawfully contract to control or limit the performance of 
governmental functions by successor government bodies. Cited in support of this 
proposition are Bair v. Layton City Corp., 307 P.2d &95, 902 (1957), and 10A McQuillin, 
Municipal Corporations, § 29,101 at 44 (3d Rev. Ed. 1993). Assessor's Brief at 34-35. 
The issue in Layton City Corp. was whether a contract between Layton City, 
North Davis County Sewer District and various individuals to construct and operate 
adequate facilities for the disposal and treatment of sewage collected in the district was 
lawful under various provisions of the Utah Constitution. The contract was to take effect 
from the date of its execution and to continue in force for fifty years. This Court held 
that a contract involving the government's exercise of its proprietary functions (including 
the provision of water, electricity and sewer systems) is binding on successors, but a 
contract cannot lawfully bind a government in the exercise of "governmental or 
legislative power." 
Layton City Corp. and the other authorities the Assessor cites, including City of 
Louisville v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, 623 S.W.2d 219 (Ky. 1981), stand for the 
undisputed proposition that contracts cannot bind governments in the performance of 
their future governmental functions, such as contracts that would preclude passage of 
certain laws or issuance of assessments. Accordingly, the Settlement Agreement in this 
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case could not lawfully bind the Assessor in prospective years to any particular 
methodology in the performance of his duties. 
However, breaching contracts made in settlement of litigation for past acts is not a 
governmental function. Nor does the settlement of past controversies bind any successor 
government to future actions. Hence, none of the authorities the Assessor cited is 
relevant or even speaks to the issue at hand, which is: May a government entity 
unilaterally repudiate a contract properly entered into by duly constituted authorities in 
settlement of litigation? 
The Settlement Agreement explicitly disavows any intent to bind the Board or any 
County officer in the performance of any future government function. It has no impact 
on the future performance of any government duties, but instead, resolves litigation over 
assessments that have already been issued and upon which Alliant has already paid its 
taxes. 
Before the Tax Commission and the Tax Court, Alliant's counsel repeatedly 
challenged opposing counsel to find a single case in American Jurisprudence that holds a 
government entity may repudiate its own good faith agreement in settlement of litigation 
for past, as distinguished from future, acts. No one has been forthcoming with any such 
case despite the passage of years, and the challenge still stands. 
Consistent with the foregoing case law, county boards of equalization routinely 
settle property tax disputes (presumably totaling hundreds annually) without challenge to 
their authority and ability to do so. The minutes of the Salt Lake County Commission 
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meeting held December 6, 2000 to consider the Settlement Agreement in this case 
confirm this history and its acknowledged legality: 
Commissioner Overson asked Mr. Robson [Granite's 
counsel] if he had heard of the settlement cases involving 
Hercules [1994 assessment], U.S. West and Kennecott. There 
have been large tax settlements of a similar nature over the 
past eight years that he [Overson] has been involved with that 
the school districts have not raised a question about. These 
settlements impacted school districts, but there was no loss in 
teacher, books and supplies. It [sic] some cases, not all of the 
issues were clarified. Many issues were left on the table and 
not settled. 
Minutes, County Commission Meeting (December 6, 2000); R. 001687. 
B. The Salt Lake County Commission, as the county legislative and 
executive body, has plenary authority to settle litigation in the best 
interests of the County. 
Both the Assessor and Granite argue the Settlement Agreement cannot be 
sustained because there is no express statutory authority allowing the Board to settle such 
disputes. Assessor's Brief at 31-32; Granite's Brief at 19-20. These arguments cannot be 
taken seriously in light of express authority conferred in Utah Code Ann. § 17-53-
315(l)(a). Appellants' arguments ignore explicit statutes vesting the County Board with 
plenary authority to equalize and adjust assessments, and the County Executive with 
plenary authority to settle litigation, as cited above. In this case, the Salt Lake County 
Commission on December 6, 2000 ratified/approved of the Settlement Agreement prior 
to its implementation by the parties. Findings of Fact f 19, 24; R. 002874, Appendix B. 
The Salt Lake County Commission, as the County's then legally constituted governing 
legislative and executive body, chose to settle Alliant's litigation against the County 
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because it believed settlement was in the County's best interests. In approving the 
Settlement Agreement, the Salt Lake County Commission considered the risk of liability 
to the County and its taxing entities based upon a review of depositions and appraisals, 
and some discussion of the relative merits of the respective parties' claims. Findings of 
Fact 120; R. 002874, Appendix B. The County Commission's settlement 
ratification/approval came after an open public meeting, at which all interested parties 
expressed their positions and concerns, specifically including both the Assessor and 
Granite. R. 001684. In light of this public record, portions of which are quoted below, 
the Assessor's insistence that he was excluded from deliberations (Assessor's Brief at 43) 
is incredulous. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 17-53-3159 expressly empowers the County Executive to 
control, prosecute, defend and settle all lawsuits and other actions to which the county is 
a party or as to which the county may be required to pay a judgment. Prior to institution 
of the Mayor-Council form of government by Salt Lake County on January 1, 2001, the 
Salt Lake County Commission that considered and approved the Settlement Agreement 
served as both the legislative and executive branch of government statutorily empowered 
with plenary authority to settle lawsuits. The Settlement Agreement is necessarily, 
therefore, a County agreement, as well as a Board of Equalization agreement. The 
County Commission then had the rights and plenary powers of a County legislative and 
9
 Effective as of April 30, 2001, Utah Code Ann.§ 17-53-315 reads, in pertinent part: "A 
county executive may control the prosecution, defense, and settlement of all lawsuits and 
other actions: (i) to which the county is a party; (ii) as to which the county may be 
required to pay the judgment or the costs of prosecution or defense; or (iii) as further 
provided by county ordinance." 
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executive body, whose legislatively vested authority expressly included the power to bind 
the County, its officers and attorneys. As the Tax Court noted in the Tax Court Decision 
dated September 20, 2001, "The actions of the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization 
were ratified/approved by the Salt Lake County Commission; (This fact alone may cast 
this case in a different posture than some case law cited as controlling.)" R. 001973, 
Appendix C. 
In adopting the Settlement Agreement, the Salt Lake County Commission was 
obviously concerned with Alliant's property values, fairness to County taxpayers and the 
risks of continuing litigation. The minutes of the December 6, 2000 public meeting 
reflect these realities, confirm the grounds for ratifying/approving the Settlement 
Agreement, and demonstrate why the Commission believed the settlement was in the 
County's best interests: 
Commissioner Overson stated that the Commission is looking 
at both ends of the spectrum. The County will either win or 
lose. There is a big difference between the two relative to the 
amount that will have to be paid by either party. This weighs 
heavily on the minds of the Commissioners ... He [Overson], 
himself, is a state certified general appraiser. He does not 
currently appraise property because it would be a conflict of 
interest with his role as a Commissioner. However, as he 
reviewed the expert witness calculations, who came up with 
zero obsolence [sic] in one year and very, very little 
economical obsolence [sic] in a number of other years. This 
really bothered him. It concerned him that there was no 
economical [sic] obsolescence considering the the [sic} size, 
nature and complexity of a facility like Alliant Techsystems. 
Although he didn't particularly agree with Alliant 
Techsystems position as to the amount of obsolescence they 
acclaim [sic], he wholly rejected the idea that there is zero 
economic obsolescence in the Alliant Techsystem's 
facility....This is the reason he reviewed Mr. Cook's 
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appraisal. As a member of the Board of Equalization, he 
knows that there is something somewhere in the middle with 
regard to economic obsolescence.... This is the reason for 
settling the matter somewhere in the middle.... He believed 
that the taxpayers should be justly treated[;]their valuations 
should reflect the actual value of their properties. He cannot, 
with a clear conscience, accept that Alliant Techsystem's 
value on the particular property went from $110 million in 
1994 to $200 million plus in 1999-2000. 
Minutes of County Commission Meeting (December 6, 2000), R. 001685. 
Commissioner Shurtleff stated ... he tried to step back and 
look at the case as a judge or jury would. He believed there 
was a substantial likelihood that the County would not prevail 
in this case. If so, there will be an $11 million hit on the 
taxpayers, and a substantially larger hit on Granite School 
District. He felt there [sic] would be inappropriately 
unreasonable and risky to continue litigating this matter.... 
By settling this case, the Commission will be resolving a five-
year dispute and avoid having to pay an $11 million 
settlement later. 
Id. R. 001684. 
Neither of the Appellants (Salt Lake County Assessor, Granite School District) nor 
the Tax Commission challenge the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 17-53-315, nor 
do they cite the statute, nor do they analyze or discuss it in any way. In fact, neither 
Appellants nor the Tax Commission evince any awareness of this controlling statute's 
existence, which necessarily renders many of their respective arguments invalid and 
superfluous as total non sequiturs. We are not told why Appellants and the Tax 
Commission are oblivious to this controlling statute, but whatever the reason, it is too late 
in a reply brief for appellants to attack the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 17-53-
315 for the first time. See, e.g., Romrell v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 611 P.2d 392 (Utah 
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1980) (as a general rule, an issue raised initially in a reply brief will not be considered on 
appeal). 
Given the undisputed statutory authority of the County Executive to settle "all 
lawsuits and other actions/' the primary legal issue in this case (i.e., whether the County 
Executive is vested with plenary authority to settle litigation) and the primary public 
policy issue in this case (i.e., whether the County Executive ought to have such authority 
despite objections of other entities within the County) have been conclusively resolved in 
favor of the Settlement Agreement. "All lawsuits and other actions" undeniably means 
and includes this litigation. The only remaining conceivable basis for challenging the 
Settlement Agreement in this case, therefore, turns on the facts - whether the Settlement 
Agreement is void because of, inter alia, fraud, undue influence, mistake, or other such 
factors that could be a basis for invalidating any contract. See generally 15A Am.Jur.2d 
Compromise and Settlement §§ 39-46, at 754-759 (2000). 
The Tax Court's specific findings of fact foreclose any such assertions. Express 
factual findings include: "There is no evidence of repudiation, retraction or withdrawal 
by any of the parties to the Settlement Agreement!,]" Findings of Fact f 22, R. 002874, 
Appendix B; "There is no evidence that the parties to the Settlement Agreement entered 
into the agreement based upon inadvertence, improvidence, excusable neglect, inequity, 
disadvantage, injustice, overreaching, or against sound public policy[,]" (Findings of 
Fact, 123, R. 002874, Appendix B); "The Settlement Agreement was negotiated and 
entered into in good faith and anticipated a refund of $5 million to Alliant[,]" (Findings 
of Fact f 36, R. 002871, Appendix B; and, "The intent of the parties to settle its property 
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tax disputes arising from 1995 through 1999 inclusive is unequivocal." (Findings of 
Fact, f 37, R. 002871, Appendix B.) 
C. The Settlement Agreement was Legal, Reasonable and Supportable 
Based Upon the Evidence* 
Appellants argue the settlement is unlawful because "it was not to be based upon 
fair market value, or 'equalized' assessments for any of the five assessment years, as 
required by Utah's constitutional and statutory scheme for ad valorem taxation." 
Assessor's Brief at 22; Granite's Brief at 19. Fleshing out the concept, the Assessor 
argues "There has been no showing [in an administrative hearing] that ATK's property 
taxes were illegally or erroneously assessed," Assessor's Brief at 32, which hearing the 
Assessor claims, is a necessary precursor to the Board's issuance of refunds under Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-2-1321. The Assessor further argues the Board may only increase or 
decrease any assessment contained in any assessment book, so as to equalize the 
assessment of all classes, and, since the settlement is for a dollar refund, rather than a 
reduced assessment, it is illegal. Assessor's Brief at 27. 
These arguments are frivolous. Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1321 provides that the 
county legislative body may refund taxes "upon sufficient evidence being produced that 
the property has been illegally or erroneously assessed." "Sufficient evidence" does not 
require an administrative hearing, as the Assessor repeatedly argues. By its express 
terms, Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1321 does not preclude the Board from compromising or 
settling litigation, as discussed above. Consequently, the Board's authority to refund 
taxes under Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1321, or lower assessments in settlement of litigation 
(which in turn results in a refund as contemplated in the Settlement Agreement), are 
independent powers. They derive from different sections of the Utah Code. Yet 
assuming Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1321 is the exclusive mechanism for property tax 
refunds, the Assessor's argument that "no evidence has been produced" of 
overassessment of Alliant's real and personal property at Bacchus Works is a 
demonstrable fiction. 
1. Prior adjudicated decisions support the Settlement Agreement 
For 1995, the Assessor originally determined the value of Alliant's real property in 
Salt Lake County at $168,801,600. Alliant sought a value reduction to $82,865,542 
before the Board. The Board lowered the assessment to $152,725,721. Alliant appealed 
the Board's decision to the Tax Commission where the Assessor sought an increase to 
approximately $205,000,000. Alliant sought a valuation of approximately $113,000,000. 
Following a full evidentiary hearing, the Tax Commission rejected the Assessor's 
proposed increase and sustained the lower value of $152,725,721. Alliant Techsystems, 
Inc. v. Salt Lake County Bd. of Equalization, Tax Commission Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Final Decision, Appeal No. 97-0031 ("Final Decision"), R. 
000701-000673. 
For 1996, the Assessor originally determined the value of Alliant's real property in 
Salt Lake County at $168,003,500. Before the Board, Alliant sought a value reduction to 
$82,965,641. The Assessor sought an increase to $253,197,000. The Board denied both 
requests and sustained the original assessed value. On appeal to the Tax Commission, the 
Board, prior to settlement, sought an increase to approximately $208,000,000. Alliant 
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sought a valuation of $109,000,000 (including NIROP). Again, following a full 
evidentiary hearing on the 1996 assessment, which had been consolidated with the 1995 
assessment, the Tax Commission once again rejected the Assessor's proposed increase 
and sustained the lower value of $168,003,500. Id. 
For 1997, 1998 and 1999, the Assessor's original assessed values were 
approximately $256,000,000, $235,000,000 and $235,000,000, respectively, or on 
average $242,000,000. For the same period of time, the Board's expert, Mr. Philip Cook, 
recommended assessments of $222,000,000, $217,000,000 and $238,000,000, 
respectively, or on average $225,670,000. The Tax Commission rejected the Assessor's 
values and sustained values of $215,210,000, $212,559,000, and $239,650,000. Alliant 
Techsystems, Inc. v. Salt Lake County Bd. of Equalization, Tax Commission Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Decision, Appeal No. 98-0452, 98-0608 & 99-0190 
("Final Decision"), R. 002422-002440. The average Commission sustained value for 
1997-1999 is $222,443,000 or $54,437,500 higher than the value the Commission held 
was the fair market value on the identical property for the previous year, 1996. 
Nonetheless, the Commission sustained value for 1997-1999 is $19,557,000 lower than 
the Assessor's initial assessed values for the same years. 
The average values the Tax Commission sustained, following the full evidentiary 
hearing, of $152,000,000 for 1995 and $168,000,000 for 1996, are respectively 
$104,000,000 and $61,000,000 lower than the $229,100,000 average value the Assessor 
sought for the same property for the same period of time; and $43,000,000 lower than the 
$203,000,000 average value the Board through Mr. Cook sought for the same property 
for the same period of time, prior to the Settlement Agreement. 
The average value the Assessor sought before the Tax Court from 1995 through 
1999 was approximately $238,000,000. The Tax Commission held in its Final Decision 
in Appeal 97-0031 that Alliant proved the Assessor's assessments were too high, even 
though Alliant had not carried its burden in proving what the lowered assessed values 
should be. Based upon the Tax Commission's Final Decision in Appeal No. 97-0031 for 
1995 and 1996, the average assessment of Alliant's real property from 1995 through 1999 
should be no higher than $160,000,000, assuming no material change in the facility. On 
this point, the evidence of prior decisions the Board reviewed is that the economic 
outlook from 1996 to 1999 was substantially the same even though the assessment 
increased from approximately $168 million to $256 million in a single year. R. 001657 
(Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Joint Motion to Approve Settlement). See also 
Alliant Techsystems, Inc. v. Salt Lake County Bd. of Equalization, Tax Commission 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Decision, Appeal No. 98-0452, 98-0608, 
99-0190, R. 002440. 
2. Undisputed evidence the Board reviewed supports the Settlement 
Agreement. 
The Board also reviewed, at the insistence of the Assessor and District Attorney, 
the depositions in the 1997-1999 consolidated Tax Commission cases. The deposition of 
Paul Ross, former President of Alliant Aerospace Group and Senior Vice President of the 
Corporation, discusses the circumstances and events that lead to the development and 
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construction of the Salt Lake County Bacchus West facilities. Simply stated, the 
facilities have suffered economic obsolescence because they are overbuilt for their 
present use. Ross testified that Hercules was "enticed" by NASA in 1984 to construct 
facilities for manufacturing solid rocket motors for the space shuttle. With 24 flights 
projected per year, no one contractor was capable of supplying all of NASA's 
requirements. The building designs, pit sizes, diameters and heights were all made for 
the shuttle motors, which are 12 feet in diameter and 149 feet in length, each containing 
over a million pounds of propellant. With the Challenger disaster in 1986, NASA 
undertook a complete re-analysis of its programs and procurement policies. In 1988, 
NASA announced that there would be no second source for the shuttle. Hercules 
immediately shifted its focus for Bacchus West to the Titan program, which although 
using motors smaller than the shuttle, still required "big motors/' With the projected 
manifest at the time, Hercules believed it could still recoup its investment in Bacchus 
West. In 1994, the decision was made to stop the Titan program and move to EELV 
(Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles). Hercules (and its successor Alliant) was not 
successful in gaining the contracts for the EELV program. This leaves the Bacchus West 
facility making reduced numbers of small motors (3.3 feet diameter, 32 feet in length, or 
3.8 feet diameter, 36 feet in length) for commercial uses rather than the big motors (12 
feet diameter and 149 feet in length) for which the facility was designed and built. The 
Board reviewed these facts, none of which are in dispute, as a basis for settlement. 
Deposition of Paul A. Ross (October 25, 2000). Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of 
Joint Motion to Approve Settlement, R. 001655. 
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This evidence had significant impact upon the Board's deliberations in arriving at 
the Settlement Agreement, even though the Assessor now claims there was no evidence 
upon which to base a settlement. Having read the depositions in the case, Commissioner 
Overson expressed doubt that the Assessor's astounding increases in Alliant's 
assessments from 1996 to 1997 could possibly be justified because the solid rocket motor 
fuels industry had in fact declined since the 1994 assessment at $110,000,000. At an 
average tax rate of .014, the differences in taxes levied on the Assessor's proposed 
assessments, which Alliant had already proved are too high, and the assessments the Tax 
Commission had already sustained upon evidence submitted, approximate $1,000,000 per 
year, or $5,000,000 from 1995 through 1999. Adding personal property and interest to 
this figure would exceed $5,000,000, making it obvious that the Board's decision to settle 
upon a $5,000,000 refund is reasonable. It is certainly not overly generous to Alliant. 
Given such facts, Commissioner Overson stated at the December 6, 2000 
Commission "He [Overson] cannot, with a clear conscience, accept that Alliant 
Techsystem's value on this particular property went from $110 million in 1994 ta $200 
million plus in 1999-2000." R. 001685. Commissioner Overson also challenged the 
Assessor of misleading the Board by claiming that "they [Alliant] have not prevailed." 
Said Mr. Overson, "[t]he Assessor's assertion that the Utah State Tax Commission 
upheld the County's value failed to clarify that he [the Assessor] was trying to get much 
higher values than what the Utah State Tax Commission actually approved." Id. 
From the evidence summarized above, it cannot be reasonably disputed that the 
Board was aware of the relevant facts related to Alliant's property tax disputes and that 
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the Assessor had misrepresented the facts in fighting against the Settlement Agreement. 
The Board clearly understood that lowering Alliant's assessed values on real and personal 
property to justify a $5 million refund to Alliant was within the range of what the Board 
and the Tax Commission had already decided on the basis of an evidentiary hearing, and 
the undisputed evidence the Board reviewed. 
3. The Board's review of the parties' appraisals confirms that the 
Settlement Agreement is reasonable compromise between two widely 
disparate positions* 
Unlike the facts summarized above, the parties' respective appraisals were 
disputed. Nonetheless the Board reviewed these appraisals and expressly stated that they 
too formed a basis for the Settlement Agreement. The evidence before the Board 
consisted of two different and disparate appraisals—one by the Assessor's appraiser and 
another by Alliant's appraiser—a review appraisal, which the County commissioned 
Appraiser William Lang to determine whether the Settlement Agreement was reasonable 
(R. 001767), and an evaluation of the hazards and costs of litigation in this case. 
Commissioners Overson and Shurtleff clearly articulated the rationale behind the Board's 
decision to reach a compromise settlement of the case. The two commissioners' 
statements demonstrate that the Board's decision was based first and foremost on a 
careful weighing of two competing appraisals and of the qualifications and "track" 
records of the appraisers of each party: 
Commissioner Overson stated that ... he has a great deal of 
respect for Phil Cook [the county's appraiser] but... He is 
aware of a number of cases where Mr. Cook made similar 
arguments, asserting higher values, which have been 
overturned on a pretty regular basis. He himself is a state 
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certified general appraiser ... [and] as he reviewed the expert 
witness calculations, who [sic] came up with zero 
obsolescence in one year and very, very little economical 
obsolescence in a number of other years. This really bothered 
him.... He didn't think the stock and debt valuation [used by 
the county assessor] would be appropriate for this particular 
property ... Although he didn't particularly agree with Alliant 
Techsystem's position as to the amount of economic 
obsolescence, he wholly rejected the idea that there is zero 
economic obsolescence in a couple of the other years.... He 
believed that the taxpayers should be justly treated; their 
valuations should reflect the actual value of their properties. 
He cannot, with a clear conscience, accept that Alliant 
Techsystems' value on this particular property went from 
$110 million in 1994 to $200 million plus in 1999-2000. 
Minutes of Salt Lake County Commission Meeting (December 6, 2000), R. 001685. 
In essence, the Board did not wholly agree with either of the two appraisals, 
concluded that the fair market value of the property lay somewhere in the middle, and 
settled the case accordingly. This type of administrative review and settlement of a 
contested assessment value is central to the Board's function in making fact-based 
judgments about assessment values. 
This Court's role is not to substitute its judgment for that of the Board, or re weigh 
the evidence the Board considered in negotiating and consummating the Settlement 
Agreement. The Court's role is to review issues of fact (in this case the reasonableness 
of the Settlement Agreement) under a "substantial evidence" standard. If there is any 
evidence to support the Settlement Agreement, this Court should affirm the Tax Court's 
Judgment concluding the Settlement Agreement was "legal, enforceable and 
constitutional." 
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D. The Settlement Agreement contemplated that the Tax Court will enter 
an appropriate order lowering Alliant's assessments and ensuring that 
the taxing entities within Salt Lake County may recover refunded 
taxes. 
The Assessor also argues that the Settlement Agreement is illegal because it is for 
a dollar refund rather than a reduced assessment. Assessor's Brief at 27. This argument 
misreads the Settlement Agreement. The Settlement Agreement expressly contemplates 
"a reduction in value" as one of several possible means for repayment to Alliant. The 
negotiated terms are "subject to execution of a settlement agreement and stipulation 
incorporating the terms hereof, final approval by the Utah State Tax Commission and the 
District Court and entry of appropriate judgments and order sufficient to authorize Salt 
Lake County and the taxing entities within Salt Lake County to recover all refunds paid 
through the imposition of an appropriate judgment levy." Settlement Agreement at 1 
(emphasis added), Appendix A. For reasons previously explained, the Settlement 
Agreement would be legal even without this language because Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-
1321 gives the county legislative body authority to refund taxes illegally or erroneously 
assessed. By the terms of the Settlement Agreement, however, an appropriate Order, 
presumably lowering the assessment to generate $5 million in refunds, could be entered, 
thereby mooting the Assessor's argument that the Settlement Agreement is illegal. 
Finally, this Court should affirm the Tax Court's approval of the Settlement 
Agreement because it is, in fact, an adjustment of the Assessor's valuation pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. 59-2-1002(3). This provision states that the Board may "make and enter 
new assessments, at the same time canceling previous entries, when any assessment made 
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by the assessor is considered by the board to be incomplete or incorrect." In this case, the 
Board's reduction of the assessment was fully justified by the evidence before it and 
should thus be upheld under the presumption of validity given to the Board's valuations 
under Utah law and general legal principles. 
II. THE TAX COURT PROPERLY HAD JURISDICTION OVER ALL YEARS 
COVERED BY THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WHEN IT ENTERED 
ITS FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND FINAL ORDER 
AND JUDGMENT THAT THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IS LEGAL, 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ENFORCEABLE, 
The Assessor devotes considerable verbiage in his brief to arguing the Settlement 
Agreement is invalid and unenforceable under a variety of typical contractual doctrines 
and principles — failure of the parties to satisfy a necessary condition, lack of mutual 
assent for the agreement and/or failure of the consideration for the agreement. Assessor's 
Brief at 35-41. Please note that the principal parties to the Settlement Agreement - the 
County itself, the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization and Alliant - make no such 
arguments. If the Assessor's arguments had merit, one would suppose the County or the 
Board, seeing the County foisted with an unfair agreement, would be among those 
protesting its validity on appeal. Assuming the County Council and/or the County Mayor 
take their duties seriously, the County's very silence on appeal betokens the inherent 
fairness of the Settlement Agreement, not its unfairness. Were that not the case, the 
County's present "benign neutrality" of silence would instead be a dereliction of duty. 
Claiming he is not a party to the Settlement Agreement that was intended to bind the 
"County, its officers and attorneys," the Assessor inconsistently claims he has statutorily 
imposed duties as a County officer to save the County from an ill-advised and illegal 
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disaster. Each of the Assessor's alleged contractual defenses are "make weight" 
arguments that are easily dismissed. 
A, The Tax Commission's and the Tax Court's initial failure to approve 
the Settlement Agreements did not violate or fail to fulfill a material 
"Condition Precedent" to the Agreement's validity, thereby rendering 
the Settlement Agreement null and void. 
The Assessor argues the Tax Commission and the Tax Court's initial refusal to 
enforce the Settlement Agreement renders it "invalid and unenforceable" because "a 
material condition precedent failed to occur." Assessor's Brief at 37. Granite repeats 
essentially the same argument, stating "The Settlement Agreement is unenforceable 
because a condition precedent [the Tax Commission's approval] failed." Granite's Brief 
at 22. Such arguments are demonstrably specious for at least three reasons: 
First, while the Settlement Agreement did contemplate the parties to the agreement 
would "seek to secure an appropriate order from the Third District Court and the Utah 
State Tax Commission approving the Settlement Agreement" [Settlement Agreement at 
2, R.001412, Appendix A], an order of approval was not a condition precedent to the 
agreement's binding effect as a contract upon the Board and Alliant. Rather, securing an 
order of approval was nothing more than recognition of jurisdictional reality as it existed 
at that time—jurisdiction for tax years 1995 and 1996 resided in the Tax Court for a "trial 
de novo" and jurisdiction for tax years 1997, 1998, and 1999 resided in the Tax 
Commission, for a formal hearing. Acknowledging jurisdictional prerequisites in the 
Settlement Agreement does not transform them to conditions precedent to the 
agreement's validity. Nor does Alliant's continued effort to seek the Tax Court's 
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approval of the Settlement Agreement unilaterally change the consideration for the 
agreement. An analysis of the reasons the Tax Commission and the Tax Court did not 
initially approve the Settlement Agreement supports, rather than undermines, this 
conclusion. 
The Tax Commission's Order on Joint Motion for Approval of Settlement dated 
March 7, 2001, [R.002449 through 002442} declines approval of the Settlement 
Agreement because Granite had intervened to challenge the agreement. The 
Commission's order states that Granite "had moved to intervene prior to the stipulated 
settlement" so approval would require Granite to accept such a settlement "against its 
will." R.002447. In the Tax Court's words, "The Tax Commission's rejection of the 
Settlement Agreement did not focus on constitutional difficulties and problematic 
implementation of the Settlement Agreement, but primarily upon the Settlement 
Agreement's failure to include a potential intervenor." Findings of Fact f 38, R. 002871, 
Appendix B. 
Similarly, the Tax Court initially declined to enforce the Settlement Agreement 
because it lacked jurisdiction over all of the years subject to the agreement. The Tax 
Court Decision of September 20, 2001 makes this perfectly clear: 
Clearly the Utah State Tax Commission has jurisdiction over 
some cases and this court has jurisdiction over others. The 
Court recognized the divisibility of jurisdiction between the 
Court and the Utah State Tax Commission. . . while this 
Court accepts the divisibility of jurisdiction it is of the 
opinion that the refund amount of $5 million is indivisible 
and non-allocable between the various tax years. Therefore, 
even though the Court disagrees with the legal theory relied 
upon by the Utah State Tax Commission, the court has no 
604432.2 45 
option but to reluctantly disapprove the Settlement 
Agreement. . . the rejection decision of the Utah State Tax 
Commission forces this court to reject a settlement agreement 
which it believes is valid and legally sustainable. 
Tax Court Decision dated September 20, 2001 at 25; R.001987, 001963, Appendix C. 
This language proves the Tax Commission and the Tax Court initially declined to 
enforce the Settlement Agreement for pragmatic, procedural reasons, having nothing to 
do with the agreement's alleged invalidity/unenforceability as a contract. To argue 
otherwise in the face of this language is untenable. The Tax Commission's and the Tax 
Court's respective initial disapprovals were unrelated to any contractual defenses to 
enforceability, as the Assessor and Granite now assert. 
Second, the Tax Court properly held the Tax Commission's disapproval of the 
Settlement Agreement "does not exclude this [the District] Court from conducting a 
careful analysis of all legal issues. An automatic rejection is not permissible by this [the 
District] Court." Tax Court Decision dated September 20, 2001 at 25, R. 001987, 
001963, Appendix C. As explained above, the Tax Commission did not approve the 
Settlement Agreement because Granite was an intervenor in the Tax Commission 
proceeding. The Tax Commission opined its approval of the Settlement Agreement 
"would require a necessary party [Granite School District} that had moved to intervene 
prior to the stipulated settlement to accept such a settlement against its will." [R. 
002447] The question then arises whether the Tax Commission thought Granite's 
participation, as an intervening party, was limited to its challenge of the Settlement 
Agreement, or that the Settlement Agreement could not be enforced because Granite was 
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not a party to it. Granite compounds this same ambiguity, arguing that when it 
intervened in the Tax Commission matter, thereby causing the Tax Commission to reject 
the Settlement, consideration under the agreement failed. Granite's Brief at 29-30. 
This is muddled thinking. The Tax Commission's analysis seems to equate 
participation in settlement discussions with the right to intervene in the underlying 
lawsuits. There can be no settlement, according to the Tax Commission, without 
everyone who could possibly assert an interest via intervention in the underlying lawsuits 
participating in the Settlement Agreement. The fatal defect in this analysis is a failure to 
recognize an unassailable fact — that parties to a lawsuit can always settle the differences 
between them notwithstanding the objection of third persons. The Settlement Agreement 
is binding as a contract between the parties to that contract, whether or not intervention 
may be available to parties opposed to the contract or desirous of undermining the 
contract in litigation. Granting intervention status to the Assessor and Granite merely 
gave them an opportunity to voice their views on the Settlement Agreement, which they 
did. Intervention does not give intervenors an absolute veto power over settlements with 
which they disagree. See, e.g., Millard County v. State Tax Comm'n, 823 P.2d 459, 464 
(Utah 1991) ("However, we need not now decide whether, after intervention has been 
allowed in a local option sales tax case, the Commission may settle a case over an 
intervenor's objection.") 
Hence, the Tax Commission got it wrong. The Tax Commission's failure to 
enforce the Settlement Agreement reflects what the Tax Court accurately called a "legally 
impermissible" ground. Tax Court Decision dated September 20, 2001 at 24, R. 001987, 
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001964, Appendix B. It is well settled law that parties contract for their own benefit, 
unless otherwise stated, and not for the benefit of a third person. See, generally, SME 
Industries, Inc. v. Thompson, 28 P.3d 669, 684 (Utah 2001). There is a limited exception 
to this general rule if the parties explicitly agree that a third party shall have enforceable 
legal rights. If performance of the promissor is to run directly to the promissee, any third 
party contemplated under the agreement is an unprotected incidental beneficiary, having 
no enforceable rights under the contract. See, e.g., American Towers Owners Ass'n v. 
CCI Mechanical, Inc., 930 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1996); McCinnico v. Marrs, 320 F.2d 22 
(10th Cir. 1963). Alliant has searched but discovered no case law for the proposition that 
persons not party to a contract can set the contract aside as unenforceable. 
In this case, the Assessor has no standing to challenge the Settlement Agreement 
because, as a County officer (though he claims not to be a County officer), he may not 
unilaterally repudiate a County contract without breaching the contract, as he has done. 
Granite, as an intervenor in the lawsuit, has standing to complain about the contract, but 
no standing under the Settlement Agreement to derail it. Granite does not qualify as a 
third-party beneficiary under the Settlement Agreement under any conceivable theory 
because the contract is between and binding on Salt Lake County, its officers (including 
the Assessor) and attorneys and Alliant. The salient terms of the Settlement Agreement 
are that Salt Lake County will pay Alliant $5 million for dismissal of its unliquidated 
claims against the County. Under the express terms of the Settlement Agreement, it does 
not matter what the source of funding will be—whether from the County's reserves, or a 
judgment levy. The Settlement Agreement states, "Payment of the refund [to Alliant], at 
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the taxing entities' option, will be made either from current cash flows and reserves or 
from the proceeds of the judgment levy." Settlement Agreement at 2, R. 001412, 
Appendix A. In other words, Granite need play no role whatsoever in refunding $5 
million to Alliant. Thus, the instant Settlement Agreement is indistinguishable in this 
respect from a settlement agreement between the County and a plaintiff asserting 
damages under an unliquidated tort claim. Neither the County nor Alliant intended to 
give Granite any rights and claims under the settlement. Instead, there was a bargained-
for exchange between the parties (the County, its officers, attorneys and Alliant) 
constituting a benefit to the promissor and a detriment to the promissee. That is all that is 
necessary for enforcement of the contract. 
Notwithstanding clear law against them, Granite, an intervenor, and the Assessor, 
a breaching party to the Settlement Agreement, seek to undermine its enforceability in a 
way that will inflict severe damage to well-established contract law and public policy. 
Were Appellants to prevail, all future, and possibly past, settlements between the County 
and a plaintiff would become vulnerable. The precedent would be that an unforeseen 
third party or a breaching party may overturn a perfectly legal contract. Likewise, as the 
Tax Court noted, a settlement agreement between a taxpayer and a county could be held 
hostage by a mosquito abatement district. Tax Court Decision dated September 20, 2001 
at 13, R.001987, 001975, Appendix C. No one would wish to settle if Appellants' 
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arguments become law. That is why the public policy favors enforcement of the 
Settlement Agreement.10 
Third and most importantly, the Tax Commission's consideration of the 
Settlement Agreement was solely in its role as the tribunal then having supervisory 
authority or jurisdiction over certain tax years included in the settlement, not as a party to 
the agreement. Consequently, the Tax Commission's approval of the Settlement 
Agreement is not a condition precedent to the agreement's validity. The Assessor's 
citation of Indiana State Highway Comm'n v. Curtis, 704 N.E.2d 1015 (Ind. 1998), is 
totally beside the point. Alliant agrees with the Assessor that "in Curtis, the Indiana 
Supreme Court was asked to consider whether a settlement agreement that explicitly 
required the approval of a component party was binding on the party without that 
approval." Assessor's Brief at 37 (emphasis added).11 
Obviously, settlement agreements that require prior approval of a party are invalid 
if that party fails to approve the agreement. But here the Tax Commission was never a 
10
 Granite's argument that the Settlement Agreement, if enforced, will inevitably result in 
"disparate treatment" is absolutely false. Under the explicit terms of the Settlement 
Agreement, the County is free to refund the $5 million from whatever source it desires. 
11
 In Curtis, the Court disapproved the settlement in part because the Governor had not 
consented to the settlement in violation of a statute that required his approval. There is 
no such statute in this case. The only governmental body that was a necessary party to 
the Settlement Agreement was the Salt Lake County Commission, which approved the 
settlement. In the words of David Yocom, District Attorney for Salt Lake County, "there 
was no question that the Commission has the ultimate authority to control litigation and 
to determine what settlement amounts should be offered." Minutes of County 
Commission Meeting (December 6, 2000) at 2, R. 001686. Alliant agrees with Mr. 
Yocom on this point. One wonders, therefore, why the County sought to invalidate the 
terms of its own agreement [Findings of Fact f 21, R. 002874] when Mr. Yocom had 
already opined the County Commission had plenary legal authority to settle litigation. 
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party to the Settlement Agreement, just as the Tax Court was not a party to the Settlement 
Agreement. The Tax Court's September 20, 2001 Decision easily grasps this point. It 
states, "Clearly, the Utah State Tax Commission has jurisdiction over some cases and this 
[District] Court has jurisdiction over others." Tax Court Decision dated September 20, 
2001 at 25, R. 001963, Appendix C There is no intimation that the Tax Commission was 
a necessary party to the agreement or that its approval was anything more than a 
jurisdictional prerequisite. The Tax Court further held the Tax Commission's 
disapproval of the Settlement Agreement had no binding effect upon the Tax Court, no 
matter the Tax Commission's reasons for disapproval. The Tax Court's holding is 
logically inescapable because jurisdiction over the Settlement Agreement approval is not 
interminably vested in the Tax Commission. Findings of Fact f 14, R. 002875, Appendix 
B. 
Conspicuously absent from any of Appellants' arguments is reference to the 
controlling jurisdictional statute, Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-601(1), which provides that "the 
district court shall have jurisdiction to review by trial de novo all decisions issued by the 
commission after ...[July 1, 1994] resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings." 
(Emphasis added.) Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-601(2) continues to foreclose any legitimate 
argument that any of the Tax Commission's decisions should be given any weight by 
explicitly defining "de novo" to mean "an original independent proceeding, [which] does 
not mean a trial de novo on the record." (Emphasis added.) Appendix D. 
On September 21, 2001, Alliant appealed the Tax Commission's Final Decision in 
Alliant Techsystems, Inc. v. Bd. of Equalization of Salt Lake County, Nos. 98-0452, 98-
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0608, and 99-0191, dated September 18, 2001, to the Tax Court. As a result of these 
appeals, the 1997, 1998 and 1999 real property tax disputes subject to the Settlement 
Agreement were before the Tax Court "de novo," in an "original and independent" 
proceeding. Nothing in the Tax Commission proceeding, including the Tax 
Commission's "legally impermissible" disapproval of the Settlement Agreement, is 
binding upon the Tax Court. Under Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-604, the district court "may 
affirm, reverse, modify, or remand any order of the commission, and shall grant other 
relief, invoke such other remedies, and issue such orders, in accordance with its decision, 
as appropriate" (Emphasis added). If Appellants' arguments prevail, the explicit wording 
of Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-1-601 through 604 would be eliminated. In other words, the 
Tax Court's September 20, 2001 Decision correctly stated, "The ruling of the Utah State 
Tax Commission does not preclude this Court from independently examining the 
Settlement Agreement." Tax Court Decision dated September 20, 2001 at 14, R. 001974, 
Appendix C. 
B. The Tax Commission's disapproval of the Settlement Agreement 
necessitated a subsequent formal hearing on the merits of the case, 
which is neither a "waiver of Alliant's appeal rights," nor 
"acquiescence" in the Tax Commission's disapproval. 
The Assessor's next argument is that Alliant somehow accepted or acquiesced in 
the Tax Commission's failure to enforce the Settlement Agreement by not taking an 
immediate appeal from the Tax Commission's order of disapproval. The Assessor 
asserts, "By proceeding to formal hearing, all parties to the Settlement acquiesced in the 
Tax Commission's denial of the Settlement and effectively repudiated the Agreement 
rendering it invalid and unenforceable." Assessor's Brief at 38. In support of this 
argument, the Assessor cites various cases to the effect that compliance with a court's 
judgment moots an appeal. Id. 
The cases the Assessor cites do not support the arguments he advances. When 
apples are compared to apples, the invalidity of the Assessor's criticisms becomes 
undeniable. Had Alliant sought immediate appeal from the Tax Commission's failure to 
enforce the Settlement Agreement, the appellate courts would have dismissed the appeal 
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, no doubt with Appellants' strong urging. 
The law on this issue is clear, and succinctly summarized in Hercules, Inc. v. Utah State 
Tax Comm'n, 974 P.2d 286 (Utah 1999), a case in which the taxpayer attempted, and 
failed, to do just what the Assessor asserts should have been done here—take an 
interlocutory appeal from a Tax Commission ruling before the Commission issued a Final 
Order. 
However, interlocutory appeals are not allowed. Said the Court in Hercules, "by 
filing its declaratory judgment action, Hercules attempted to obtain judicial review of an 
interlocutory and otherwise unappealable Tax Commission order. As the Tax Court 
correctly noted, '[This] attempt to invoke the jurisdiction of the court to seek review of an 
interlocutory order [was] procedurally improper.'" Id. at 287. The Court added, "such 
review may only be sought from final agency action, meaning that the agency's decision 
must have fully disposed of the case." Id. (emphasis in original). 
Consistent with Hercules, Alliant here sought judicial review of the Tax 
Commission's Final Order in the 1997, 1998 and 1999 valuation cases on September 21, 
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2001. One of the grounds for relief in Alliant's Petition for Review asserts "Salt Lake 
County, its officers and attorneys," including Lee Gardner the Assessor, breached the 
Settlement Agreement in refusing to seek to secure its approval, and that the Tax 
Commission wrongfully denied the joint motion to approve the agreement. Affiant 
Techsystems, Inc. v. Salt Lake County Board of Equalization et al, No. 010908307 at 
f 22. Alliant could not have sought reversal of the Tax Commission's disapproval of the 
Settlement Agreement any sooner than it did. 
Equally illogical is the Assessor's argument that Alliant waived its right to appeal 
the Tax Commission's failure to enforce the Settlement Agreement by submitting to the 
formal hearing on the merits of the property tax disputes before the Tax Commission. 
Argues the Assessor, "At significant expense, the parties submitted their respective 
appraisals and cross-examined witnesses to determine the value of ATK's real property 
for 1997 through 1999. In doing so, ATK (and the BOE) effectively repudiated the 
Agreement and waived the right to further challenge the Tax Commission's rejection of 
the Settlement." Assessor's Brief at 39. 
The incontestable inference of the Assessor's argument is that the one and only 
reason for settlement was to eliminate the costs and risks associated with the fonnal 
hearing in front of the Tax Commission on the 1997, 1998 and 1999 tax years. And so 
the argument continues, by participating in the Tax Commission hearing, Alliant's 
consideration supporting the Settlement Agreement had failed. Such an inference badly 
misses the mark. 
The truth is there were numerous reasons, legal and economic, supporting the 
Settlement Agreement besides eliminating the costs and risks associated with the Tax 
Commission's formal hearing. Indeed, the "County, its officers and attorneys," including 
the Assessor, have been caught in their own snare. The reason there has been no 
termination of the litigation costs, but instead a perpetuation of such is because the 
"County, its officers and attorneys" have refused to honor the Settlement Agreement they 
themselves drafted. The escalation of litigation costs has nothing to do with Alliant, 
which has taken the County at its word since December 6, 2000, the date the County 
Commission approved the Settlement Agreement. 
Equally important, all parties to the Settlement Agreement continue to face 
litigation risks and expenses because, were the Settlement Agreement to fail, the parties 
would then undergo a "trial de novo," in the Tax Court as if the trial before the Tax 
Commission had never happened. The risks of litigation thus remain substantial for all 
parties if the Settlement Agreement is not enforced. That aspect of consideration 
supporting the Settlement Agreement remains relevant even today. 
Most important, had the "County, its officers and attorneys" kept their word, the 
costs and risks associated with continuing litigation would likely have long since been 
eliminated, just as Alliant said, and the case would likely now be over. The Settlement 
Agreement was signed almost three years ago. Since then, the Assessor has repeatedly 
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imposed stumbling blocks to the Settlement Agreement's successful consummation, 
while the County feigns "benign neutrality."12 
AUiant has found no case in all American Jurisprudence in which the party 
breaching a settlement agreement (the Assessor) has been able to assert its own breach as 
the reason for lack of mutual assent and/or failure of consideration which invalidates the 
agreement. The notion is preposterous. 
C. Alliant's dismissal of its personal property tax claims before the Tax 
Commission was to fulfill its obligations under the Settlement 
Agreement 
The Assessor's next distortion is his argument that AUiant's dismissal of its 
pending personal property tax claims before the Tax Commission constitutes a failure of 
the consideration for and a unilateral attempt to rewrite the Settlement Agreement. 
Assessor's Brief at 40. The sinister motives that the Assessor seems to infer from 
AUiant's actions "spin" the facts to appear the opposite from what they really are. Rather 
than a repudiation of the Settlement Agreement, AUiant's dismissal of its personal 
property tax claims was undertaken to fulfill its obligations under the Settlement 
12
 One of many examples was the County's opposition to AUiant's Motion to Transfer 
AUiant's appeal of the Tax Commission Final Order on the 1997-1999 valuation cases 
from Tax Court Judge Pat B. Brian to Tax Court Judge Lynn W. Davis. AUiant argued 
the transfer would make it easier to enforce the Settlement Agreement since Judge Davis 
had jurisdiction over the NIROP and the 1995-1996 valuation cases. Yet the County 
resisted, claiming inconvenience in driving to Provo, though its attorneys had so driven 
for the related tax cases. Judge Brian rejected the County's argument and transferred the 
1997-1999 valuation cases to Judge Davis. If the County truly sought to reduce litigation 
risks and costs, there is, of course, nothing that prevents the County, even now, from 
keeping its word, honoring the Settlement Agreement, paying what it promised to pay 
and mooting this appeal. If the Settlement Agreement is not upheld, litigation expenses 
will likely be incurred for years to come. 
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Agreement. The Settlement Agreement, by its express terms, "includes all claims in all 
outstanding actions for those years involving real and personal property/' Settlement 
Agreement dated December 5, 2000 at 1; R.001412, Appendix A (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, the Settlement Agreement covered the pending personal property disputes 
as well as the real property disputes. Had Alliant refused or failed to withdraw its 
personal property tax claims, it would have violated the Settlement Agreement and part 
of the County's consideration for settlement would have been lost. The truth is exactly 
the opposite from what the Assessor labels as a failure of consideration resulting from 
"ATK's extreme action in withdrawing its personal property tax claims." Assessor's 
Brief at 41. Alliant's dismissal of its personal property claims fulfills the Settlement 
Agreement's requirements, rather than "altering its consideration." Alliant kept its 
promise. 
Granite's somewhat different arguments against the Settlement Agreement are 
likewise transparently shallow. The underpinnings for much of Granite's arguments rest 
on its assertion that the Tax Court erred in holding that it was not bound by the Tax 
Commission's decision, which recognized Granite as a respondent-intervenor, and 
rejected the Settlement Agreement. Granite's Brief at 27. Granite ultimately became, in 
fact, a defendant-intervenor in the Tax Court when the 1995-1999 valuation cases were 
functionally consolidated.13 Granite thinks the Tax Court's separate approval of the 
13
 By "valuation cases," Alliant refers to those cases in which it protested its assessed 
value before the County Board of Equalization and then the Tax Commission. These are 
the 1995-1996 valuation case, and the 1997-1999 valuation case referenced in Judge 
Davis' Findings/Conclusions. Although the 1995-1999 valuation cases were never 
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Settlement Agreement in the 1995-1996 valuation case (in which Granite had not timely 
intervened) would mystically have changed the outcome of Judge Davis' decision 
upholding the Settlement Agreement when the Tax Court eventually acquired jurisdiction 
over the 1997-1999 valuation case (in which Granite had intervened before the Tax 
Commission). Granite argues Judge Davis had no alternative but to remand the 
combined 1995-1999 valuation cases to the Tax Commission, although the Tax 
Commission had already rejected the Settlement Agreement in the 1997-1999 valuation 
case, solely on the grounds that Granite was not a party to an agreement between Aliiant 
and Salt Lake County. Granite stresses this argument, without disclosing even an 
awareness of the Utah statute vesting the Tax Court with de novo jurisdiction on appeals 
from the Tax Commission. 
There are obvious, multiple and insurmountable flaws with Granite's arguments. 
First, Granite's arguments cannot possibly be reconciled with Utah statutes, which 
Granite, either intentionally or negligently, fails even to cite, much less discuss, and 
which contradict its contention that the Tax Court is somehow bound by any Tax 
Commission decision. The relevant statute that Granite ignores is Utah Code Ann. § 59-
1-601, which provides in its entirety: 
formally consolidated by a formal order of consolidation, they were functionally 
consolidated because they were considered and decided together and simultaneously. 
The valuation cases are distinguished from the "independent" or "N1ROP" action, in 
which Aliiant challenged the legality of the County's imposition of a privilege tax on 
AUiant on the unapportioned assessed value of its use of federal property. The three 
cases (the 1995-1996 valuation case, the 1997-1999 valuation case and the "independent" 
action) were functionally consolidated for purposes of the Tax Court's 
Findings/Conclusions in this case. 
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(1) In addition to the jurisdiction granted in Section 63-
46b-15, beginning July 1, 1994, the district court shall have 
jurisdiction to review by trial de novo all decisions issued by 
the commission after that date resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings. 
(2) As used in this section, "trial de novo" means an 
original, independent proceeding, and does not mean a trial de 
novo on the record. 
(3) (a) In any appeal to the district court pursuant to 
this section taken after January 1, 1997, the commission shall 
certify a record of its proceedings to the district court. 
(b) This Subsection (3) supersedes Section 63-46b-
16 pertaining to judicial review of formal adjudicative 
proceedings. 
In Evans & Sutherland Computer Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 953 P.2d 435 
(Utah 1997), this Court held that a prior version of Section 59-1-601 was unconstitutional 
because it conflicted with the Tax Commission's vested powers under Utah Const., Art. 
XIII, § 11 and Art. V, § 1. However, in 1998, the Utah voters by an overwhelming 
majority approved an amendment to Utah Const., Art. XIII, § 11, now Art. XIII, § 6. 
This constitutional amendment provides in pertinent part: "Notwithstanding the powers 
granted to the State Tax Commission in this Constitution, the Legislature may by statute 
authorize any court established under Article VIII to adjudicate, review, reconsider, or 
determine any matter decided by the State Tax Commission relating to revenue and 
taxation/' The 1998 constitutional amendment reinstated Section 59-1-601. 
As with any statute, Section 59-1-601 should be interpreted according to the plain 
meaning of its language. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co., 853 P.2d 877, 879 
(Utah 1993) ("The court's principal duty in interpreting statutes is to determine 
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legislative intent, and the best evidence of legislative intent is the plain language of the 
statute.") It should, therefore, be beyond dispute that "original" means "not secondary, 
derivative or imitative," Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, "original"; and that 
"independent" means "not subject to control by others," id. at "independent." If these 
statutory words are given their intended effect, the Tax Court is not "bound" by Tax 
Commission decisions, as Granite asserts. Simply stated, Granite's argument is directly 
repugnant to plain and controlling statutory language to the contrary. Recognizing this, 
Judge Davis wrote that "Alliant filed a Petition for Judicial Review in the Third Judicial 
District Court, seeking 'review by trial de novo' under Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-601 of the 
Tax Commission's [various decisions,]." Mem. Dec. (June 3, 2002) at 17, R. 002641, 
Appendix F. Given this statutory language, Judge Davis concluded, "The rejection of the 
Settlement Agreement by the Utah State Tax Commission does not exclude this Court 
from conducting a careful analysis of all legal issues. An automatic rejection is not 
permissible by this Court." Id. at 25. 
Second, Granite distorts this Court's decision in Millard County v. Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 823 P.2d 459 (Utah 1991) by making it appear that its intervention in the Tax 
Commission proceeding to oppose the Settlement Agreement is the necessary equivalent 
of having its opposing views prevail in the Tax Court. As the quintessential incongruous 
comparison of apples and oranges, Granite writes: 
The Tax Court rejected this theory [that Granite was a 
necessary party to the Settlement Agreement], even though it 
did not determine the viability of the Settlement Agreement 
until a full nine months after Granite filed its motion to 
intervene and seven months after Granite's motion was 
An 
granted. Thus, by the time the Settlement Agreement was 
ruled upon, Granite was a party and the case could not be 
disposed of, in its entirety, absent Granite's consent and 
approval. 
Granite's Brief at 30-31. 
To untangle Granite's thinking, Alliant begins with a recitation of Millard 
County's express holding. The issue in Millard County was whether the County had a 
right of intervention in a Tax Commission proceeding to challenge a settlement 
agreement between Intermountain Power Agency and the Tax Commission in a sales tax 
case. This Court held that the Tax Commission erred in denying intervention. However, 
the Court neither stated nor implied that the County's intervention to challenge the 
settlement agreement meant its opposition to settlement must necessarily triumph. In 
fact, the Court expressly reserved that issue, stating, "we need not now decide whether, 
after intervention has been allowed in a local option sales tax case, the Commission may 
settle a case over an intervenor's objection." Id. at 464. Granite's brief thus omits the 
most important statement in Millard pertaining to this case. Compounding the confusion, 
Granite misleads the Court by citing passages in Millard, knowing they are inapplicable. 
An example is Page 28 of Granite's brief in which it quotes the following statement from 
Millard: "[T]he settlement of a controversy by the parties before a motion to intervene as 
of right has been adjudicated does not constitute a final settlement and does not moot 
either the motion or an appeal from a denial of that motion." Id., quoting Millard at 461 
(emphasis in Granite's brief). 
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The principal defect with Granite's selective quotation from Millard is its 
emphasis on facts that have no parallel to the facts here, and its disregard of facts that do 
have a striking parallel. Unlike Millard* in which the Tax Commission and the taxpayer 
consummated a settlement agreement in the face of an "extant motion" to intervene, the 
Settlement Agreement in this case was consummated before Granite moved to intervene 
in the Tax Court. There was no extant motion to intervene before Judge Davis at the time 
he approved the Settlement Agreement as it pertained to the 1995-1996 valuation case 
then before him. Here again, Granite selectively quotes only part of Judge Davis' 
decision that implies Granite was unfairly treated. Granite's Brief at 28. What Granite 
omits is Judge Davis' recitation of the all-important time table in the 1995-1996 valuation 
case—then the only valuation case over which he had jurisdiction. Said Judge Davis: 
It is a matter of record in this Court that the Board of 
Education of Granite School District faxed a copy of its 
Motion to Intervene under Rule 24(a) on December 7, 2000 
and filed an original on January 8, 2001. If counsel for 
Alliant is accurate, the stipulated settlement agreement was 
entered into on December 5, 2000 and was approved by the 
Salt Lake County Commission on December 6, 2000. It is 
clear there wasn't even a faxed copy of a motion to intervene 
on file with this Court at the time of the settlement. If the 
motion did not precede the County Commission action, then 
this Court cannot give any weight to a potential filing of a 
potential intervenor who potentially might become a future 
party to the action. 
Tax Court Decision dated September 20, 2001 at 13, R. 001975, Appendix C. 
Granite notes that its motion to intervene was filed with the Tax Commission on 
November 17, 2000, well before the County Commission approved the Settlement 
Agreement on December 6, 2000. Yet Granite chooses not to disclose relevant facts that 
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paint the entire, accurate picture. Granite knew the Settlement Agreement encompassed 
the 1995-1996 valuation case, then before Judge Davis, as well as the 1997-1999 
valuation case, then before the Tax Commission, At the time, jurisdiction in the 
valuation cases for tax years 1995 through 1999 inclusive was divided between the Tax 
Court (on petition for review from the Tax Commission for years 1995-1996), and the 
Tax Commission (on appeal from the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization for years 
1997-1999). Filing a motion to intervene with the Tax Commission is not equivalent to 
filing a motion to intervene with the Tax Court for prior years, over which the Tax 
Commission then had no jurisdiction. The Tax Commission lost jurisdiction when 
Alliant filed its Petition for Review of the Tax Commission's Final Decision in the 1997-
1999 valuation case under Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-604. At that point, the Tax Court's 
September 20, 2001 decision, premised on what was then split jurisdiction between the 
Tax Court (1995-1996) and the Tax Commission (1997-1999), was mooted. As a 
respondent-intervenor before the Tax Commission, Granite automatically became a 
defendant-intervenor when Alliant filed its Petition for Review of the Tax Commission's 
final decision in the 1997-1999 valuation case before Judge Davis. Granite subsequently 
and strenuously voiced its objections to the Settlement Agreement before Judge Davis, 
exceeding hundreds of pages in the aggregate, which the Tax Court considered and 
rejected. There are no parallel facts in Millard, which thus has no application whatsoever 
to this case. 
Third, Granite selectively manipulates applicable statutes by quoting only Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-1-604 (3) as the seeming universe of statutes pertaining to the Tax 
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Court's jurisdiction over Tax Commission final decisions. Section 604(3) provides that 
the Tax Court "may affirm, reverse, modify, or remand any order of the commission." 
Granite's Brief at 31. Granite argues this statute somehow requires the Tax Court to give 
the Tax Commission some deference. But the argument disregards Utah Code Ann. § 59-
1-601, which, as quoted above, vests the Tax Court with "original" and "independent" 
jurisdiction in a "trial de novo." An honest reading of the words "original" and 
"independent" implies, at the very least, that the Tax Court is not bound by anything the 
Tax Commission decides. To compound its misleading omission of relevant statutes, 
Granite misrepresents the state of the law by quoting Kennecott Corp. v. Salt Lake 
County, 702 P.2d 451, 457 (Utah 1985) for the proposition that "the Tax Court could 
simply not replace its judgment for that of the Tax Commission." Granite's Brief at 31. 
In 1985, Kennecotfs holding was indisputably the state of law. Clinging to that 
argument in 2004 is nonsense. Since Kennecott, the Utah Constitution has been 
amended, as explained above, giving the legislature express authority to "authorize any 
court . . . to adjudicate, review, reconsider, or redetermine any matter decided by the 
State Tax Commission." The very words of Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-604(3), upon which 
Granite exclusively relies, do not mandate a "remand," as Granite contends was the Tax 
Court's only choice. Granite's Brief at 31. Among the explicit options open to the Tax 
Court was reversal of the Tax Commission. It is, therefore, logically indefensible for 
Granite to insist that "the Tax Court" erred when it did not chose remand, as Granite 
would have preferred. After extensive briefing, repeated oral argument, and repeated Tax 
Court decisions rethinking and reaffirming its previous analyses, the Tax Court reversed 
the Tax Commission, as was its express statutory prerogative. The Tax Court's decision 
to reverse the Tax Commission, rather than remand the case, makes eminent sense 
because the aggrieved party before the Tax Commission would have petitioned for 
review under Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-601 in a "trial de novo," thus bringing the matter 
back to Judge Davis from whence the remand would have come. Granite's preference 
for an unduly inefficient remand, in the face of a statute giving the Tax Court "de novo" 
jurisdiction, would have served no legitimate purpose, and would have unnecessarily 
hiked the costs of litigation for everyone. Reduced to its essence, Granite's argument is 
simply that it does not like what Judge Davis decided. 
IIL ASSESSOR GARDNER WAS COVERED BY THE SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT AND BOUND BY THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT. 
The Tax Court awarded attorneys' fees in favor of Alliant and against the Assessor 
as a result of the Assessor's continuing efforts to defeat the Settlement Agreement in 
direct contravention of the express terms of the Agreement. The Settlement Agreement 
provides "the non-breaching party is entitled to attorneys' fees or costs incurred in 
enforcing the Settlement Agreement." Settlement Agreement dated December 5, 2002 at 
2, R.001412, Appendix A. The District Court correctly applied this attorneys' fees 
provision as the basis for its attorneys' fees award. 
Not surprisingly, the Assessor vigorously defends his actions and claims that the 
award of attorneys' fees should be reversed. Regrettably, however, the Assessor has been 
less than candid in his brief in arguing the attorneys' fees issue, going so far as claiming 
the "award of Attorney fees present issues of law." Assessor's Brief at 4. Under the 
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Assessor's Issue No. 3, he states, "Application by the District Court of constitutional and 
statutory standards for determination of the authority of a County Assessor and award of 
attorney's fees present issues of law. The Supreme Court will apply a correction standard 
to issues of law and will not defer to the Tax Court's conclusions." Id. A similar claim is 
also made by the Assessor under his Issue No. 4, also related to the attorneys' fees issue. 
Assessor's Brief at 5. Such claims are obvious distortions. 
In the abstract it undoubtedly is true that application of constitutional and statutory 
standards present matters of law. However, "If the language within the four corners of 
the contract is unambiguous, the parties' intentions are determined from the plain 
meaning of the contractual language, and the contract may be interpreted as a matter of 
law.'" Wagner v. Clifton, 2002 UT 109, \ 12, 62 P.3d 440 (quoting WebBank v. 
American Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88, f 19, 54 P.3d 1139)(emphasis added). 
At least from Appellants' perspective, the "four corners" of the Settlement Agreement are 
arguably unclear since the Assessor, an officer of Salt Lake County, claims not to be 
included within the Settlement Agreement that binds "Salt Lake County, its officers and 
attorneys." From the Assessor's perspective, the contractual issues he raises are not 
issues of law because, he thinks, the contract is ambiguous. As further discussed in 
Alliant's statement of issues, interpretation of the Settlement Agreement raises an issue 
of fact because the Tax Court relied, in part, on extrinsic evidence to conclude the 
Assessor was a party to the Settlement Agreement. Consequently, constitutional and 
statutory standards have nothing whatever to do with the award of attorneys' fees in 
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accordance with the express contractual terms negotiated and approved by the parties to a 
negotiated contract. The Assessor has once again argued a non sequitur. 
In the present controversy, the attorneys' fees award results from the Tax Court's 
interpretation and application of contractual remedies the parties wrote into the 
Settlement Agreement when one party to the agreement, in this case the Assessor, fails to 
keep his end of the bargain. Determining whether or not the Assessor was covered under 
the terms of the Settlement Agreement and subject to its remedy provision is a specific 
factual inquiry that can only be made through analysis and interpretation of the 
Settlement Agreement's language and the relationships and intent of the settling parties. 
Such factual inquiries and interpretations are always within the prerogative of the finder 
of fact. Hence, to preserve his right to challenge the attorneys' fees award, the Assessor 
is obligated to marshal and identify all evidence on which the Tax Court relied and then 
demonstrate that such evidence is insubstantial. See, e.g., Neeley v. Bennett, 51 P.3d 724, 
726 (Utah App 2002); Morgan County v. Holnam, Inc., 29 P.3d 629, n. 8 (Utah 2001). 
The Assessor's brief makes no attempt whatsoever to comply with mandatory 
"marshaling" standards. Accordingly, the Assessor's arguments that the Settlement 
Agreement's remedy provision is invalid and/or not binding on the Assessor must 
necessarily fail. It is simply too late for the Assessor to attempt to marshal the evidence 
in a reply brief. See, e.g., Atlas Steel, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 61 P.3d 1053, 1062 
("[the] eleventh hour attempt to marshal the evidence and challenge the sufficiency of the 
evidence in a reply brief is too late.") 
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In disregard of the "marshaling" requirement, the Assessor's brief substitutes a 
conclusory statement that "[T]he Court's ruling on attorney fees is unsupported by the 
record and legally flawed. Assessor's Brief at 43. Instead of citing the record that would 
conceivably support his bald conclusion, the Assessor simply reasserts more 
unsubstantiated conclusions that, in his view, the Settlement Agreement does not bind 
him. Such is not marshaling the evidence by any conceivable stretch. 
Besides his failure to marshal the evidence, the Assessor's brief makes a number 
of misstatements and arguments. Alliant will address each in turn. 
The first argument the Assessor advances is that inasmuch as the Settlement 
Agreement was negotiated and consummated between Alliant and the Board, it cannot 
cover and bind the Assessor. The Assessor claims, "the settlement counteroffer was 
issued by the BOE, and not by 'Salt Lake County, its officers and attorneys.'" Assessor's 
Brief at 43. Apparently, the Assessor wants the Court to draw the inference that because 
Alliant and the Board negotiated the Settlement Agreement, its terms and obligations 
cannot bind "Salt Lake County, its officers and attorneys." This inference can only be 
valid if one ignores or distorts the ratification/approval of the Settlement Agreement by 
the Salt Lake County Commission at the public hearing conducted December 6, 2000. 
See Findings of Fact, % 11, R. 002876, Appendix B. Following the Salt Lake County 
Commission's ratification/approval of the Settlement Agreement, and consistent with the 
Commission's statutorily vested prerogative as the County's duly elected and constituted 
legislative and executive body, the agreement bound and binds "Salt Lake County, its 
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officers and attorneys," which necessarily includes the Assessor as an officer of the 
County. See Findings of Fact 1 31, R. 002873, Appendix B. 
The next argument the Assessor advances is that he cannot be bound by the 
Settlement Agreement because he "was deliberately 'kicked out' of settlement 
discussions and never participated in its terms." Assessor's Brief at 43. Having not 
participated in the deliberations, the Assessor argues he was not a party to and cannot be 
bound under the Settlement Agreement. But as the Tax Court found, this argument is 
flawed in many respects. One, the Settlement Agreement bound "Salt Lake County, its 
officers and attorneys" when the Salt Lake County Commission ratified it on December 
6, 2000, as discussed above. Two, the Assessor's own admissions describing his 
opposition to the Settlement Agreement contradict his claim that he had no input in the 
settlement negotiations.14 Put differently, the Assessor's arguments cannot be reconciled 
with his actions and the facts. The Assessor himself communicated his protestations to 
Board members at several phases of their deliberations, as well as at the public meeting 
before the Salt Lake County Commission on December 6, 2000. Despite his protests, the 
Assessor lost the debate. The decision-making bodies—the Board and the Salt Lake 
14
 In the Affidavit of Lee Gardner dated February 28, 2001 [R. 001743], the Assessor 
states that (1) he attended a meeting on September 18, 2000 with representatives of the 
Board of Equalization and others to discuss settlement with Alliant and he expressed his 
objections to settlement and the inequities he thought it would create. Id f 3,4; (2) he 
provided at least two letters to each Board member and others formally voicing his 
concerns and objections about efforts of settlement. Idf 2,5; and (3) he appeared at and 
voiced his concerns and objections to the Settlement Agreement in the public Salt Lake 
County Commission meeting held December 6, 2000. Id.fl. 
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County Commission—twice rejected the Assessor's arguments when they adopted and 
approved the Settlement Agreement, despite the Assessor's repeated complaints. 
The next argument the Assessor advances in seeking reversal of the attorneys' fees 
award stems from a counteroffer of settlement Alliant wrote to the Board dated 
November 30, 2000 [R. 001708], in which the concept of joint cooperation in good faith 
was first proposed as a condition of settlement. Alliant there stated, "Salt Lake County, 
its officers, attorneys and assessors, shall, in good faith and operating in concert with 
Alliant" secure the approval of the Settlement Agreement. Letter from Maxwell A. 
Miller to Karl Hendrickson (November 30, 2000); R. 001708. In the next iteration of the 
settlement documents, the Settlement Agreement Mr. Hendrickson prepared on behalf of 
the Board, which was the version it ultimately adopted, the word "assessors" was deleted. 
Based upon that deletion, the Assessor claims he has a loophole through which to escape. 
This argument is without merit. Alliant's original counteroffer dated November 
30, 2000 used the words "officers, attorneys and assessors" as double coverage in an 
effort to foreclose the County from attempting to dishonor the Settlement Agreement. 
Alliant's intent in writing the November 30, 2000 letter is self-evident from the fact that 
Salt Lake County has only one elected assessor, and one elected district attorney, 
although the letter says "assessors," and "attorneys." More important, both the District 
Attorney and the Assessor are statutorily defined as and admitted to be "officers" of the 
County. The Assessor expressly admits he "is an independently elected County Official" 
[Assessor's Brief at 47], obviously bringing him within the scope of those bound to seek 
approval of the Settlement Agreement "in good faith." Clothed with apparent authority 
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and speaking as an agent for his principals "Salt Lake County, its officers and attorneys," 
Mr. Karl L. Hendrickson, Deputy District Attorney, bound his principals to the 
Settlement Agreement.15 The words in the Settlement Agreement, "Salt Lake County, its 
officers and attorneys," mean precisely what they say and the Assessor is bound. 
Yeargin, Inc. v. Auditing Division, 2001 UT 11 (the "plain language" of a stipulation will 
control). It was precisely on that basis that the Tax Court found the Assessor to be a 
"nominal party" to the Settlement Agreement, [Findings of Fact f l 18,31, R. 002875, 
002873, Appendix B] and therefore had breached his obligations under the agreement by 
refusing to honor it, and aggressively seeking its disapproval before the Tax Commission 
and the Tax Court. See specifically Findings of Fact fj[ 16, 17, 18, 27 and 30, R. 002875, 
002873, Appendix B. Most important, the Salt Lake County Commission expressly 
ratified/approved the Settlement Agreement on December 6, 2000 thereby solidifying its 
binding effect on "Salt Lake County, its officers and attorneys." Findings of Fact f 19, 
R. 002874, Appendix B. 
The Assessor's final argument is that if the Board had intended to include the 
Assessor in the proposed settlement with Alliant, the Board's approval of the Settlement 
Agreement would have exceeded the scope of its authority. Assessor's Brief at 47. In 
support of this proposition, the Assessor cites several statutes and court decisions that 
15
 Basic agency law dictates that a principal (Mr. Gardner) is bound by the acts of an 
agent clothed with apparent authority (Mr. Hendrickson). Restatement (Second) of 
Agency § 8 (1958). In Harrison v. Auto Securities Co., 257 P. 677 (Utah 1927), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: "It is a general principle of the law of agency that the principals 
are bound by the acts of their agents which fall within the apparent scope of the authority 
of the agents, and that the principals will not be permitted to deny the authority of their 
agents against innocent third parties, who have dealt with those agents in good faith." 
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allow the Assessor appeal rights. Alliant agrees the Assessor is vested with appeal rights 
as to certain Board actions, but the Assessor's conceded appeal rights to a Board decision 
are completely irrelevant in an appropriate analysis of a County Commission contract. 
The Assessor has asserted another non sequitur. 
As explained in Section I above, the crux of this matter is the statutorily granted 
power to the Salt Lake County Commission, as the duly constituted executive and 
legislative body of the County, to settle protracted litigation involving the County, when, 
in good faith, it believes such to be in the County's best interests. If not before, the 
Settlement Agreement became binding on "Salt Lake County, its officers and attorneys" 
when it was expressly ratified/approved by the Salt Lake County Commission on 
December 6, 2000. Findings of Fact f 11, R. 002876. As the Tax Court noted "This fact 
alone [adoption of Settlement Agreement by the County Commission] may cast this case 
in a different posture than some case law cited as controlling." Tax Court Decision of 
September 20, 2001 at 15, R. 001973, Appendix B. 
Moreover, the Assessor has confused his "right of appeal" with a supposed "right 
of veto," wrongly assuming the two are equivalent. The Assessor may have the right to 
have the Board and the County Commission consider his opinion, but that does not mean 
the reviewers must necessarily sanction and adopt the Assessor's views. As discussed in 
footnote 10, the Assessor forcefully asserted his opinions to both the Board and the Salt 
Lake County Commission, and yet notwithstanding the Assessor's expressed concerns, 
each viewed settlement of litigation with Alliant to be in the County's best interests. See 
specifically Notes of the Salt Lake County Commission meeting of December 6, 2000; R. 
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001687, 001684. The simple reality of the situation is that the Assessor was unable to 
persuade the Board and the Salt Lake County Commission that his opinion was correct 
and in the County's best interests. 
CONCLUSION 
This is an easy case for affirmance. The fundamental issue is whether explicit 
language in the Utah Code vesting the Salt Lake County Commission with authority to 
settle unliquidated claims in "all lawsuits and other actions" should have a judicially 
inferred exception for property tax litigation. Appellants' briefs and that of the Tax 
Commission invite this Court to invent case law, and disregard statutory law, as if there 
were no law. The Tax Commission, for instance, wants this Court, not the legislature, to 
establish procedures for settlement of property tax cases in the face of explicit statutory 
authority to the contrary. Appellants want the Court to invalidate settlement procedures 
for property tax litigation that have been successfully used in hundreds of cases for many 
years. If Appellants have their way, property tax settlements, which invariably are 
compromises between competing claims of fair market value, will rarely be achieved. 
Salt Lake County's present refusal to honor the Settlement Agreement remains a 
mystery, especially in light of voluminous case law imposing a duty of "good faith and 
fair dealing" upon contracting parties. See, e.g., Campbell v. State Farm Auto Ins. Co., 
2004 UT 34, f 27 (Good faith and fair dealing is the parties' expectation in a contractual 
relationship.). To this day, there is absolutely no legal impediment stopping Salt Lake 
County from keeping its word, honoring the Settlement Agreement and paying Alliant 
the refund it agreed to pay. Were Salt Lake County to honor its commitment, this case 
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would then be moot. Yet whatever reasons may exist for the County's so-called "benign 
neutrality," as the Tax Court termed the County's attempt "to invalidate and reject its 
own detailed [contractual] language," it is inarguable that "Salt Lake County, its officers 
and attorneys" have made no attempt "in good faith and acting in concert with Alliant" to 
secure approval of the Settlement Agreement, as the County and County officials 
promised they would. Despite such breach of contract, it is nonetheless apodictic that 
Salt Lake County District Attorney David Yocom was correct in declaring on December 
6, 2000 in a public meeting on the Settlement Agreement, "there [is] no question that the 
[County] Commission has the ultimate authority to control litigation and to determine 
what settlement amounts should be offered." Mr. Yocom's admission recognizes, as did 
Tax Court Judge Lynn W. Davis, that Utah statutes confer plenary authority on the 
County Executive to settle "all lawsuits and other actions" including property tax 
litigation. The Settlement Agreement is "legal, enforceable and constitutional," just as 
Judge Davis held. The Tax Court should be affirmed. 
DATED this ^ day of July, 2004 
IAXWELL A. MILLER 
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Dear Max: 
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Legation 
The Board has requested me to communicate a final settlement counteroffer to you to be 
presented to your client. The Board's offer of settlement is for tax years 1995 through 1999, 
inclusive, and is in the amount of 55 Million dollars. That settlement number includes all claims 
in all outstanding actions for those tax years involving real and personal property, NTROP. and is 
inclusive of all interest, both that accruing prior to the issuance of the judgments or orders and 
that accruing after the issuance of the judgments or orders through the date of final payment. 
fn proposing a setdement amount of S5 Million dollars, the Board specifically makes this 
a settlement in satisfaction of all disputed claims for the years 1995-1999 inclusive. No 
obsolescence percentage or amount will be applied to any particular year under appeal and any 
allocation of a reduction in value to any particular year shall be for refund calculation 
percentages only and shall be neither indicative nor dispositive with respect to any issue raised in 
Affiant's appeals. Specificalfy included within that category are claims as to excessive or 
extraordinary functional pbsolescence, economic or external obsolescence, environmental 
contamination and remediation, and any stigma associated therewith. With respect to the 
personal property inclusion within the settlement amount, acceptance of the settlement shall 
include all issues which have been asserted with respect to personal property, including but not 
limited to existence or non-existence of items of property, extraordinary functional obsolescence 
economic or external obsolescence associated with production equipment and unresolved issues 
related to previously filed personal property affidavits by Alliant and audits performed by Salt 
Lake County. This settlement proposal is subject to execution of a settlement agreement and 
stipulation incorporating the terms hereof, final approval by the Utah State Tax Commission and 
the District Court and entiy of appropriate judgments and orders sufficient to authorize Salt Lake 
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County and the affected taxing entities within Salt Lake County to recover^11 refunds paid 
through the imposition of an appropriate judgment levy Payment of the refund, at the taxing 
entity's option, will be made either from current cash flows and reserves or from the proceeds of 
the judgment levy. 
This settlement shall be deemed by the parties to be a litigation settlement of disputed 
claims. To that end, in the event the settlement is not accepted, none of the communications nor 
correspondence relating to the settlement shall be introduced or produced by any party nor shall 
they be deemed admissible including by reference or inclusion in the pleadings of the parties in 
any proceeding relating to the matters in dispute or any subsequent proceeding involving Alliant 
or Alliant's successors in interest In the event the settlement is accepted, the prohibition against 
production, introduction, or admissibility in any proceeding shall extend to any and all 
correspondence, communications relating to the settlement proposal, the settlement adoption and 
the actual settlement documents themselves, including therein pleadings, orders and judgments 
except as may be required to enforce the terms of the settlement 
Unless prohibited by an order entered in the intervention proceedings, the settlement 
agreement and the stipulation shall be signed and filed with the Third District Court and the Utah 
State Tax Commission, as the case may be, no later than December 15, 2000. Payment of the 
refund, at each taxing entity's option, will be made either from current cash flows and reserves or 
from the proceeds of the judgment levy no later than December 31, 2001. 
Salt Lake County, its officers and attorneys, in good faith and acting in concert with 
Alliant shall seek to secure an appropriate order from the Third District Court and the Utah State 
Tax Commission approving the settlement agreement and the stipulation in an expeditious 
manner. 
In the event any party breaches the foregoing conditions of settlement, the non-breaching 
party is entitled to attorneys' fees or costs incurred in enforcing the settlement agreement. 
Sincerely, - f / 
KARL L. HENDRJCKSON 
Deputy District Attorney 
Tax & Revenue Unit Chief 
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pc: David Yoconi 
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IN THE TAX COURT DIVISION OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF 
EQUALIZATION and the UTAH STATE 
TAX COMMISSION, 
Defendants, 
and 
LEE GARDNER, and GRANITE SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, 
Defendants-Intervenors. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
,rd 3™ Dist Civil No. 980901298 
(1995-1996 valuation tax years) 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
VLLIANT TECHSYSTEMS, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
ALT LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF 
QUALIZATION and the UTAH STATE 
AX COMMISSION, 
3rd Dist Civil No. 010908307 
(1997-1999 valuation tax years) 
1867.1 
Defendants, 
and 
LEE GARDNER, and GRANITE SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, 
Defendants-Intervenors. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS, INC. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, LEE GARDNER 
in his official capacity as SALT LAKE 
COUNTYASSESSOR; LARRY 
RICHARDSON in his official capacity as 
SALT LAKE COUNTY TREASURER; 
MARY CALLAGHAN, RANDY 
HORIUCHI, and BRENT OVERSON, in 
their official capacities as the SALT LAKE 
COUNTY COMMISSION, and the SALT 
LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF 
EQUALIZATION, 
Defendants. 
vs. 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION and 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF 
GRANITE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
<tfa 4l" Dist. Civil No. 990402607 
(Independent Action) 
Honorable Lynn W. Davis 
Intervenors 
On December 5, 2000, Plaintiff Alliant Techsystems, Inc. ("Alliant"), and Defendants 
Salt Lake County, its officers and assessors, entered into a written stipulation in settlement of the 
above-captioned matter. The Salt Lake County Commission approved the Settlement Agreement 
on December 6, 2000, and on December 15, 2000 parties to the Settlement Agreement filed a 
Stipulation for Settlement and Joint Motion for Approval and Entry of an Order Approving 
Settlement ("Joint Motion") with this Court. 
The parties in the above-captioned matter, including Defendants-Intervenors Lee 
Gardner, Utah State Tax Commission, and Granite School District (collectively "Defendants") 
subsequently filed their respective memoranda stating their positions on the Joint Motion. On 
March 13, 2001, the Court heard oral argument on the Joint Motion. 
Based upon the arguments and memoranda of counsel for the respective parties, and the 
Court being fully advised in the premises, the Court entered a written "Tax Court Decision" 
("Decision") dated September 20,2001 with respect to the Joint Motion. 
On June 7,2002, the Court entered a Memorandum Decision in which it considered: 
1. Salt Lake County Assessor's Motion Asking the Court to Reconsider Its Decision 
That the Assessor Was a Party to the Settlement Agreement; 
2. Acceptance, modification of, or rejection of Plaintiffs Proposed Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order on Joint Motion to Approve Settlement; 
3. Alliant's Motion to Alter or Amend Tax Court Decision and consideration of 
Plaintiffs [Proposed and Revised] Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
on Joint Motion to Approve Settlement; and 
u u *s 
mei.x 
4. The Award of Attorneys' Fees. 
Having carefully reviewed the arguments and briefing of the parties, the Court now enters 
the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On March 7, 2001, the Tax Commission denied Alliant and the County's Joint 
Motion for Approval of Settlement. 
2. The Tax Commission held a Formal Hearing on April 23, 2001 through April 27, 
2001, to determine the fair market value for the property in question for the years 1997 through 
1999. The Tax Commission determined that the fair market value for Alliant's property was 
$215,210,000, $212,559,000 and $232,650,000 for the years 1997 through 1999 respectively. 
3. On September 21, 2001, Alliant filed a Petition for Judicial Review in the Third 
District Court, seeking "review by trial de novo" under Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-601 of the Tax 
Commission's Final Decision in Alliant Techsystems v. Board of Equalization of Salt Lake 
County, et aL Appeal Nos. 98-0452, 98-0608 and 99-019. These consolidated cases protest the 
County's assessments of Alliant5s real property for the years 1997, 1998 and 1999 (the "1997-
1999 Valuation Case")- Under regular administrative procedures, the 1997-1999 Valuation Case 
was designated Case No. 010908307 and assigned to the Honorable Ronald E. Nehring, sitting as 
a Tax Court Judge. 
4. Judge Ronald E. Nehring disqualified himself from the case by Minute Entry 
dated October 9, 2001. 
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5. The 1997-1999 Valuation Case was thereupon assigned to Judge Pat B. Brian, 
sitting as a Tax Court Judge. 
6. Filed simultaneously with its Petition for review in the 1997-1999 Valuation Case 
was Alliant's Motion to Transfer the case to the Honorable Judge Lynn W. Davis, a designated 
"Tax Court Judge'* in the Tax Division of the Utah District Courts. 
7. Alliant filed a Motion to Transfer the 1997-1999 Valuation Case to this Court. 
No less than six other related cases involving the same parties, properties and taxes are pending 
before the Court. The first of the six pending Alliant v. Salt Lake County cases was filed 
February 6, 1998, and was initially assigned to Judge Dennis Frederick (980901298). This first 
case was termed the "Independent or NIROP Action," and involves Alliant's statutory and 
constitutional challenge to the County's assessment of federal property that Alliant operates 
under the direction and control of the United States Navy (the Naval Industrial Reserve 
Ordnance Plant or "NIROP"). The Complaint in the Independent or NIROP Action seeks 
declaratory and injunctive relief against defendant Salt Lake County for the years 1995, 1996, 
1997, 1998, 1999 and future years. The Complaint also requests relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
against the County for having taxed Alliant in violation of Article VI of the United States 
Constitution. 
8. There being no opposition, Judge Frederick assigned the Independent or NIROP 
Action to a "Tax Court Judge," who, by random rotation, was the Honorable Lynn W. Davis. 
9. The other five pending Alliant v. Salt Lake County, et al., cases are appeals that 
either Salt Lake County ot Mliaot filed ftom a Fmal Decision the Utah State T&K Commi^ioa 
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("Tax Commission") issued November 16, 1999 on the consolidated appeals of the County's 
1995 and 1996 tax assessments of Alliant's real property (the "1995-1996 Valuation Case"). 
The Clerk of the Third Judicial District initially assigned the various appeals of the 1995-1996 
Valuation Case respectively to Judges Nehring (990912695), Hanson (00090065 AA), Lewis 
(00901301), Medley (000901449 AA), and Memmott 00070001). Again with agreement from 
all parties, the 1995-1996 Valuation Case was consolidated and reassigned to the Honorable 
Lynn W. Davis because he was the assigned "Tax Court Judge" for the Independent or NIROP 
Action. 
10. By Order dated on November 6, 2001, Judge Pat B. Brian transferred the 1997-
1999 Valuation Case to this Court. 
11. On December 5, 2000, the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization and Alliant 
entered into a Settlement Agreement, whereby all property tax disputes between the parties for 
the years 1995 through 1999 inclusive were compromised and settled. On December 6, 2000, 
the Salt Lake County Commission, as the County's duly elected legislative body, adopted and 
approved the Settlement Agreement. 
12. On September 27, 2001, Alliant filed a Notice of Withdrawal and Voluntary 
Dismissal of the 1995-1999 personal property tax appeals with the Tax Commission, dismissing 
all its pending appeals with the Utah State Tax Commission with respect to personal property tax 
assessments from 1995 through 1999 inclusive. 
13. As a result of the foregoing actions and events, now pending before this Court are 
all cases and controversies that exist between Alliant and Salt Lake County relating to property 
tax matters for the years 1995 through 1999 inclusive; to-wit, the Independent or NIROP action, 
the 1995-1996 Valuation Case, and the 1997-1999 Valuation Case. The personal property tax 
matters have been dismissed. 
14. Parties to the Settlement Agreement entered into the agreement while some 
matters covered by the Settlement Agreement, specifically property tax disputes involving 
Alliant and some of the Defendants, were pending before this Tax Court and the Tax 
Commission. Decision at 12. 
15. The Settlement Agreement is conditioned upon the approval of the Tax 
Commission and this Court. Decision at 13. 
16. Prior to the formalization and approval of the Settlement Agreement, a draft or 
proposal was circulated that clearly indicated Salt Lake County, "Assessors," etc., as parties to 
the action. While the Settlement Agreement deletes the word "Assessors," as approved and 
executed, it states that Salt Lake County, and its "officers" are parties to the Settlement 
Agreement Decisional 15. 
17. The executed Settlement Agreement bears the signature of Karl Hendrickson, 
Deputy District Attorney for and on behalf of Salt Lake County, its officers and attorneys, and 
the signature of Maxwell Miller for and on behalf of Alliant. The Settlement Agreement was an 
offer of settlement presented by the attorney/agent of the parties to the Settlement Agreement, 
Decisional 15. 
18. Defendant Lee Gardner, as the duly elected Salt Lake County Assessor, is an 
officer of Salt Lake County and a nominal party to the Settlement Agreement. Decision at 15. 
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19. The actions of the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization in extending and 
agreeing to the Settlement Agreement were ratified/approved by the Salt Lake County 
Commission. Decision at 15. 
20. In reaching settlement, consideration was given to the risk of liability to Salt Lake 
County and taxing entities within Salt Lake County, together with the costs and trouble of 
protracted litigation, a review of depositions and appraisals, and at least some discussion relative 
to the merits of the respective claims. Decision at 16. 
21. The Settlement Agreement was drafted by Salt Lake County, which later 
attempted to invalidate and reject its own detailed language based upon statutory, constitutional 
and pragmatic arguments. Decision at 16. 
22. There is no evidence of repudiation, retraction or withdrawal by any of the parties 
to the Settlement Agreement. Decision at 16. 
23. There is no evidence that the parties to the Settlement Agreement entered into the 
agreement based upon inadvertence, improvidence, excusable neglect, inequity, disadvantage, 
injustice, overreaching, or against sound public policy. Decision at 16. 
24. This Settlement Agreement was proposed initially by the Salt Lake County Board 
of Equalization and then was adopted/ratified by the Salt Lake County Commission. 
25. The Settlement Agreement addresses but does not set or fix valuations based upon 
fair market value. Decision at 17. 
26. The Settlement Agreement does not address the divisibility/severability of the $5 
million dollar settlement amount to separate years. The Settlement Agreement spans multiple 
tax years and multiple jurisdictions. Decision at 17. 
27. The Settlement Agreement binds "Salt Lake County, its officers and attorneys," 
who, "in good faith and acting in concert with Alliant" shall "seek to secure an appropriate order 
from the Third District Court and the Utah State Tax Commission approving the settlement 
agreement and the stipulation in an expeditious manner." Decision at 22. 
28. The Settlement Agreement further provides that "In the event any party breaches 
the foregoing conditions of settlement, the non-breaching party is entitled to attorneys' fees or 
costs incurred in enforcing the settlement agreement." Decision at 22. 
29. The Salt Lake County Board of Equalization did not affirmatively seek to secure 
approval of the Settlement Agreement, nor did it object to approval of the Settlement Agreement; 
instead it acted in "benign neutrality" with respect to the approval process. Decision at 23. 
30. Defendant Lee Gardner, in his role of Salt Lake County Assessor, advocated the 
defeat of the Settlement Agreement and invited the Court to void the agreement on a variety of 
statutory, factual and constitutional grounds, which the Court rejects. Decision at 23. 
31. Defendant Lee Gardner, in his capacity as Salt Lake County Assessor, is a party 
to the Settlement Agreement because he is, at least nominally, an "officer" of Salt Lake County. 
Decision at 23. 
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32. Defendant Lee Gardner, in his capacity as Salt Lake County Assessor, breached 
the Settlement Agreement by seeking to defeat the Settlement Agreement rather than seeking to 
secure its approval. Decision at 23. 
33. Other Defendants who are not parties to the Settlement Agreement are not bound 
by the attorneys' fee provision of the Settlement Agreement, Decision at 23. 
34. While the Settlement Agreement is a blanket settlement for all property tax 
disputes between the parties for 1995 through 1999 either pending before this Court or before the 
Tax Commission, the Settlement Agreement did not address future valuations. Decision at 23. 
35. The Independent or NIROP Action involves Alliant's challenge to the County's 
assessment of federal property that Alliant operates under the direction of the United States Navy 
(the Naval Industrial Reserve Ordnance Plant or NIROP). The Complaint in the independent or 
NIROP actions seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against defendant Salt Lake County for the 
years 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 and further years. In addition, the Complaint also requests 
relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the County for having taxed Alhant in violation of Article 
VI of the United States Constitution. The Settlement Agreement expressly covers tax years 
1995-1999, clearly including the NEROP action. But the Settlement Agreement does not cover 
future years (beyond the scope of the Settlement Agreement) where Alliant claims continued 
unlawful assessment of NIROP. Therefore, portions of the NIROP claims are expressly covered 
by the Settlement Agreement and portions, future claims, were expressly excepted; never 
addressed in the Settlement Agreement. The Settlement Agreement does not bar post-settlement 
NIROP claims. The NIROP claims are separate from the other related valuation cases. 
36. The Settlement Agreement was negotiated and entered into in good faith and 
anticipated a refund of $5 million to Ailiant. Decision at 24. 
37. The intent of the parties to settle its property tax disputes arising from 1995 
through 1999 inclusive is unequivocal. Decision at 24. 
38. The Tax Commission's rejection of the Settlement Agreement did not focus on 
constitutional difficulties and problematic implementation of the Settlement Agreement, but 
primarily upon the Settlement Agreement's failure to include a potential intervenor. Decision at 
13. 
39. The Tax Commission's factual basis for rejecting the Settlement Agreement does 
not exist here because an intervenor does not become a party to an action until the motion to 
intervene has been filed, briefed, noticed, argued and ruled upon. Decision at 13. Defendant 
Granite School District filed its Motion to Intervene on December 7, 2000, whereas the Salt Lake 
County Commission ratified the Settlement Agreement on December 6, 2000. 
40. Alliant's request for attorneys' fees is reasonable and appropriate in the amount of 
$30,000. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now therefore enters its 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Settlement Agreement is enforceable, legal and constitutional. Decision at 
2L 
2. The Court rejects Defendants' constitutional challenges to the Settlement 
Agreement, specifically including Defendants' arguments that the Settlement Agreement is 
unconstitutional because it does not assign an assessed value to the property at issue based upon 
fair market value. Decision at 21. 
3. The Court rejects the Tax Commission's objection to the Settlement Agreement 
that the Tax Commission and/or Granite School District are necessary parties to the Settlement 
Agreement. Granite School District was not a necessary party to the Settlement Agreement and 
its absence as a party to the agreement does not make the Settlement Agreement unenforceable. 
Decision at 24. 
4. When the Court issued its Decision, jurisdiction to approve the Settlement 
Agreement was divided between this Court and the Tax Commission. This Court had partial 
jurisdiction to approve the Settlement Agreement in that jurisdiction was then shared between 
this Court and the Tax Commission. Decision at 22. 
5. While jurisdiction to approve the Settlement Agreement was divisible between the 
Tax Commission and the Court, the refund award to Alliant under the Settlement Agreement is 
global, indivisible and cannot be allocated between separate taxing years. Decision at 22. 
6. The refund amount of $5 million to Alliant under the Settlement Agreement is 
indivisible and non-allocable between the various tax years. Decision at 25. 
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7. The sole reason the Court initially declined to enforce the Settlement Agreement 
is that the Court's jurisdiction and the Tax Commission's jurisdiction over the years 1995 
through 1999 at issue under the Settlement Agreement were divisible. Decision at 25. 
8. The Salt Lake County Commission is a legislative body and has authority to 
resolve, compromise and settle lawsuits during pending litigation. Decision at 16. 
9. Alliant is entitled to attorneys5 fees to be assessed against Defendant Lee Gardner, 
in his official capacity as Salt Lake County Assessor, because Mr. Gardner breached the 
Settlement Agreement in not seeking to secure approval of the Settlement Agreement. Decision 
at 24 and 25. 
10. The Court has entertained, considered and rejected Defendants' arguments against 
the Settlement Agreement and its enforcement, which include: 
10.1 At least initially, the Salt Lake County Assessor does not have the 
opportunity to fulfill his statutory duties to assess all property 
uniformly and equally based upon Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-302 and 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102, as amended; 
10.2 The Settlement Agreement address but does not set or fix values 
based upon fair market value; Failure to address Fair Market Value 
violates Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-301, Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102 
and Utah Const. Art. Xm, sec. 2. 
10.3 Because of the collateral decision of the Utah State Tax 
Commission the Settlement Agreement must be defeated on its 
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face: the Utah State Tax Commission's decision is dispositive 
because the "conditional language" of the agreement is plain and 
clear; 
10.4 The issue of divisibility/severability has not been addressed in the 
Settlement Agreement and bifurcation is impossible. The 
Settlement Agreement presents a single integrated resolution for 
five tax years and cannot be bifurcated between two forums with 
differing jurisdictions; 
10.5 There is no mechanism in the Settlement Agreement to allocate the 
$5 million dollar settlement amount to separate years; allocation 
would involve arbitrary and capricious decisions and further, if the 
tax years are severed, it would result in an assessment nightmare; 
10.6 The Settlement Agreement spans multiple tax years and multiple 
jurisdictions; 
10.7 The Court lacks any jurisdiction, regardless of the language of the 
Settlement Agreement; 
10.8 The overriding concern of those who object to the Settlement 
Agreement is that the terms of the Agreement are manifestly unjust 
and the Agreement entirely ignores uniform and equal taxation 
statutes and fair market value. The Agreement is fundamentally 
flawed because there is no attempt to achieve fair market value. 
Uniformity, fairness and equality cannot be achieved. 
10.9 The Board lacks plenary power to settle cases. 
10.10 The Assessor is not a party to nor bound by the Settlement 
Agreement. 
10.11 Fundamental fairness and due process should compel the Court to 
reject the Settlement Agreement. 
10.12 The Settlement Agreement cannot be implemented in its current 
form because it fails to reflect fair market value assessments. 
Decision at 17-18. 
11. This Court is not bound by the Tax Commission's decision of rejection of the 
Settlement Agreement. Decision at 13. 
Based upon the foregoing Conclusions of Law, the Court now enters its 
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ORDER 
Alliant's Motion to Alter or Amend is hereby granted and the Court enforces the Settlement 
Agreement in its entirety. Judgment is hereby entered against Salt Lake County and in favor of 
AUiant for $5 million. The Court awards attorneys' fees to Alliant Techsystems, Inc., against 
Defendant Lee Gardner, in his capacity as Salt Lake County Assessor, in the amount of $30,000. 
DATED this JO day of June 2003. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, LEE GARDNER in 
his official capacity as SALT LAKE COUNTY 
ASSESSOR; LARRY RICHARDSON in his 
official capacity as SALT LAKE COUNTY 
TREASURER; MARY CALLAGHAN, 
RANDY HORIUCHI, and BRENT 
OVERSON, in their official capacities as the 
SALT LAKE COUNTY COMMISSION, and 
the SALT LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF 
EQUALIZATION, 
Defendants. 
TAX COURT DECISION 
CASE NO. 990402607 
DATE: SEPTEMBER 19,2001 
! JUDGE: LYNN W. DAVIS 
CLERK: SGJ 
Randy M Grimshaw 
Maxwell A. Miller 
COUNSEL OF RECORD: 
Alliant Techsystems, Inc. 
John McCarry, Assistant Attorney General 
Michelle Snow, Assistant Attorney General 
Bill Thomas Peters 
Mary Ellen Sloan, Deputy Salt Lake District 
Attorney 
Utah State Tax Commission 
Salt Lake County, Lee Gardner, Larry 
Richardson, Mary Callaghan, Randy 
Horiuchi, Brent Overson, Salt Lake County 
Board of Equalization, Salt Lake County 
Commission at the Motion to Dismiss and 
Motion for Summary Judgment stage 
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J. Craig Smith Salt Lake County, Salt Lake County Board 
of Equalization at the Motion to Approve 
Settlement Stage 
Kelly Wright Salt Lake County Assessor 
John E. S. Robson Granite School District 
There are now pending before the Court various motions from both sides. Rulings on 
various motions have been stayed because of Alliant's Motion for Approval of Settlement which 
was filed on or about March 1,200 L 
This Court will attempt to outline the legal arguments gleaned from oral argument, 
memoranda and various reply briefs of each^party. Please consider the following: 
PENDING MOTION #1 
ALLIANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
FILED AUGUST 24,1999 
The motion was "limited to defendants' unlawful taxation of NIROP property, and to 
claims related to that unlawful taxation." AUiant alleges that "because the federal government, in 
this instance the United States Navy, and not plaintiff, has and exercises the most significant 
incidents of ownership over its NIROP real and personal property which plaintiff manages under 
contract with the United States Navy, such property is immune from assessment and taxation by 
defendant Salt Lake County and/or any of its subdivisions under Article VI of the United States 
Constitution." (See generally Alliant's Motion to Supplement Record With After-Acquired 
Testimony.) 
-2-
~
 t
 -* r ty ^ U U i i J O S 
PENDING MOTION #2 
TAX COMMISSION'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
FILED JUNE 1,2000 
PARTY POSITION AND ARGUMENTS 
TAX COMMISSION (ARGUMENTS taken from Tax Commission's Reply 
Memo in Support for Motion for Summary Judgment 6-1-
2000) 
POINT ONE: Alliant is not exempt from the Utah privilege 
tax, UCA § 59-4-101 
* Alliant claims an exemption from the privilege 
tax under UCA 59-4-10 l(3)(e) which exempts 
"the use or possession of any lease, permit, or 
easement unless the lease, permit, or easement 
entitles the lessee or permittee to exclusive 
possession of the premises to which the lease, 
permit, or easement relates..," 
L Tax Commission argues Alliant has not 
pled, nor can it show, that it uses NIROP 
pursuant to any "lease, permit or easement" 
2. Alliant cannot show that its use of 
NIROP is not "exclusive." 
3. Alliant must prove it is exempt which it 
has not done. 
4. The exemption statute must be construed 
strictly against the taxpayer (Newspaper 
Agency Corp. v. Auditing Division. 938 P.2d 
266,270 (Utah, 1997). 
** "Even if the Court construes Alliant's contract to be a 
"lease, permit or easement," the Court must reject Alliant's 
argument for exemption." 
1. Alliant argues "exclusive possession" as used in 
the statute, must be interpreted to mean that the 
possession is exclusive of everyone, including the 
owner. The Tax Commission argues "exclusive 
possession" must be read to mean that the possession 
is exclusive of everyone but the owner or lessor. Tax 
Commission directs the Court to Thiokol Chem. 
*• ** t 
Corp. v. Peterson, 393 P.2d 391 (Utah 1964) where 
it states the intent of the statute is to Hclose the gap 
in the tax laws by imposing a tax on any property 
possessed or used in connection with a business for 
profit which was otherwise exempt from taxation." 
2. NIROP is the only contractor with a contract for 
the use of NIROP. 
3. NIROP is not open to the public, or other 
contractors. 
4. The Navy's (owner) exercise of its rights to the 
property should not change the conclusion that 
Alliant5 s possession of NIROP is exclusive. 
POINT TWO: The privilege tax against Alliant does not 
violate the Supremacy Clause. 
1. Tax Commission argues that Alliant's 
argument is that the privilege tax is 
unconstitutional because it measures tax with 
reference to the value of exempt property. 
Commission argues this same argument was 
rejected in U.S. v. City of Detroit 355, U.S. 466, 
470. (See Reply Memo p. 6-7) 
PENDING MOTION #3 
TAX COMMISSION'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
PARTY POSITION AND ARGUMENTS 
TAX COMMISSION POINT ONE: The Utah Constitution and the Utah 
Supreme Court's decision in Evans & Sutherland, 953 P.2d 
435 establish the limits of the district court's original 
jurisdiction over tax matters. 
POINT TWO: The Court lacks jurisdiction because 
plaintiff must first exhaust its administrative remedies. 
POINT THREE: Alliant is ban*ed by Res Judicata 
*Tax Commission issued a final decision on the 
taxability of NIROP and Alliant cannot thus bring 
this original action. 
POINT FOUR: Declaratory relief is barred where another 
action is pending with the same issues. 
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POINT FIVE: The Court should dismiss Alliant's section 
1983 action because Alliant has an adequate remedy under 
state law. 
THE ASSESSOR, COUNTY COMMISSION, AND BOARD OF EQUALIZATION 
SUPPORTED THE MOTION TO DISMISS FILED JUNE 1,2000 
ALLIANT (The following arguments are taken from Alliant's Reply 
'Memo addressing Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment.) 
POINT ONE: There is no constitutional bar to the 
"independent" action. 
-Creation of tax court certainly provides no 
limitation on the rights taxpayers have had for 
years to institute independent court proceedings 
against erroneous, illegal and unlawful tax 
assessments (see UCA §§ 59-1-301, 59-2-1321, 
59-2-1326, 59-2-1327). 
POINT TWO: The Tax Commission's final decision is not 
res judicata in the "independent" proceeding on the taxation 
ofNIROP. 
1. Tax Commission's decision on NIROP dealt 
primarily with valuation issues and secondarily 
with the application of the privilege tax to NIROP 
under Utah State Law. The Commission did not 
address nor should it have, federal law issues, 
which must be raised in an independent action. 
2. Tax Commission decision was for 1995-96, the 
"independent" action involves 1995-1999. 
3. Certain causes of action in the "independent 
proceeding are asserted under express statutory 
provisions vesting jurisdiction in the district courts 
to adjudicate taxes "deemed unlawful by the party 
whose property is taxed." UCA 59-1-301, 59-2-
1321, 59-2-1326 and 59-2-1327. 
POINT THREE: Alliant may assert a claim under 42 
U.S.C. §1983 (see Reply Memo, p. 6-11). 
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POINT FOUR: Alliant is entitled to property and 
privilege tax exemption under Utah Law, UCA § 59-4-
101(3) (fully quoted on p. 16 of the memo). 
-Alliant's use of NIROP is not exclusive. It is 
controlled and limited by the Navy. 
POINT FIVE: Alliant does not assert the Supremacy 
Clause. 
-Alliant makes a fair apportionment argument 
under the commerce clause. (Tax Commission 
argues that the cases cited here by Alliant have 
nothing to do with the commerce clause and must 
fall under the Supremacy Clause). (Reply Memo 
p. 24-29). 
PENDING MOTION #4 
ALLIANT'S MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENT FILED MARCH 1,2001 
PARTY POSITION AND ARGUMENTS 
ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS, -BROKERED SETTLEMENT 
INC. 
(Taken from both the Memorandum and Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Settlement.) 
-District Court has jurisdiction to approve Settlement. 
a. "If the Court dismisses the NIROP action for 
lack of jurisdiction, the Court nonetheless can, 
and should approve the SETTLEMENT 
agreement in the "consolidated valuation cases." 
By the terms of the Settlement Agreement, if 
approved, there could be no appeal from a 
dismissal of the NIROP action and the matter 
would be moot." (p. 8 Reply Memo) 
-Board of Equalization had authority to settle. 
a. Board's power to settle comes from Utah 
Const. Art. XIII, sec. 11(7) AND UCA 59-2-
1000, and public policy favoring settlements. 
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b. The Assessor's duty to assess fair market value 
(59-2-302, 59-2-102) is not solely his. Board can 
also assess fair market value (UCA 59-2-103(1), 
and Utah Const. Art. XIII sec 2(1)). 
c. Assessor's duty to assess property at fair 
market value is constitutionally subordinate to the 
Board's duty to equalize assessment. See Rio 
Algom Corp. v. San Juan County. 681 P.2d 184 
("Where it is impossible to achieve perfectly both 
the standard of true value and the standard of 
uniformity and equality, the latter standard should 
prevail.") 
d. Neither Assessor nor Granite has veto power 
over the Board's ability to settle. 
-Settlement Agreement binds Assessor. 
a. Agreement states: "Salt Lake County, its 
officers and attorneys, in good faith and acting in 
concert with Alliant " 
b. Alliant is entitled to attorney's fees against the 
Assessor for having to compel him to honor the 
agreement. 
-Board of Equalization is bound by Settlement 
a. New Board argues prior Board cannot enter 
into a contract, which controls or limits the future 
Board's actions. Alliant argues that the case 
relied upon refers to the binding of "governmental 
or legislative power" and breaching contracts 
made in settlement is not a governmental power. 
b. Government entity cannot repudiate its own 
settlement offer. 
-Court should approve the Settlement 
a. UCA 59-20-1321 provides county legislative 
body with the power to refund taxes, or lower 
assessments. 
b. Sufficient proof was given that wide 
discrepancies existed between Alliant and the 
Assessor. (See p. 11-26 discussing the prior 
adjudicated decisions and the appraisals.) 
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c. The Settlement Agreement contemplates that 
this Court will enter an appropriate order lowering 
Alliant's assessments and ensuring that the taxing 
entities within Salt Lake County may recover 
refunded taxes. 
1. The language of the settlement calls for 
"entry of appropriate judgments and orders 
sufficient to authorize Salt Lake County and 
the affecting taxing entities within Salt Lake 
County to recover all refunds paid the 
imposition of an appropriate judgment levy." 
-"The prerogative to evaluate the risks and likely costs of 
litigation and to choose or compromise between conflicting 
appraisals" belongs to the Board of Equalization. Logan 
City v. Allen. 44 P.2d 1085. 
-Board of Equalization is authorized to "adjust and equalize 
the valuation and assessment of real and personal property 
within their respective counties." UCA §59-2-1000 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
BOARD OF 
EQUALIZATION 
-BROKERED SETTLEMENT 
(New Board is neutral to settlement) 
(Arguments taken from "Reply Memorandum to the Joint 
Motion for Approval of Settlement Agreement.") 
-Board of Equalization changed its entire membership on 
January 2, 2001. 
-Remaining neutral the new Board argues that it is not 
bound by the settlement 
* government bodies "cannot make a contract 
which is binding on the municipality after the 
end of such governing body's term of office." 
Bair v. Lavton City Corp., 307 P.2d 895, 902 
(Utah 1957). 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
ASSESSOR 
-OPPOSES SETTLEMENT 
(Arguments taken from "Reply Memorandum in 
Opposition to Joint Motion for Approval of Settlement.") 
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-Argues Assessor is a necessary party for settlement. 
(UCA §59-2-1001(5)). 
* Assessor was not a party of the settlement. 
* Assessor is not bound by the settlement. 
-Argues the Court lacks jurisdiction over '97, '9$, '99. 
•Settlement covers ' 97, '98, '99 issues (Tax 
Commission has jurisdiction), 
*And settlement covers '95, '96 NIROP (Court 
has jurisdiction). 
-Argues NIROP issue res judicata. 
*Tax Commission found NIROP property 
lawfully taxable subject to UCA §59-4-101 in 
November 1998. 
-Argues settlement invalid because it does not address 
valuation. 
*Fair Market Value not addressed: this violates 
UCA §59-2-301, UCA 59-2-102 and Utah 
Const. Art. XIII, Sec. 2. 
-Argues Board of Equalization lacks the power to broker 
the settlement. 
*UCA §59-2-1347 allows "county legislative 
body" to refund taxes and Board of Equalization 
is not the legislative body. 
*The mere possibility of losing the litigation 
does not justify ignoring constitutional and 
statutory mandates. 
-Argues ("Memorandum in Opposition to Joint Motion 
for Approval of Settlement") that the Assessor is legally 
bound to assess all property uniformly and equal based on 
"fair market value." UCA §59-2-301, 59-2-102. 
-Assessor has a statutory right to appeal the decisions of 
the Board of Equalization. UCA §59-2-1006(1). 
JTAH STATE TAX -OPPOSES SETTLEMENT 
:OMMISSION 
(Arguments taken from "Reply Memorandum in 
Opposition to the Motion to Approve Settlement.") 
uul^j 
-COURT LACKS JURISDICTION (refers the Court to 
Assessor's Memorandum at p. 16-17). 
-Court must ignore issues of valuation methodology (p. 3-
4). 
-March 7,2001 the Tax Commission denied the proposed 
settlement finding as follows: 
1. Granite petitioned to intervene 11-17-2000. 
2. Alliant and Commission knew Granite 
petitioned to intervene and requested to be a 
party in the resolution. 
3. Granite was a necessary party to any 
settlement as of 11-17-2000. 
4. Approval of the settlement "would require a 
necessary party that had moved to intervene 
prior to the stipulated settlement to accept such 
a settlement against its will." 
GRANITE SCHOOL -OPPOSES SETTLEMENT 
DISTRICT 
(Arguments taken from "Reply Memorandum in 
Opposition to Joint Motion for Approval of Settlement.") 
-Board of Equalization lacks the authority to make a 
settlement that ignores fair market value. 
-Utah Constitution requires all property to be taxed 
uniformly and equally. 
-Settlement is not in the best interests of the County. 
PENDING MOTION #5 
ALLIANT'S MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT RECORD WITH 
AFTER-ACQUIRED TESTIMONY FILED JULY 30,2001 
This motion has been dealt with separately by the Court 
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PENDING MOTION #6 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ASSESSOR'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
FILED MARCH 12,2001 
Assessor argues that any attempt to include valuation testimony at this point is beyond 
the scope of settlement 
This motion has been dealt with separately by the Court. 
I. 
PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION 
The creation of a tax court by statute is of recent vintage. This Court's authority is 
governed by law and the Constitution. The Court must analyze its authority carefully. Consider: 
As argued by defendants, 
As a general rule, "parties must exhaust applicable administrative remedies as a 
prerequisite to seeking judicial review," State Tax Commission v. Iverson, 782 P.2d 519, 524 
(Utah 1989). 
As argued by plaintiff, 
A duly constituted tax court in the State of Utah has jurisdiction to decide whether 
Salt Lake County's imposition of a privilege tax violates state or federal law or both. Bluth v. 
Tax Commission, 2001 Ut App 138, 420 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (Ct App. 2001) 2001 Utah App. 
Lexis 35). This Court is aware that the Utah Supreme Court has granted a writ of certiorari. In 
addition the Court may consider whether injunctive/declaratory relief is exclusively within the 
province of the Court, as opposed to the Utah State Tax Commission. 
Next, the Court must also consider in the statutory/constitutional mix, the fact that these 
parties have entered into a settlement agreement which contains specific language requiring a 
district court approval. Certainly, while jurisdiction cannot be stipulated to, the parties have 
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agreed procedurally to have a district court review and either approve or disapprove of the 
settlement. 
It seems to this Court that should the Court disapprove and reject the Settlement 
Agreement, then it must return and carefully rule on the pending Motion to Dismiss, Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment, and other motions. Should this Court approve the settlement, then 
most of the issues and arguments of the parties are moot. 
II. 
SETTLEMENTS AND PUBLIC POLICY 
An agreement was entered into by the litigants or their attorneys while matters were 
pending both before the Utah State Tax Commission and this Tax Court. As addressed above, 
the parties may not by stipulation invest a court with jurisdiction over the subject matter of a 
cause which it would not otherwise have had. The parties understood this basic concept and 
required approval by the Utah State Tax Commission and the Tax Court/District Court. 
A court should give stipulations or agreements of the parties a "fair and liberal 
construction, consistent with the apparent intention of the parties, the spirit of justice, and the 
futherance of fair trials upon the merits, rather than a narrow and technical one calculated to 
defeat the purpose of their making." (See generally 73 Am Jur 2nd §§ 7, 541.) While courts 
generally look upon stipulated settlements with favor, legitimate judicial scrutiny is necessary. 
The Court, in a settlement agreement, ought to look at thfe circumstances surrounding the parties 
at the time of making, ought to look for internal language and term consistency, ought to examine 
whether the result is against public policy, and whether the agreed upon result is 
constitutionally/statutorily sanctioned. Relief from a settlement agreement may be granted due to 
constitutional impairment. 
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A. 
Is This Court Barred by the Decision of the Utah State Tax Commission? 
The Settlement Agreement is conditioned upon the approval of the State Tax 
Commission and the District Court. It was brought to this Court's attention the day before oral 
argument that the State Tax Commission rejected the Settlement Agreement. Is the Settlement 
Agreement simply null and void? Is the Court bound by that decision, even if this Court 
determines the controlling facts to be distinguishable? This Judge is of the opinion that the Tax 
Court is not bound by the decision of rejection by the Utah State Tax Commission. Had the Tax 
Commission focused on constitutional deficiencies and problematic implementation of the 
agreement, this Court would have taken clear notice and given in-depth scrutiny to the reasoning. 
But the Commission seemed to base its decision primarily on the failure of the settlement to 
include a potential intervenor. (See paragraphs 1 - 4 of the State Tax Commission decision.) As 
emphasized below, the factual basis relied upon by the Tax Commission does not exist here. A 
motioned intervenor does not become a party to an action until the motion to intervene has been 
filed, briefed, noticed, argued and ruled upon. If a county commission must include not only the 
litigants, but also a representative from every conceivable taxing entity in a settlement agreement, 
then, as pointed out by plaintiff, a Mosquito Abatement District could hold the litigants hostage.1 
It is a matter of record in this Court that the Board of Education of Granite School 
District faxed a copy of its Motion to Intervene under Rule 24 (a) on December 7, 2000 and filed 
*Of course this Court recognizes that the Granite School District has a far greater interest in this dispute 
than other taxing entities. If the State Tax Commission "Order on Joint Motion for Approval of Settlement" is 
accurate, the "Granite School District is the single largest recipient of the property tax revenue that was the subject 
of the dispute and would be responsible for approximately fifty percent of the refund, or about $2.5 million." (See 
Order at paragraph 13, page 3 attached to Utah State Tax Commission's Reply Memorandum in Opposition to the 
Motion to Approve Settlement) 
Query: If a taxing entity, even a major stakeholder, is entitled to be a party to a settlement agreement and 
has the power to defeat an agreement, and the matter is thereafter heard on the merits, and the "refund" far exceeds 
the stipulated refund, then what? Can other taxing entities look to the intervenor for relief? 
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an original on January 8, 2001. If counsel for Alliant is accurate, the stipulated settlement 
agreement was entered into on December 5, 2000 and was approved by the Salt Lake County 
Commission on December 6, 2000. It is clear that there wasn't even a faxed copy of a motion to 
intervene on file with this Court at the time of the settlement. If the motion did not precede the 
County Commission action, then this Court cannot give any weight to a potential filing of a 
potential intervenor who potentially might become a future party to the action.2 Having said all of 
this, this Court admits ignorance as to Granite School District's status, if any, in any pending 
matters before the Utah State Tax Commission. From the Utah State Tax Commission decision it 
appears that a motion to intervene may have been filed as early as November 17, 2000 in those 
matters. 
This Court is charged with the duty to independently review the settlement agreement 
and clearly the circumstances surrounding intervention before the Utah State Tax Commission 
were not extant before this Court. As argued by Alliant, the "factual basis upon which the Tax 
Commission entirely rested its decision is not present here. There was no motion to intervene 
before the settlement agreement was consummated." It is the opinion of this Court that the ruling 
of the Utah State Tax Commission does not preclude this Court from independently examining 
the Settlement Agreement. 
C 
Is the Settlement Agreement Defeated by the Salt Lake tountv Assessor's 
Claim that He is Not a Party to the Settlement Agreement? 
2Granite School District did not rely upon a "necessary party" theory before this Court. Granite makes no 
mention of this theory in its "Reply Memorandum in Opposition to Joint Motion for Approval of Settlement" or at 
oral argument on the motion to approve settlement. Granite focused on the Board of Equalization's lack of 
authority to enter into a settlement that ignores fair market value, the constitutional defects of the settlement 
because it ignores requirements that all property be taxed uniformly and equally, and the fact that settlement is not 
in the best interests of the County. In addition Granite does rely on the totality of the Tax Commission decision 
which would arguably bar this Court from approving the settlement; there is nothing to approve. 
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Prior to the adoption of the Settlement Agreement, a draft or proposal was circulated 
that clearly indicated Salt Lake County, "Assessors," etc. as the parties to the action. The 
"assessors" language was stricken out. The Settlement Agreement which was agreed to indicates 
"Salt Lake County, its officers," etc. 
That agreement/letter, agreed to and adopted/ratified by the Salt Lake County 
Commission bears the signature of Karl Hendriksen, Deputy District Attorney. It was an offer of 
settlement presented by the attorney/agent of the parties. No one can contend that the duly 
elected Salt Lake County Assessor is not an officer of Salt Lake County. He is. He is a nominal 
party to the Settlement Agreement. 
This Court appreciates the unique duties and role of a county assessor. A county 
assessor has statutory charges which frequently place him/her at odds with the decisions of a 
board of equalization. The assessor necessarily "checks" the decisions of the board and the 
assessor may appeal decisions of the Board of Equalization on various grounds. Nonetheless, the 
Court finds that the Salt Lake County Assessor, as an officer of Salt Lake County, is a nominal 
party to the settlement agreement. The Salt Lake County Commission has authority to legally 
bind the County and its officers. 
D. 
The Settlement Agreement - What Do We Know About This Settlement 
Agreement Which Would Surest Approval, Validity and Enforceability 
by This Court? 
Consider: 
1. The Settlement Agreement was reduced to writing; 
2. The parties were present and/or represented by legal counsel; 
3. The actions of the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization were ratified/approved 
by the Salt Lake County Commission; (This fact alone may cast this case in a different posture 
than some case law cited as controlling.) 
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4. There was a consideration of the risk of liability together with the costs and trouble 
of protracted litigation, a review of depositions and appraisals, and at least some discussion 
relative to the merits of the respective claims. 
5. The terms and conditions are fairly detailed; 
6. No party was misled, deceived or defrauded in the process; 
7. The Agreement does not dictate how a court should resolve questions of law; 
8. The purpose and clear intent of the parties to settle is unequivocable; 
9. The Settlement Agreement/letter was drafted by Salt Lake County, who now 
attempts to invalidate and reject its own detailed language on statutory, constitutional and 
pragmatic grounds; 
10. There is no evidence of repudiation, retraction or withdrawal by any of the parties 
to the Settlement Agreement; 
11. The Agreement does not divest the Court of jurisdiction; 
12. There is no evidence that these parties entered into the Settlement Agreement based 
upon inadvertence, improvidence, excusable neglect, inequity, disadvantage, injustice, over-
reaching, or against sound public policy. 
13. The Salt Lake County Commission is a legislative body and certainly has authority 
to resolve, compromise and settle lawsuits during pending litigation. This Settlement Agreement 
was proposed initially by the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization and then was 
adopted/ratified by the Salt Lake County Commission. As a general rule, a court ought not to 
substitute its judgment for that of duly elected officials. Either this Settlement Agreement was 
entered into in good faith, or it was an absolute sham. Whether this Court likes the result, agrees 
with the methodology, believes the amount of the settlement to be fair, is of absolutely no 
consequence. 
E. 
Deficiencies of the Settlement Agreement 
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Though the intent of the parties is patently clear, the deficiencies are likewise clear. 
Consider: 
1. At least initially, the Salt Lake County Assessor does not have the opportunity to 
fulfill his statutory duties to assess all property uniformly and equally based upon UCA §59-2-302 
and UCA §59-2-102,1953, as amended; 
2. The Settlement Agreement addresses but does not set or fix valuations based upon 
fair market value; Failure to address Fair Market Value violates UCA §59-2-301, UCA 59-2-102 
and Utah Const Art. XIII, Sec. 2. 
3. Because of the collateral decision of the Utah State Tax Commission the Settlement 
Agreement must be defeated on its face: the Utah State Tax Commission's decision is dispositive 
because the "conditional language" of the agreement plain and clear; 
4. The issue of divisibility/severability has not been addressed in the Settlement 
Agreement and bifurcation is impossible. The Settlement Agreement presents a single integrated 
resolution for five tax years and cannot be bifurcated between two forums with differing 
jurisdictions. 
5. There is no mechanism in the Settlement Agreement to allocate the $5 million dollar 
settlement amount to separate years; allocation would involve arbitrary and capricious decisions 
and further, if the tax years are severed, it would result in an assessment nightmare; 
6. The Settlement Agreement spans multiple tax years and multiple jurisdictions; 
7. The Court lacks any jurisdiction, regardless of the language of the Settlement 
Agreement; 
8. The overriding concern of those who object to the Settlement Agreement is that the 
terms of the Agreement are manifestly unjust and the Agreement entirely ignores uniform and 
equal taxation statutes and fair market value. The Agreement is fundamentally flawed because 
there is no attempt to achieve fair market value. Uniformity, fairness and equality cannot be 
achieved. 
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9. The Board lacks plenary power to settle cases. 
10. The Assessor is not a party to nor bound by the Settlement Agreement 
11. Fundamental fairness and due process should compel the Court to reject the 
Settlement Agreement. 
12. The Settlement cannot be implemented in its current form because it fails to reflect 
fair market value assessments. 
III. 
DECISION OPTIONS AND DISCUSSION 
The difficulties in reaching a decision in this case are legion and rest first with the 
jurisdictional challenges (NIROP), second with the Utah State Tax Commission disapproval of the 
settlement agreement and the implications on this Court's decision, and third with severability 
issues both as jurisdiction and the award. If the Court then factors in the position of the Salt Lake 
County Assessor that he was not a party to the Settlement Agreement, and the merits of the 
arguments of the other defendants, the permutations increase geometrically. The following 
decisional permutations do not address and isolate the myriad of the legal or constitutional claims 
for disapproval. Please consider: 
Decision Options 
Category Possible Decisions 
I, Conditional Settlement Agreement 1. Automatic disapproval. 
This Court is simply barred from any 
approval because of the rejection by the Utah 
State Tax Commission and the conditional 
language of the agreement. The Tax 
Commission decision is dispositive. End of 
inquiry! 
Of course the obvious downside to the 
automatic disapproval position is the fact 
that the basis of the dispositive decision 
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might turn out to be reversible error. Then 
what? 
Certainly any basis for rejection must be 
legally sustainable. The Utah State Tax 
Commission position should not paint this 
Court into a corner of no escape. What if 
the refund is not divisible, but the jurisdiction 
clearly is? 
If the Tax Court approves the settlement 
and the Utah State Tax Commission rejects 
it, but on non-sustainable grounds, or vice 
versa, where does that leave the parties? Is a 
divisibility of the refund award the only clear 
legal option and solution until appellate 
courts opine? 
II. Global/Plenary Jurisdiction 
The Court may determine pursuant to the 
terms of the Settlement Agreement, that it 
has independent plenary jurisdiction. This 
decision requires no severability of 
jurisdiction or severability of the refund. 
This decision places the Court decision 
and Tax Commission decision on a collision 
course in the appellate courts on 
jurisdictional grounds. 
The Settlement Agreement contemplates 
a resolution of all disputes between the 
parties. Arguably, without even reaching the 
merits of the Court's jurisdiction as to 
NIROP, the Court could conclude that the 
NIROP action is a pending action, and if the 
$5 million Settlement Agreement is global, 
2. Not approve Settlement - Award no 
attorney fees. 
3. Not approve Settlement - Award attorney 
fees. 
4. Approve Settlement - Award no attorney 
fees. 
5. Approve Settlement - Award attorney 
fees. 
<r * r p n 
then it would include all claims including 
NIROP and even those pending before the 
Utah State Tax Commission. There is no 
language in the Settlement Agreement that 
would carve out or except out the NIROP 
action. 
III. Limited Jurisdiction 
1995 & 1996 consolidated valuation 
cases and NIROP where jurisdiction is 
contested. 
A decision in this category requires both 
severability of jurisdiction and severability of 
the refund in order to approve the Settlement 
Agreement plus a decision favoring Alliant as 
to the merits of the constitutional and 
statutory arguments. A disapproval may be 
reached either by the lack of authority to 
sever the refund, or a ruling in favor of the 
defendants on the merits of other arguments. 
A decision of this limited jurisdiction 
including NIROP is contrary to the position 
of some defendants and, again, would place 
the Court's decision and the Tax 
Commission decision in a collision course in 
the appellate courts. 
As addressed in Category II above, the 
Settlement Agreement contemplates a 
resolution of all disputes between the parties. 
Arguably, without reaching the merits of 
arguments respecting the Court's jurisdiction 
as to NIROP, the Court could conclude that 
the NIROP action is a pending-action, and if 
the Court finds that it has plenary jurisdiction 
6. Not approve Settlement - Award no 
attorney fees. 
7. Not approve Settlement - Award attorney 
fees. 
8. Approve Settlement - Award no attorney 
fees. 
9. Approve Settlement - Award attorney 
fees. 
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over actions pending before it, then the 
Court could include all claims including 
NIROP. Again, if the Court finds that 
jurisdction is severable, there is np language 
in the Settlement Agreement that would 
carve out or except out the NIROP action. 
10. Not approve Settlement - Award no 
attorney fees. 
11. Not approve Settlement - Award 
attorney fees. 
12. Approve Settlement - Award no 
attorney fees. 
13. Approve Settlement - Award attorney 
fees. 
IV. Limited Jurisdiction II 
1995 and 1996 consolidated valuation 
cases only. 
If this Court determines that it may 
proceed on the 1995 and 1996 consolidated 
valuation cases, in order to approve the 
Settlement Agreement, then it must first 
adopt a severability of jurisdiction theory, 
and then a severability of refund theory, plus 
make a decision favorable to Alliant as to the 
merits of the constitutional and statutory 
arguments. A disapproval may be reached 
either by the lack of authority to sever the 
amount of the refund, or a ruling in favor of 
defendants on their arguments. 
There are at least thirteen different options or decisions available to this Court. It is 
also entirely possible for the Court to adopt some hybrid. 
As all parties are aware, the Court has labored over this decision. Each party should 
know the reason why. It is the opinion of this Court that the Settlement Agreement entered into 
by these parties is enforceable, legal and constitutional. The Court rejects the constitutional 
challenges. But the difficulty with this decision is the ultimate fact that this Court does not believe 
that the stated basis for the Utah State Tax Commission rejection decision, that of a "necessary 
party theory," is sustainable as a matter of law. 
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How does this Court then approve the Settlement Agreement when the Court is of the 
view that the jurisdiction is non-intregrated and is, therefore, divisible, but the refund award is 
global, indivisible and cannot be allocated between separate taxing years? What a dilemma! 
Should the Court simply adopt a less preferable and less legally sustainable position of 
refund divisibility? Or should this Court simply reject the legal settlement agreement because of 
the Tax Commission rejection and concomitant impossibility of refund allocation? Can the Court 
order allocation based upon the "good faith" requirements of the agreement? 
With these issues in mind, the Court will discuss attorneys' fees, jurisdiction and finally 
rule on the Motion to Approve the Settlement Agreement. 
IV. 
ATTORNEYS' FEES 
The Settlement Agreement/letter provides for an award of attorneys' fees, in pertinent 
part as follows: 
Salt Lake County, its officers and attorneys, in good faith and acting in 
concert with Alliant shall seek to secure an appropriate order from the Third 
District Court and the Utah State Tax Commission approving the settlement 
agreement and the stipulation in an expeditious manner. 
In the event any party breaches the foregoing conditions of settlement, 
the non-breaching party is entitled to attorneys' fees or costs incurred in 
enforcing the settlement agreement. (See Settlement of Outstanding Alliant 
Tech Litigation, counter-offer letter dated December 5,2000 attached to 
"Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Joint Motion to Approve Settlement 
and in Reply to the Assessor's Memorandum in Opposition to the Joint 
Motion.) 
Alliant requests attorneys' fees because the Salt Lake County Assessor, having filed a 
memorandum in opposition to the joint motion has breached the condition of acting in good faith. 
In addition, Alliant seeks attorneys' fees from the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization 
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because it did not, in concert with Alliant, seek to secure an appropriate order... approving the 
Settlement Agreement before this Court. 
This Court can best define the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization role in the 
approval process as "benign neutrality." The Board did not, unlike other parties, object to the 
approval of the Settlement Agreement. The court simply concludes that no attorneys' fees can be 
awarded against the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization. 
Next, the Court turns to the role of the Salt Lake County Assessor. This role is clear; 
he is an advocate for defeat of the Settlement Agreement and invites the Court to void the 
agreement on a variety of statutory, factual, and constitutional grounds. This Court has already 
found that the Assessor is a party to the Settlement Agreement, at least nominally, as an "officer" 
and was so bound by the Salt Lake County Commission. 
The Assessor breached the provisions of the Settlement Agreement. It does not matter 
who prevails on the motion. The award is independent of which side prevails. Alliant is entitled 
to an award of attorneys' fees as may be established by affidavit. 
Other parties to this action which oppose the Settlement were not parties to the 
Settlement Agreement and not bound by the attorney fee provision. 
V. 
JURISDICTION 
These parties agreed that $5 million would be refunded to Alliant to settle all cases 
involving property tax disputes from 1995 to and including 1999. It was a blanket settlement 
agreement, but, of course, it did not address future valuations. 
Clearly, the Utah State Tax Commission maintains jurisdction over some of those years 
and this Court maintains jurisdiction over others. This Court has jurisdiction over the 1995 and 
1996 consolidated valuation cases and the Utah State Tax Commission maintains jurisdiction over 
the 1997, 1998 and 1999 real and personal property cases. It is also clear that the parties folly 
recognized that tax matters involving Alliant were pending both before the Tax Court and the 
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Utah State Tax Commission as of the date of the Settlement Agreement; December 7,2000. The 
Utah State Tax Commission and the Tax Court would have to rule independently. That just 
makes sense. 
The Utah State Tax Commission has no authority to approve a settlement with respect 
to tax years 1995 and 1996 and this Court has no authority or jurisdiction to approve the 
settlement for years 1997, 1998, and 1999. Both this Court and the Utah State Tax Commission 
recognize jurisdictional limitations and both reject a global jurisdictional theory. 
Next, this Court is of the opinion that the NIROP independent action falls outside the 
scope of the terms and conditions of the Settlement Agreement. A 1983 civil rights cause of 
action, together with other causes of action, does not fit into the post-filing Settlement Agreement 
of these parties. That fact does not disturb the Settlement Agreement respecting the 1995 and 
1996 consolidated valuation cases. 
Finally, as emphasized earlier, the facts extant before the Utah State Tax Commission 
are distinguishable from the facts here. With due deference to the Utah State Tax Commission, 
this Court cannot find, as a matter of law, that Granite School District was a necessary party to 
the Settlement Agreement for a number of reasons, the chief of which was that it was 
inadequately briefed and argued before this Court. To automatically force this Court to reject the 
Settlement Agreement on that ground seems legally impermissible to this Court. But then the 
appellate courts will instruct us whether the Tax Court view or the Tax Commission view 
constitutes reversible error. 
DECISION 
It is the opinion of this Court that these parties entered into a legal, enforceable, 
constitutionally sanctioned Settlement Agreement to resolve and settle their differences for all 
cases involving property tax disputes from 1995 to and including 1999. The Settlement 
Agreement was entered into in good faith and anticipated a refund of $5 million to Alliant The 
intent to settle is unequivocal. 
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Clearly, the Utah State Tax Commission has jurisdiction over some cases and this Court 
has jurisdiction over others. The Court recognizes divisibility of jurisdiction between the Court 
and the Utah State Tax Commission. 
The rejection of the Settlement Agreement by the Utah State Tax Commission does not 
exclude this Court from conducting a careful analysis of all legal issues. An automatic rejection is 
not permissible by this Court. 
While this Court accepts the divisibility of jurisdiction, it is of the opinion that the 
refund amount of $5 million is indivisible and non-allocatable between the various tax years. 
Therefore, even though this Court disagrees with the legal theory relied upon by the Utah State 
Tax Commission, the Court has no option but to reluctantly disapprove of the Settlement 
Agreement. The separately recognized divisibility of jurisdiction does not direct this Court, 
legally, to adopt a divisibility of the global refund. The rejection decision of the Utah State Tax 
Commission forces this Court to reject a Settlement Agreement which it believes is valid and 
legally sustainable. As mentioned earlier, these disparate decisions are on a collision course which 
can best be resolved by Utah's appellate courts. 
Counsel for plaintiff is instructed to submit an affidavit in support of attorneys' fees and 
to prepare Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and an Order consistent with this decision. 
Plaintiffs filing of the Joint Motion to Approve Settlement delayed this Court's ruling 
on: 
Alliant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; 
Tax Commission's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; and 
Tax Commission's Motion to Dismiss (joined by the Salt Lake County 
Assessor, Salt Lake county Commission and Salt Lake County Board of 
Equalization) 
The Court must now turn its attention back to these motions. 
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The Clerk of the Court is instructed to schedule a status conference call with the various 
Dated this £& day of September, 2001. 
BYTHE^OURT 
Randy M. Grimshaw, Esq. 
Maxwell A. Miller, Esq. 
John McCarry, Esq. 
Michelle Snow, Esq. 
Bill Thomas Peters, Esq. 
Mary Ellen Sloan, Esq. 
J. Craig Smith, Esq. 
Kelly Wright, Esq. 
John E. S. Robson, Esq. 
, JUDGE 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 17-53-315 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 17. COUNTIES 
CHAPTER 53. COUNTY EXECUTIVE, LEGISLATIVE BODY, AND OTHER OFFICERS 
PART 3. COUNTY EXECUTIVE 
17-53-315 Actions —Control and direction. 
(1) (a) A county executive may control and direct the prosecution, defense, and settlement of all 
lawsuits and other actions: 
(i) to which the county is a party; 
(ii) as to which the county may be required to pay the judgment or the costs of prosecution 
or defense; or 
(Hi) as further provided by county ordinance. 
(b) I f necessary, the county executive may, upon the recommendation of the county or district 
attorney or if required by court order, employ counsel to represent the county in the lawsuit or 
other action or assist the county attorney or, in a county that does not have a county attorney, 
the district attorney in conducting those lawsuits or any other actions where the county attorney 
or district attorney, as the case may be, is authorized by law to act. 
(2) If a lawsuit or other action is brought or prosecuted by another elected official or a board or other 
entity of the county under a statutory duty, that other elected official, board, or other entity may 
control and direct the lawsuit or other action, consistent with applicable law. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L 1907, § 511, subd. 8; C.L 1917, § 1400x8; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 19-5-24; 
L 1971, ch. 24, § 1 ; C. 1953, 17-5-24; renumbered by L 1994, ch. 147, § 23; C. 1953, 17-5-219; 
renumbered by L 2000, ch. 133, § 150 as § 17-53-314; recompiled as § 17-53-315; L 2001, ch. 241, 
§ 7 4 . 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Amendment Notes. —The 2000 amendment, effective May 1, 2000, renumbered this section, which 
'ormerly appeared as § 17-5-219, added "or in a county that does not have a county attorney, the 
district attorney," and made related and stylistic changes. 
The 2001 amendment, effective April 30, 2001, in Subsection ( l ) (a ) substituted the end of the 
ntroductory paragraph beginning with "defense" for "and defense of all actions"; added Subsections 
l ) (a)( i i ) and ( l ) (a)( i i i ) ; in Subsection ( l ) (b ) added the phrases "upon the recommendation of the 
:ounty or district attorney or if required by court order" and "to represent the county in the lawsuit or 
)ther action"; added Subsection (2); and made stylistic changes. 
:ompiler's Notes. —This section was recompiled by the Office of Legislative Research and General 
:ounsel from § 17-53-314 to accomodate the recompilation by that office of a provision enacted by 
nother chapter consistent with the renumbering of the other provisions of this title by Laws 2000, ch. 
33. 
OTES TO DECISIONS 
NALYSIS 
U l 51 S 1 / O J O U 
Attorney-client relationship. 
Fees for defending indigents. 
Attorney-client relationship. 
Since this section merely states the necessary effect of the basic relationship between the county 
commission and the county attorney, that the attorney acts under the direction of the commission, and 
since the duties that may be specified under § 17-18-1.5(6)(c) are consistent with the basic scheme of 
Rule of Professional Conduct 1.13, the county attorney has an attorney-client relationship only with the 
county as an entity, not with the commission or the individual commissioners. Salt Lake County 
Comm'n v. Salt Lake County Att'y, 1999 UT 73, 985 P.2d 899. 
Only when the county attorney determines that there is a potential for a violation of law is he given 
certain limited remedies available to a private attorney. Salt Lake County Comm'n v. Salt Lake County 
Att'y, 1999 UT 73, 985 P.2d 899. 
Fees for defending indigents. 
This section does not authorize county commissioners or the district court to incur liability against the 
county for attorney's fees in defending an indigent person charged with crime. Pardee v. Salt Lake 
County, 39 Utah 482, 118 P. 122, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 200 (1911). 
U.C.A. 1953 § 17-53-315, UT ST § 17-53-315 
Statutes current through 2003 2nd Special Session. Annotations current through 
UT 51 (11/14/2003), 2003 Utah APP 389 (11/14/2003 and November 14, 2003 
(Federal Cases). 
Copyright © 2003 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the 
of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
Copr. (C) West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 59-1-601 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 59. REVENUE AND TAXATION 
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL TAXATION POLICIES 
PART 6. JUDICIAL REVIEW 
59 -1 -601 District court jurisdiction. 
(1) In addition to the jurisdiction granted in Section 63-46b-15, beginning July 1, 1994, the district 
court shall have jurisdiction to review by trial de novo all decisions issued by the commission after that 
date resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings. 
(2) As used in this section, "trial de novo" means an original, independent proceeding, and does not 
mean a trial de novo on the record. 
(3) (a) In any appeal to the district court pursuant to this section taken after January 1, 1997, 
the commission shall certify a record of its proceedings to the district court. 
(b) This Subsection (3) supersedes Section 63-46b-16 pertaining to judicial review of formal 
adjudicative proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 59-24-1, enacted by L 1977, ch. 80, § 20; renumbered by L. 1987, ch. 3, § 36; 
1987, ch. 161, § 215; 1992, ch. 127, § 2; 1993, ch. 248, § 2; 1997, ch. 309, § 2. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Amendment Notes. —The 1997 amendment, effective January 1, 1997, divided Subsection (3) 
adding the Subsection (3)(a) and (3)(b) designations; in Subsection (3)(a) substituted "January 1, 
1997" for "July 1, 1994," deleted "which record shall be reviewed and considered by the district court" 
at the end of the first sentence, and deleted the second and third sentences concerning consideration 
of new witnesses and evidence; and made stylistic changes. 
Compiler's Notes. —Laws 1998, ch. 326, § 1 amended this section; § 5 of the same act provided that 
if during the 1998 general election, the electors of the state approve the amendment to Utah Const., 
Art. XI I I , Sec. 11 proposed by L. 1998, S.J.R. 13, Resolution on Review of Tax Commission Cases, 
effective on January 1, 1999, the 1998 amendment to this section is repealed and the section as last 
amended in 1997 is reinstated. The amendment was approved and the 1997 version of this section 
reinstated. This section, as last amended in 1997, has retrospective operation to July 1, 1994, for 
decisions relating to revenue and taxation that are issued by the State Tax Commission or a county 
board of equalization, for which the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or a district court has not 
issued a final unappealable judgment or order, and for which retrospective application does not 
enlarge, eliminate, or destroy a vested right. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Retroactive application. 
Timeliness of filing. 
Zonstitutionality. 
U i d i s jy-L-vvL 
This section, which purports to grant the district court jurisdiction to review by trial de novo final 
decisions of the state tax commission resulting from formal hearings, was unconstitutional under Utah 
Const., Art. X I I I , Sec. 11 and Art. V, Sec. 1. (Decision prior to amendment to Utah Const., Art. X I I I , 
Sec. 11.) Evans & Sutherland Computer Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm%nf 953 P.2d 435 (Utah 1997). 
Retroactive application. 
This section applied retroactively to authorize the district court to review a dispute arising before the 
effective date of the section; however, dismissal was upheld as section was ruled unconstitutional. 
(Decision prior to amendment to Utah Const., Art. XI I I , Sec. 11.) Evans & Sutherland Computer Corp. 
v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 953 P.2d 435 (Utah 1997). 
Timeliness of filing. 
Untimely filing of petition for judicial review of Tax Commission order that was unambiguously the last 
final agency action in the case deprived court of jurisdiction. Union Pac. R.R. v. State Tax Comm'n, 
2000 UT 40, 999 P.2d 17. 
The court of appeals appropriately granted plaintiff an "equitable exception" to the filing requirement 
because plaintiffs petition for review of a tax commission decision was pending when Utah Supreme 
Court opinon Evans & Sutherland Computer Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 953 P.2d 435 (Utah 
1997), was issued that held that the 1993 amendment to § 59-1-601 violated the Utah Constitution. 
Yeargin, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of State Tax Comm'n, 2001 UT 11 , 20 P.3d 287. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 59-1-601, UT ST § 59-1-601 
Statutes current through 2003 2nd Special Session. Annotations current through 
UT 51 (11/14/2003), 2003 Utah APP 389 (11/14/2003 and November 14, 2003 
(Federal Cases). 
Copyright © 2003 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the 
of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
Copr. (C) West 2004 No Claim to Ong. U.S. Govt. Works 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, LEE GARDNER in 
his official capacity as SALT LAKE COUNTY 
ASSESSOR; LARRY RICHARDSON in his 
official capacity as SALT LAKE COUNTY 
TREASURER; MARY CALLAGHAN, 
RANDY HORIUCHI, and BRENT 
OVERSON, in their official capacities as the 
SALT LAKE COUNTY COMMISSION, and 
the SALT LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF 
EQUALIZATION, 
Defendants, 
vs. 
THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
and GRANITE SCHOOL DISTRICT, j 
Defendants-Intervenors. ; 
RULING RESPECTING THE LEGAL 
EFFECT OF BLUTH V. UTAH 
STATE TAX COMMISSION (BLUTH 
H) ON THIS COURT'S DECISIONS 
CASE NO. 990402607 
DATE: MAY 20,2003 
V 
JUDGE: LYNN W.DAVIS 
PTFRK- SGT 
v_ l^_vJ_vlv£v.. OvJJ 
In this Court's Ruling on Various Pending Objections and Requests dated December 10, 
2002, this Court noted: 
Various parties have referenced the recent Utah Supreme Court case of 
Bluth v State Tax Commission, 2002 Ut 91. It has been relied upon in early 
briefing. Because of its reversal by the Utah Supreme Court, additional 
briefing is dictated as to the pending Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Partial 
GG2854 
Summary Judgment and Motion for Summary Judgment, Also, since briefing 
and argument on these motions, the Settlement Agreement, which the Court 
has validated, included the plaintiffs NIROP complaint for 1995-1999. 
This Court does not wish to entertain any further oral argument, but it 
does invite short, concise briefing on how these developments potentially 
affect the outcome of the pending motions. Alliant is invited to first 
commence briefing. 
This Court has previously approved the submitted Findings/Conclusions subject to 
changes noted on pages 5 and 6 of the ruling. Counsel were instructed "to reduce the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law to one pleading, if possible, or if necessary, two pleadings if the 
NIROP action is carved out." Accordingly, the invitation to comment on Bluth and to 
consolidate the pleadings was not an invitation to further tinker with the language approved by 
the Court in its previous ruling. 
I. 
RECENT PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Since the invitation to participate in additional briefing, this Court has received the 
following pleadings, documents and correspondence: 
L D A T E FILED 
December 26, 2002 
December 23, 2002 
January 2,2003 
January 13,2003 
DOCUMENT OR PLEADING 
Defendants' Objection to Proposed Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision 
(NIROP) 
Letter 
Letter 
Supplemental Memorandum on Bluth v. Utah 
State Tax Commission 
PARTY ] 
Defendants, except for 
Salt Lake County 
Board of Equalization 
From Maxwell A. 
Miller, Eteq., Alliant 
Techsystems, Inc. 
J. Craig Smith, Esq., 
Salt Lake County 
Board of Equalization 
Alliant Techsystems, 
Inc. 
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January 30, 2003 
January 31, 2003 
February 5, 2003 
February 7, 2003 
March 18, 2003 
Utah State Tax Commission's Supplemental 
Memorandum on Bluth v. Utah State Tax 
Commission 
Defendants' Supplemental Memorandum on 
Bluth v. Utah State Tax Commission 
Letter 
Notice to Submit 
Letter 
Utah State Tax 
Commission 
Defendants, except for 
Salt Lake County 
Board of Equalization 
Maxwell A. Miller, 
Esq., Alliant 
Techsystems, Inc. 
Alliant Techsystems, 
Inc. 
Alliant Techsystems, 
Inc. 
In addition, the Court has received copies of a series of emails exchanged between 
counsel bearing dates of December 16, 17, 18, 19, 2002. These have not been entered into the 
file. Generally these emails deal with the order/caption concern raised by the Court in the 
December 10, 2002 Ruling. 
II. 
DISCUSSION 
This Court has carefully reviewed the briefs from the parties regarding Bluth. This 
Court, in a Memorandum Decision dated November 7,2002, interpreted Bluth in a pending tax 
court case; Monson v. Utah State Tax Commission (Fourth District Court, Case No. 010402468). 
This Court ruled then, and reaffirms here, that Bluth is a very fact sensitive, fact intensive case 
which must be interpreted and applied very narrowly. The decision was based upon the 
application the Administrative Rulemaking Act, not the Administrative Procedures Act. No 
administrative rule is challenged here. The Utah Supreme Court could have announced the 
decision with more sweeping and broad language, but it did not. 
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Accordingly, this Court now re-emphasizes its analysis of Bluth II consistent with the 
Monson decision.1 
This court has specifically and repeatedly rejected defendants' arguments that this Court 
lacks jurisdiction. That argument is again repeated in light of Bluth v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 
2002 UT 91 (hereafter Bluth II). This Court's decision in Monson most closely parallels the 
analysis of Alliant Techsystems, Inc. found in its supplement memorandum. This Court adopts, in 
large measure, that succinct position. The specific issue in Bluth II as articulated by the Supreme 
Court, is "whether a district court has subject matter jurisdiction over a challenge to a rule 
promulgated by the Utah State Tax Commission." 2002 UT 91 at \ 1 (emphasis added). The 
Supreme Court concluded the District Court had no jurisdiction to entertain such a challenge 
because Utah Code Ann. §63-46a-12 of the Administrative Rulemaking Act "requires exhaustion 
as a prerequisite to judicial review of a Commission rule," Id. at \ 7 (emphasis added). By its 
express language, the Supreme Court's Bluth II decision is limited to what constitutes the 
"irreparable harm exception" to exhaustion under the Administrative Rulemaking Act. Bluth II 
did not arise under, nor does it have application to, the Administrative Procedures Act. 
The Supreme Court's analysis in Bluth II is manifestly narrower than the Court of 
Appeals' decision in the same case, which the Supreme Court reversed. Specifically, the Court of 
Appeals had framed the issue as a "declaratory judgment action challenging the Commission's 
very authority to act in this matter." Bluth v Tax Comm'n, 2001 UT App 138, ^ f 7 (copy 
attached) ("Bluth I"). Under the Court of Appeals' framing of the issue, any declaratory 
judgment action against the Tax Commission for alleged "illegal" actions can be brought in 
District Court. The Supreme Court decided the case in a very limited context; whether 
xUpon request the Court will send counsel a copy of the Monson v. Utah State Tax 
Commission ruling. 
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exhaustion of administrative remedies was a statutory prerequisite to a District Court challenge of 
a Tax Commission rule under the Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
The distinction between the framing of the issue in Bluth I and Bluth II is important 
because Bluth II applies solely to a construction of the Administrative Rulemaking Act. Given its 
broader framing of the issue, the Court of Appeals cited several cases holding, '"a plaintiff is not 
generally required to exhaust its administrative remedies prior to maintaining an action for 
declaratory relief.' Hercules, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 1999 UT 12, P4, 974 P.2d 286; see 
also Brumlev v State Tax Comm'n, 868 P.2d 796, 799 (Utah 1993); Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Taylor. 15 Utah 2d 234, 390 P.2d 592, 595 (1964) ('The [exhaustion requirement] does not apply 
when.. .the administrative officer of body [] acts without the scope of.. .its defined statutory 
authority.')." Id. at % 7. 
Significantly, Bluth II did not overrule any of the cases Bluth I relied upon, but simply 
found them inapplicable. These cases remain viable law. Because the issue in Bluth II involved 
only "challenges [to] the Commission's application of its own rules," "Brumlev and related case 
law does not support the Court of Appeals' conclusion that plaintiffs would be irreparably harmed 
[within the meaning of the Administrative Rulemaking Act] if required to exhaust their 
administrative remedies." 2002 UT 91 \ 17. 
In support of its Bluth II decision, the Supreme Court cites Nebeker v. Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 2001 UT 74 for the general proposition that "requiring exhaustion is appropriate 
because it would give the Commission the opportunity to address plaintiffs' constitutional claims 
[in Nebeker]"). Id. at % 17 (summarizing Nebeker at % 16-17). In Bluth II footnote 4, the Court 
further explains Nebeker: "The mere introduction of a constitutional issue does not obviate the 
need for exhaustion of administrative remedies because the Commission's decision in the 
administrative proceeding could avoid and moot the constitutional issue." Id. at n. 4. Logically, 
the obverse must also be true; legal issues that cannot be mooted or avoided are appropriately 
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brought in an original proceeding before the District Court because they are the sole issues at 
stake or the Tax Commission lacks jurisdiction to decide them. 
Alliant's Motion for Summary Judgment in the NIROP action does not challenge any 
Tax Commission rule under the Administrative Rulemaking Act, as did the Bluth plaintiffs. For 
that reason, Alliant's NIROP action and the Supreme Court holding in Bluth IL by its express 
language, are not analogous to the instant case. 
Equally significant, Alliant's Motion for Summary Judgment in the NIROP action, 
unlike the Nebeker action, seeks relief solely upon constitutional and related grounds the Tax 
Commission has no jurisdiction to decide. These are issues which no conceivable Tax 
Commission ruling could moot. In the NIROP action, Alliant seeks: 
1. An order declaring that Defendants, and each of them, acting under color of state 
law, have . . . imposed an unconstitutional tax upon Plaintiff in violation of Article 
VI of the United States Constitution, and have violated 42 U.S.C § 1988; [and]; 
2. A preliminary and permanent injunction against Defendants enjoining them from 
further issuing unlawful and unconstitutional assessments; and a preliminary and 
permanent injunction against Defendant Richardson enjoining him from collecting 
unlawfully assessed taxes; 
Amended Complaint at 23, 24. 
Whatever the Tax Commission ruled in the 1995-1999 valuation cases, or could rule in 
the 2000 valuation case, on Alliant's claim that County taxation of NIROP violates state law, the 
federal law claims (specifically including the civil rights violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983), and 
the claim for injunctive relief on prospective years remain unadjudicated. Neither of these claims 
challenges the Tax Commission's promulgation of a rule under the Administrative Rulemaking 
Act. Bluth IPs exhaustion requirement is, accordingly, inapplicable to the NIROP action. The 
Utah cases the Court of Appeals cited, as well as others that permit direct challenges to unlawful 
taxation, remain applicable law. See, e.g.. State Tax Comm'n v. Wright 596 P.2d 634 (Utah 
1979) (constitutionality or legality of the tax statutes may be raised as issues in an action in 
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district court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §59-2-301 (action to recover illegal tax) and Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-2-1326 (injunction to restrain illegal collection)). 
BLUTH IPS HOLDING ON EXHAUSTION IS INAPPLICABLE TO 
DEFENDANTS' RESPECTIVE MOTIONS TO DISMISS THE NIROP ACTION. 
The Tax Commission's Motion to Dismiss claims Alliant's "original action contravenes 
the plain language of the Utah Constitution requiring that this action be brought first before the 
Commission." Tax Commission Motion to Dismiss at 1. Alliant's response emphasizes, "the Tax 
Commission is not legally competent and has no jurisdiction to address the federal constitutional 
issues [present in NIROP], the Section 1983 issues, nor the injunction or refund issues and 
properly declined to do so." Alliant Memorandum in Reply to Tax Commission Motion to 
Dismiss at 4. Bluth II and Nebeker conclusively reinforce Alliant's argument. Following 
Nebeker, it would be completely senseless, indeed impossible, to require exhaustion of the federal 
constitutional-1983 issue in NIROP when the Tax Commission has no jurisdiction to decide it. 
Whatever exhaustion may arguably have been required of Alliant in 1999 when it filed 
its NIROP suit no longer pertains. Since 1999, the Tax Commission has ruled in each of the five 
years, from 1995 to 1999 inclusive, the County lawfully imposed a privilege tax upon Alliant 
because, the Tax Commission apparently thought, Alliant's use of federal property was 
"exclusive" (provided one does not count the Navy's supervision and control as "use"). The fact 
remains the Tax Commission never purported to decide, and indeed cannot resolve, the federal 
constitutional issue Alliant has raised in the NIROP action. The constitutional question Alliant 
raised in NIROP remains unresolved despite Alliant's reservation of the issue in each of the Tax 
Commission proceedings since 1995. 
The County's Motion to Dismiss the NIROP action is premised upon the argument that 
"The Tax Commission's Final Decision is res judicata on the independent proceeding," meaning 
that the Court must enforce the Tax Commission ruling on NIROP and dismiss Alliant's 
Complaint. (County Reply to Plaintiffs Response to the County's Supplemental Memorandum in 
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Support of Motion to Dismiss, May 30,2000, p. 2.) To the contrary, the plain language of Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-1-601(1), provides that appeals from the Tax Commission to the District Court 
are by "trial de novo," statutorily defined as "an original, independent proceeding." More relevant 
here, Bluth II and Nebeker reaffirm the concept that exhaustion is not required when the Tax 
Commission cannot resolve, and therefore cannot moot, federal constitutional claims (Section 
1983 claims) and claims for injunctive relief, as are present in the NIROP action. 
BLUTH IFS HOLDING ON EXHAUSTION IS INAPPLICABLE TO 
DEFENDANTS' RESPECTIVE MOTIONS TO STRIKE. 
The Tax Commission and other defendants filed a Motion to Strike the Affidavits of 
Kim Abplanalp and Lt. Commander Robert Kauffman on various grounds the parties have 
extensively briefed. Likewise, Alliant filed a Motion to Strike the Affidavits of Robert Sumsion 
and Ed Kent, on various grounds that were also extensively briefed. The parties' respective 
memoranda on these motions do not expressly argue the jurisdictional issues in Bluth II and 
Nebeker. Since this Court has already ruled it has jurisdiction in the NIROP action, the 
admissibility of the respective affidavits must be resolved on the merits, and not on any applicable 
directive from Bluth II. 
Bluth II and Nebeker do shed light on why the Tax Commission's jurisdictional 
arguments in the NIROP action are without merit. The Tax Commission's Memorandum in 
Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, filed May 1,2000, disputes portions of the 
Affidavits of Kim Abplanalp and Lt. Commander Robert Kaufman. Tax Commission 
Memorandum in Opposition to Alliant's Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 5-7. 
Simultaneously, yet contrariwise, the Tax Commission's Motion for Summary Judgment claims 
"there are no genuine issues as to the material facts relating to [Alliant's] claims." Tax Comm'n 
Motion for Summary Judgment at 2. 
The legality of taxing Alliant for its use of NIROP property is pending before this Court 
and the Tax Commission for the year 2000. On the one hand, the Tax Commission should be an 
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impartial adjudicator of issues before it. Yet on the other hand, the Tax Commission chose to 
intervene as a party defendant in the NIROP action to "contest" proposed facts in the affidavits 
Alliant submitted. Since then, the Tax Commission has continuously fought against Alliant in the 
NIROP action. 
The incompatibility of the Tax Commission as "impartial adjudicator" and simultaneous 
"advocate" is obvious. Said this Court, "A contestation of the facts by the Utah State Tax 
Commission may cross the line into an advocacy role, may suggest partiality of the State Tax 
Commission, and would hopelessly weaken or destroy its jurisdictional arguments based upon an 
exhaustion of administrative remedies theory." Tax Court Ruling (Sept. 7, 2001), p. 6. Under 
Brumley, as reaffirmed in Bluth IL legal questions, which the Tax Commission cannot answer (or 
should not answer because the Tax Commission has chosen to compromise its roles), must be 
resolved in District Court. 
DECISION 
This Court's ruling that it has jurisdiction in the NIROP action is consistent with Bluth 
II and Nebeker. This Court, based upon the above analysis, rejects defendants' view that Bluth II 
divests this Court of jurisdiction. 
Counsel for Alliant Techsystems, Inc. is instructed to prepare an order consistent with 
this decision. 
Dated this ?& day of May, 2003. 
BY THE COURT 
r. L n r / <\ 
cc: Randy Grimshaw, Esq. 
Maxwell Miller, Esq. 
Michelle Bush, Esq. 
Bill Thomas Peters, Esq. 
Mary Ellen Sloan, Esq. 
John E S Robson, Esq. 
Kelly Wright, Esq. 
J Craig Smith, Esq. 
David Pearce, Esq. 
TabF 
FILED &1-o^ 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
CARMA B. SP^ITH, Clerk 
- ^k^__Peputy 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALLIANT TECHS YSTEMS, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, LEE GARDNER in 
his official capacity as SALT LAKE COUNTY 
ASSESSOR; LARRY RICHARDSON in his 
official capacity as SALT LAKE COUNTY 
TREASURER; MARY CALLAGHAN, 
RANDY HORIUCHI, and BRENT 
OVERSON, in their official capacities as the 
SALT LAKE COUNTY COMMISSION, and 
the SALT LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF 
EQUALIZATION, 
Defendants, 
vs. ! 
THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
and GRANITE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Defendants-Intervenors. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 990402607 
DATE: JUNE 3,2002 
JUDGE: LYNN W.DAVIS 
CLERK: SGJ 
This matter came before the Court for oral arguments on January 29,2002. The parties 
vere present and represented as follows: 
Alliant Techsystems, Inc. Maxwell Miller, Esq. 
Randy Grimshaw, Esq. 
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Salt Lake County Assessor Kelly Wright, Esq. 
Utah State Tax Commission Michelle Bush, Esq. 
Salt Lake County & Salt Lake Mary Ellen Sloan, Esq. 
County Board of Equalization Bill Thomas Peters, Esq. 
Salt Lake County Board of Craig Smith, Esq. 
Equalization Brett Rich, Esq. 
Granite School District, Intervenor David Pearce, Esq. 
Arguments were entertained and the matter was taken under advisement. Counsel were 
advised that the written decision would be delayed because the issues are complex and unique, the 
briefing is extensive, and the Court does not have the benefit of a law clerk. In addition, the 
Court is handling over a hundred cases in the Municipal Division assignment on many days and 
occasionally two hundred to three hundred cases per day. Attempting to find contemplative time 
to consider the profound arguments of counsel in a case of this importance and magnitude is 
mind-boggling. 
The various motions will be treated separately because some have unique facts and 
procedure. It is important also to note that the date stamping of motions, memoranda, responses 
and replies is a bit tricky because in many instances faxed copies were entered, and upon arrival 
originals were again entered by a clerk of the court. In addition, some briefing addresses 
overlapping and intertwining issues. The Court will treat the pending motions in the following 
order: 
1. Salt Lake County Assessor's Motion Asking the Court to Reconsider 
Its Decision That the Assessor Was a Party to the Settlement Agreement; 
2. Acceptance, modification of, or rejection of Plaintiff s Proposed 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on Joint Motion to Approve 
Settlement; 
uu2u58 
3. Alliant's Motion to Alter or Amend Tax Court Decision and 
consideration of Plaintiff s [Proposed and Revised] Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order on Joint Motion to Approve Settlement; and 
4. The Award of Attorneys' Fees. 
Having carefully reviewed the arguments and briefing of the parties, the Court now 
enters the following: 
I. 
MOTION 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ASSESSOR'S MOTION ASKING THE COURT TO 
RECONSIDER ITS DECISION THAT THE ASSESSOR WAS A PARTY 
TO THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
A, Procedural History 
1. On September 20,2001, this Court issued its "Tax Court Decision," in which it held 
the language of the Settlement Agreement, "Salt Lake County, its officers and attorneys" included 
the County Assessor as a County officer and, therefore, a party. 
2. Salt Lake County Assessor filed this motion and supporting memorandum on 
October 29,2001, requesting reconsideration of this portion of the decision. 
3. Within the motion and memorandum, the Salt Lake County Assessor also objects to 
an award of attorney fees. (This objection will be addressed separately under Section IV of this 
opinion.) 
4. Plaintiff responded by filing "Plaintiffs Response to (1) Defendants' Objections to 
Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on Joint Motion to Approve 
Settlement; and (2) Assessor's Memorandum for Reconsideration." (Response 1 will be addressed 
n Section II of this opinion.) 
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5- On December 21,2001, the Utah State Tax Commission filed a Memorandum in 
Reply to Alliant's Motion to Alter OR Amend Tax Court Decision and In Reply to Salt Lake 
County Assessor's Motion to Reconsider. (The first part of the brief will be discussed in Section 
III of this opinion.) 
6. Alliant filed an opposing memorandum on October 31,2001. 
7. On January 17,2002, Alliant Techsystems, Inc. ("Alliant") responded to 
a. Tax Commission's Memorandum in Reply to Alliant's Motion to 
Alter or Amend Tax Court Decision ("Tax Commission Memorandum"); 
b. Salt Lake County Assessor's Memorandum in Support of His Motion 
to Amend OR Dismiss Alliant's First Claim for Relief ("Assessor 
Memorandum"); 
c. Granite's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Alter or Amend 
Tax Court Decision ("Granite Memorandum"); and 
d. Salt Lake County Board of Equalization's Memorandum Opposing 
Plaintiffs Motion to Alter or Amend Tax Court Decision ("County 
Memorandum"). Many of these responses will be addressed in other sections 
of this opinion, but there are arguments intertwined dealing with the 
Assessor's Motion to Reconsider. 
8. On November 28,2001, the Salt Lake County Assessor filed a "Notice to Submit for 
Decision. 
B. What Is This Court Reconsidering? 
This Court, in its September 20,2001, "Tax Court Decision," on pages 14-15, under 
Sub-Section C (Is the Settlement Agreement Defeated by Salt Lake County Assessor's Claim that 
He is Not a Party to the Settlement Agreement?), ruled as follows: 
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Prior to the adoption of the Settlement Agreement, a draft or proposal 
was circulated that clearly indicated Salt Lake County, "Assessors," etc., as 
the parties to the action. The "assessors" language was stricken out The 
Settlement Agreement which was agreed to indicates "Salt Lake County, its 
officers," etc. 
That agreement/letter, agreed to and adopted/ratified by the Salt Lake 
County Commission bears the signature of Karl Hendriksen, Deputy District 
Attorney. It was an offer of settlement presented by the attorney/agent of the 
parties. No one can contend that the duly elected Salt Lake County Assessor 
is not an officer of Salt Lake County. He is. He is a nominal party to the 
Settlement Agreement, 
This Court appreciates the unique duties and role of a county assessor. 
A county assessor has statutory charges which frequently place him/her at 
odds with the decisions of a board of equalization. The assessor necessarily 
"checks" the decisions of the board and the assessor may appeal decisions Qf 
the Board of Equalization on various grounds. Nonetheless, the Court finds 
that the Salt Lake County Assessor, as an officer of Salt Lake County, is an 
nominal party to the settlement agreement. The Salt Lake County 
Commission has authority to legally bind the County and its officers. 
C« County Assessor Legal Arguments 
The Assessor specifically requests that this Court reconsider the above ruling and the 
concomitant award of attorneys' fees against the Assessor. At earlier stages the Assessor did not 
iddress the issue of attorneys' fees because of his constant and steadfast claim that he was not a 
Darty to the Settlement Agreement. In making a Motion to Reconsider, the Assessor relies 
generally upon the holding of Ron Shepherd Ins. v. Shields. 882 P. 2d 650 (Utah 1994) citing 
3ennion v. Hansen, 699 P. 2d 757, 760 (Utah 1985), which state that "(I)t is settled law that a 
rial court is free to reassess its decision at any point prior to entry of a final order or judgment." 
Jince no final ctrder or judgment has entered, the Motion Asking the Court to Reconsider Its 
)ecision is procedurally authorized. 
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The County Assessor argues that he is an independently elected county official with 
unique statutory and constitutional duties and that the County Commission had no authority to 
bind the Assessor. Secondly, the Assessor argues that the Settlement was void as contrary to 
public policy and constitutional and statutory mandates. Next, the Assessor argues that the 
Settlement Agreement was an unlawful attempt to bind a future legislative body, and that the 
Settlement Agreement violates the Utah Constitution and state statutes. 
At oral argument, counsel argues that the Assessor cannot be bound by the Settlement 
Agreement as a matter of contract law because there was no meeting of the minds, no bargain for 
exchange and no offer and acceptance. The Salt Lake County Assessor was not privy to the offer 
from Alliant to the Board of Equalization in November of 2000. Further, the counter offer made 
in December 5, 2000, made by the Board of Equalization back to Alliant specifically struck 
"assessors," but included Salt Lake County, its officers and attorneys. 
The Utah State Tax Commission argues that the Salt Lake County Assessor is an 
independently elected official, independent from the Board of Equalization and with constitutional 
and statutory duties to assess property both uniformly and at fair-market value. The State Tax 
Commission submits that this Court ought to be wary of approving any procedure that allows 
these duties and rights to be easily circumvented. 
Alliant argues that the arguments made in the Motion to Reconsider simply rehash 
those previously "made, debated, considered and rejected." Alliant further argues that a motion 
to reconsider is not recognized under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and that Utah Cdurts 
have "consistently held that our rules of civil procedure do not provide for a motion for 
reconsideration of a trial court's order or judgment." See Ron Shepherd Ins. v. Shields. 882 P. 2d 
650,653 n.4 (1994). 
Further, Alliant reiterates arguments made previously that a county commission has 
authority to bind the Assessor in property tax disputes, and that the Settlement Agreement is 
supported by public policy. In addition, Alliant argues that the Settlement Agreement does not 
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bind a future legislative body in performing a legislative function, but binds a government to 
honor its contract and live up to its word. AUiant points out again that "breaching contracts made 
in settlement of litigation is not a governmental function" and again challenges defendants "to Find 
a single case in American Jurisprudence holding that a government entity may breach a settlement 
agreement of an unliquidated claim in the absence of fraud or overreaching." 
D. Court's Discussion 
If this Court reads Ron Shepherd Ins. v. Shields, 882 P. 2d 650 (Utah 1994) correctly, a 
court is free to entertain a motion for reconsideration at any point prior to entry of final order for 
judgment. Here, as in Shepherd, no final order or judgment has entered. In the opinion of this 
Court, here, as in Shepherd, the motion for reconsideration is, in essence, simply re-argument of 
opposition to the previous motion. 
This Court is acquainted with cases where a motion to reconsider has been brought 
where a relied upon controlling case is no longer good law because of an intervening Supreme 
Court decision. Likewise, a court may misstate something or prepare a ruling obvious to all 
parties is in error. That is not the case here. The defendants again try to convince the Court that 
the Assessor is not a county officer and again attempt to educate the Court as to the unique 
constitutional and statutory duties of the assessor. The Court is profoundly aware of those duties. 
While it does no harm to revisit these issues, it does no good either if already thoroughly briefed, 
argued by counsel and thoroughly considered previously by this Court. 
E. Decision on Salt Lake County Assessor's Motion Asking, the Court to Reconsider 
Its Decision That the Assessor Was a Party to the Settlement Agreement 
It is the opinion of this Court that a party bringing a motion to reconsider has the 
burden to demonstrate that the Court ought to modify its decision prior to entry of an order or 
ludgment in light of an intervening appellate court decision, newly discovered pertinent facts not 
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previously available, newly discovered case law which is on point and potentially dispositive, 
because of obvious error, or other substantive reasons not tantamount to simple re-argument. 
The Court has accepted the invitation to carefully reconsider and finds that the Assessor has failed 
to meet this burden. Accordingly, Salt Lake County Assessor's Motion to Reconsider Its 
Decision That the Assessor Was a Party to the Settlement Agreement is hereby denied. 
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n. 
CONSIDERATION OF PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER ON JOINT MOTION 
TO APPROVE SETTLEMENT 
A. Procedural History 
L This Court entered a written "Tax Court Decision" on September 20, 2001, with 
respect to the Parties' Joint Motion to Settlement. 
2. On page 25 of the opinion, counsel for plaintiff was instructed to prepare Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Order consistent with the decision. 
3. Counsel fox AUiant prepared the pleading and submitted it to the Court for signature 
on or about October 1,2001. 
4. Granite filed an Objection to Allianf s Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order on Joint Motion to Approve Settlement on October 24,2001. 
Granite revised the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law submitted by 
AUiant to correct the paragraphs to which Granite objects and to add those findings which were 
omitted by AUiant. A copy of a red-lined version of Allianf s proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law was attached. A copy of a final Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
encompassing Granite's objections and proposed changes was also attached. 
5. Salt Lake County Board of Equalization filed its Objection to Plaintiffs Proposed 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on Joint Motion to Approve Settlement and 
Request for Hearing on October 25,2001. 
6. On October 29,2001, Salt Lake County Assessor filed its Objection to Proposed 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on Joint Motion to Approve Settlement. 
7. On November 2,2001, AUiant filed its Reply to Salt Lake County Board of 
Equalization's Objection to Plaintiffs Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
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on Joint Motion to Approve Settlement and Request for Hearing. This Reply addresses 
attorneys' fees exclusively and will be considered more fully in Section IV. 
8. On November 2,2001, Alliant filed a general/collective Response to Defendants' 
Objections to Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on Joint Motion to 
Approve Settlement. 
9. Alliant filed a Notice to Submit Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order for Decision on November 2,2001. 
B. Succinct Statement of Defendant Objections 
While a consideration of each objection is laborious and time consuming, attention to 
detail in this case is imperative and fly-specking, unfortunately is merited. 
1. Granite School District 
i. Findings of Fact Objections 
(1) Substitute "shall11 for "are committed" in paragraph 15. 
(2) Paragraph 23 should be removed in its entirety, 
ii. Conclusions of Law 
(1) Granite objects to paragraphs 4, 5 and 7 because the Decision was not 
limited in time to September 20,2001. The proposed Conclusions of 
Law should eliminate any reference to the September 20, 2001 date. 
(2) Granite objects to paragraph 8. While the substance is accurate, it is 
not supported by the cite. 
(3) Granite objects to paragraph 9 because it needs clarification. Granite 
suggests substitution of the following language: "This Court is not 
bound by the Tax Commission's reasoning in reaching its decision of 
rejection of the Settlement Agreement because Granite was not an 
intervenor in the action before this Court." 
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iii. Order 
(1) The proposed Order should eliminate any reference to the September 
20,2001 date. 
2. Supplementation - Granite suggests that Alliant has ignored and omitted relevant 
findings and proposes the inclusion of the following paragraphs: 
"Because of the collateral decision of the Utah State Tax 
Commission the Settlement Agreement must be defeated on its 
face: the Utah State Tax Commission's decision is dispositive 
because the "conditional language" of the agreement [is] plain and 
clear." Tax Court Decision at 17. 
"The issue of divisibility/severability has not been addressed in 
the Settlement Agreement and bifurcation is impossible. The 
Settlement Agreement presents a single integrated resolution for 
five tax years and cannot be bifurcated between two forums with 
differing jurisdictions." Id. Accordingly, this Court has no 
authority or jurisdiction to approve the settlement for years 1997, 
1998, and 1999." M a t 24. 
"There is no mechanism in the Settlement Agreement to 
allocate the $5 million dollar settlement amount to separate years; 
allocation would involve arbitrary and capricious decisions and 
further, if the tax years are severed, it would result in an assessment 
nightmare." Id at 17. 
"The Agreement is fundamentally flawed because there is no 
attempt to achieve fair market value. Uniformity, fairness and 
equality cannot be achieved." Id. 
3. Salt Lake County Board of Equalization Objection 
This objection does not suggest specific revisions and simply objects to the 
award of any attorney fees and revisits argument why Assessor Gardner is not a 
party to the Settlement Agreement. Salt Lake County Board of Equalization takes 
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no further exception to Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order on Joint Motion to Approve Settlement 
4. Salt Lake County Assessor's Objections 
L Findings of Fact 
(1) Assessor takes exception to paragraph 3 because the italicized 
language is misleading, factually inaccurate and beyond the 
Court's decision. 
(2) Assessor takes exception to paragraph 5 because of the pending 
Motion to Reconsider. 
(3) Assessor takes exception to paragraph 8 - same objection as 
paragraph 5. 
(4) Assessor takes exception to paragraph 11 because it is a conclusion of 
law, not a finding of fact In addition, the County Commission's 
authority to settle tax disputes is limited. A 
(5) Assessor takes exception to paragraph 13, but "valuations based upon 
fair market value" is not addressed in the settlement. 
(6) Assessor takes exception to paragraph 17 which is inaccurate as to the 
role of the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization. 
(7) Assessor takes exception to paragraph 19 as redundant and it should be 
stricken. 
(8) Assessor takes exception to paragraph 23 as inconsistent with the plain 
language of the Settlement Agreement. It should be reconsidered by 
the Court and deleted. 
(9) Assessor takes exception to paragraph 28 on various grounds. 
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ii. Conclusions of Law - Assessor Objections 
(1) Much of the language in paragraph 2 is not found in the Court's 
decision. 
(2) The language of paragraph 3 is inconsistent with the Court decision on 
page 24. 
(3) The "September 20,2001" language of paragraph 4, 5,6 and 7 should 
be eliminated and the language of paragraph 7 must be clarified. 
(4) Assessor objects to attorney fee provision in paragraph 8 for the 
reasons stated in the Motion for Reconsideration. 
iii. Assessor's Objections to Order 
Assessor objects to any award of attorney's fees and also adopts by 
reference Granite's Objection to Alliant's Proposed Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order on Joint Motion to Approve Settlement. 
C. Alliant's Collective Response to Defendant Objections 
In pages 4 -11 of its collective response, Alliant addresses each of the objections of 
Granite and the Salt Lake County Assessor. Alliant does not respond specifically to the Salt Lake 
County Board of Equalization because the Board does not suggest specific revisions and simply 
re-argues its positions. 
D. Court's Consideration of Objections by Defendants And Alliant's Response 
A careful review of the objections and response suggests that the decision could have 
been written with greater specificity. Some objections are well taken and proposed language is 
more consistent with the decision. 
If the Court is accurate, the defendants collectively take exception to the following: 
Findings of Fact paragraphs 3, 5, 8,11,13,15, 17,19,23,28; 
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Conclusions of Law, paragraphs 2,3,4, 5, 6, 7,8,9; and 
Order in its entirety. 
E. Ruling as to Defendants' Objections to Findings of Fact 
Conclusions of Law And Order 
L There being no objection, the Court approves paragraphs 1,2, 4, 6, 7, 9,10,12, 14, 
16,18,20, 21, 22, 24,25,26, and 27 of the proposed Findings of Fact 
2. Paragraph 3 should be clarified stating that "a draft or proposal was circulated that 
clearly indicated Salt Lake County, 'Assessors/ etc., as the parties to the action." 
3. Paragraphs 5 and 8, 11,13,17 and 19 are approved over objection of Assessor. 
4. Paragraph 15, substitute "shall" for "are committed to." 
5. Paragraph 23 needs further clarification. Alliant is correct that it is drawn practically 
verbatim from the Court's decision. Salt Lake County Board of Equalization refers to paragraph 
23 as an "apparent oversight" in a collateral memorandum. Other defendants echo an identical 
sentiment. It is not an "apparent oversight," but it is worthy of a revisit. Consider: 
The Independent or NIROP Action involves Alliant's challenge to the County's 
assessment of federal property that Alliant operates under the direction of the United States Navy 
(the Naval Industrial Reserve Ordnance Plant or NIROP). The Complaint in the independent or 
NIROP action seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against defendant Salt Lake County for the 
years 1995,1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 and further years. In addition, the Complaint also requests 
relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against the County for having taxed Alliant in violation of Article VI 
of the United States Constitution. The Settlement Agreement expressly covers tax years 1995-
1999, clearly including the NIROP action. But the Settlement Agreement does not cover future 
years (beyond the scope of the Settlement Agreement) where Alliant claims continued unlawful 
assessment of NIROP. Therefore, portions of NIROP claims are expressly covered by the 
Settlement Agreement and portions, future claims, were expressly excepted; never addressed in 
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the Settlement Agreement The Settlement Agreement does not bar post-settlement NIROP 
claims. The NIROP claims are separate from the other related valuation cases. 
6. The attorneys' fees provision contained in paragraph 28 will be addressed in Section 
IV of this decision. 
7. The Court approves paragraph 1 of the Conclusions of Law because there is no 
objection. 
8. Over objection of Assessor paragraph 2 is approved. 
9. Paragraph 11 of the Findings of Fact should be included as a Conclusion of Law and 
paragraph 11 of the Findings should be substituted with the following: "This settlement 
Agreement was proposed initially by the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization and then was 
adopted/ratified by the Salt Lake County Commission/1 
10. References to September 20,2001 should be deleted in paragraphs 4, 5 and 7. 
11. Paragraph 3 of the Conclusions is approved over objection of Assessor. 
12. Paragraph 8 of the Conclusions is approved over objection with the addition of a 
citation to page 24 of the decision. 
13. Paragraph 9 of the Conclusions is approved over objection. 
14. Granite argues that the Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ignore 
and omit relevant findings of the Tax Court. Granite's proposed findings are accurately drawn 
from the opinion, but are simply this Court's attempt to articulate the defendants' arguments as 
the Court understood them. If the parties wish, these paragraphs could be included as a laundry 
list of arguments entertained and considered by the Court before reaching its decision. 
15. The Order should eliminate any reference to the September 20,2001 date. 
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in. 
ALLIANTS MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND TAX COURT DECISION AND 
CONSIDERATION OF PLAINTIFF'S [PROPOSED AND REVISED] 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER ON 
JOINT MOTION TO APPROVE SETTLEMENT' 
A. Procedural History 
1. This Court entered a written "Tax Court Decision" on September 20,2001, with 
respect to the Parties' Joint Motion to Approve Settlement. 
2. Pursuant to the request of the Court, Alliant submitted Proposed Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order on Joint Motion to Approve Settlement on October 1,200 L 
3. Alliant submitted [Proposed and Revised] Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order on Joint Motion to Approve Settlement on November 13,2001. 
4. Alliant filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Tax Court Decision together with a 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Alter or Amend Tax Court Decision on November 14, 
200L 
5. Salt Lake County Board of Equalization filed a Memorandum Opposing Plaintiffs 
Motion to Alter or Amend Tax Court Decision on December 21,2001. 
6. Granite filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Alliant's Motion to Alter or Amend 
Tax Court Decision, Objection to Proposed and Revised Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order on Joint Motion to Approve Settlement on December 27,200 L 
7. The Utah State Tax Commission filed a Memorandum in Reply to Alliant's Motion 
to Alter or Amend . . on December 21,2001. 
8. The Salt Lake County Assessor filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to 
Alter or Amend Tax Court Decision, Objection to Proposed and Revised Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order on Joint Motion to Approve Settlement on November 24,2001. 
9. Alliant filed Plaintiffs Response/Reply to: (1) Tax Commission's Memorandum in 
Reply to Alliant's Motion to Alter or Amend Tax Court Decision; (2) Salt Lake County 
-16-
lili*/ 
Assessor's Memorandum in Support of His Motion to Amend or Dismiss Alliant's First Claim For 
Relief; (3) Granite's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Alter or Amend Tax Court 
Decision; and (4) Salt Lake County Board of Equalization's Memorandum Opposing Plaintiffs 
Motion to Alter or Amend Tax Court Decision on January 15,2002. 
B. Statement of Facts 
Granite agrees with Alliant's statement of facts 1-8, and 10-11 and disputes Alliant's 
statement #9. Granite also proposes additional facts. 
Assessor generally adopts Alliant's statements 1 - 4,6 and 7, and acknowledges that 
Alliant's Petition for Review and Complaint for the 1997 through 1999 property tax years has 
been assigned to this Tax Court. 
The Utah State Tax Commission submitted its own "background" facts but does not 
specifically take exception to the Alliant's statement of facts. Likewise, Salt Lake County Board 
of Equalization proposed abbreviated facts but did not take specific exception to the facts as 
stated by Alliant. Upon review, the Court adopts the following statement of facts: 
1. On March 7,2001, the Tax Commission denied Alliant and the County's Joint 
Vtotion for Approval of Settlement. 
2. The Tax Commission held a Formal Hearing on April 23,2001 through April 27, 
£001, to determine the fair market value for the property in question for the years 1997 through 
[999. The Tax Commission determined that the fair market value for Alliant's property was 
5215,210,000, $212,559,000 and $232,650,000 for the years 1997 through 1999 respectively. 
3. On September 21,2001, Alliant filed a Petition for Judicial Review in the Third 
udicial District Court, seeking "review by trial de novo" under Utah Code Ann. §59-1-601 of the 
"ax Commission's Final Decision in Alliant Techsvstems v. Board of Equalization of Salt Lake 
bounty, et aL Appeal Nos. 98-0452,98-0608 and 99-019. These consolidated cases protest the 
bounty's assessments of Alliant's real property for the years 1997,1998 and 1999 (the "1997-
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1999 Valuation Case"). Under regular administrative procedures, the 1997-1999 Valuation Case 
was designated Case No. 010908307 and assigned to the Honorable Ronald E. Nehring, sitting as 
a Tax Court Judge. 
4. Judge Ronald E. Nehring disqualified himself from the case by Minute Entry dated 
October 9, 2001. 
5. The 1997-1999 Valuation Case was thereupon assigned to Judge Pat B. Brian, 
sitting as a Tax Court Judge. 
6. Filed simultaneously with its Petition for review in the 1997-1999 Valuation Case 
was AUiant's Motion to Transfer the case to the Honorable Judge Lynn W. Davis, a designated 
"Tax Court Judge" in the Tax Division of the Utah District Courts. 
7. Alliant filed a Motion to Transfer the 1997-1999 Valuation Case to this Court. No 
less than six other related cases involving the same parties, properties and taxes are pending 
before the Court. The first of the six pending Alliant v. Salt Lake County cases was filed 
February 6,1998, and was initially assigned to Judge Dennis Frederick. This first case was 
termed the "Independent or NIROP Action," and involves Alliant's statutory and constitutional 
challenge to the County's assessment of federal property that Alliant operates under the direction 
and control of the United States Navy (the Naval Industrial Reserve Ordnance Plant or 
"NIROP"). The Complaint in the Independent or NIROP Action seeks declaratory and injunctive 
relief against defendant Salt Lake County for the years 1995,1996, 1997,1998, 1999 and future 
years. The Complaint also requests relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the County for having 
taxed Alliant in violation of Article Vf of the United States Constitution. 
8. There being no opposition, Judge Frederick assigned the Independent or NIROP 
Action to a "Tax Court Judge," who, by random rotation, was the Honorable Lynn W. Davis. 
9. The other five pending Alliant v. Salt Lake County, et aL cases are appeals that 
either Salt Lake County or Alliant filed from a Final Decision the Utah State Tax Commission 
("Tax Commission") issued November 16, 1999 on the consolidated appeals of the County's 1995 
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and 1996 tax assessments of Alliant's real property (the "1995-1996 Valuation Case"). The Clerk 
of the Third Judicial District initially assigned the various appeals of the 1995-1996 Valuation 
Case respectively to Judges Nehring, Hanson, Lewis, Medley and Memmott Again with 
agreement from all parties, the 1995-19996 Valuation Case was consolidated and reassigned to 
the Honorable Lynn W. Davis because he was the assigned "Tax Court Judge" for the 
Independent or NIROP Action. 
10. By Order dated on November 6,2001, Judge Pat B. Brian transferred the 1997-
1999 Valuation Case to this Court. 
1L On December 5,2000, the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization and Alliant 
entered into a Settlement Agreement, whereby all property tax disputes between the parties for 
the years 1995 through 1999 inclusive were compromised and settled. On December 6, 2000, the 
Salt Lake County Commission, as the County's duly constituted legislative body, adopted and 
approved the Settlement Agreement. 
12. On September 27,2001, Alliant filed a Notice of Withdrawal and Voluntary 
Dismissal of the 1995-1999 personal property tax appeals with the Tax Commission, dismissing 
all its pending appeals with the Utah State Tax Commission with respect to personal property tax 
assessments from 1995 through 1999 inclusive. 
13. As a result of the foregoing actions and events, now pending before this Court are 
all cases and controversies that exist between Alliant and Salt Lake County relating to property 
tax matters for the years 1995 through 1999 inclusive; to-wit, the Independent or NIROP action, 
the 1995-1996 Valuation Case, and the 1997-1999 Valuation Case. The personal property tax 
natters have been dismissed. 
C Discussion 
This Court has already opined that the Settlement Agreement is "legal, enforceable and 
constitutionally sanctioned." It is a blanket settlement between the parties and is a compromise 
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and it was negotiated and entered into in good faith and anticipated a refund of $5 million to 
Alliant 
Because of jurisdictional developments since the time of the Joint Motion to Approve 
Settlement, this Court now has exclusive jurisdiction over all pending tax disputes between Alliant 
and defendants for the years 1995 to 1999 inclusive, specifically including the "NIROP" or 
"independent action," the 1995-1996 Valuation Case and the 1997-1999 Valuation Case. It is the 
opinion of the Court, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §59-1-601, the 1995-1996 Valuation Case and 
the 1997-1999 Valuation Case are now before this Court as an "original and independent 
proceeding" for review by "trial de novo" 
The Court has carefully considered defendants' arguments against the Motion to Amend 
or Alter filed by Alliant. The Court believes that Alliant's Reply brief adequately addresses each 
of those arguments. The Court so finds in order to achieve the clear intent of the parties to settle 
the case. This Court declined to initially adopt the Joint Motion, but jurisdictional challenges have 
evaporated. In addition, while this Court opined on the divisibility/indivisibility and non-
allocatable tax year arguments of counsel, that issue does not become an insurmountable hurdle 
for parties working together in good faith to effectuate a settlement agreement The fact that the 
Settlement Agreement was drafted and reviewed by seasoned and experienced tax attorneys on 
both sides is noted by this Court. 
Public policy favors enforcement of the Settlement Agreement; to refund $5 million to 
Alliant Exactly how that will take place is unknown, but the source of the funds is clearly 
contractually provided; "either from current cash flows and reserves or from the proceeds of the 
judgment Levy." 
The Court has treated Alliant's Motion to Amend akin to a Motion to Reconsider in 
light of the unique jurisdictional developments in this case and because no final order has entered 
from the September 20th decision. This Court "may affirm, reverse, modify, or remand any order 
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of the commission, and shall grant relief, invoke such other remedies, and issue such orders, in 
accordance with its decision, as appropriate." Utah Code Ann. §59-1-604. 
D. Decision 
Alliant's Motion to Amend or Modify is hereby granted and the Court enforces the 
Settlement Agreement in its entirety. This decision avoids weeks, if not months, of trial and 
squarely places critical issues before Utah's Appellate Courts. 
1. Is the Settlement Agreement entered into by and between Salt Lake County, its 
officers and attorneys, and Alliant "legal, enforceable and constitutionally sanctioned?" 
2. Is the reference to the approval by the State Tax Commission and the Tax Court a 
condition precedent or simply a jurisdictional pre-requisite? 
3. Even if it is condition precedent, can the Tax Court reverse or modify "any order of 
the Commission" and approve the settlement if it has exclusive jurisdiction? 
4. Does the "failure of consideration" argument defeat the Settlement Agreement even 
if a party to the Settlement Agreement sought its defeat? 
5. Is Alliant's Motion to Alter tantamount to a Motion to Reconsider in light of the 
unique jurisdictional developments in this case and because no formal order has entered from the 
September 20th decision? 
6. If the Salt Lake County Assessor is an independently elected county official with 
/ery unique statutory and constitutional duties, does the Salt Lake County Commission have the 
mthority to bind the Assessor in a lump-sum settlement agreement? 
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IV. 
COMPUTATION OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Lastly, Alliant seeks an award of attorneys' fees against the Salt Lake County Assessor. 
Various affidavits have been filed by Maxwell A. Miller, Esq. and Randy M. Grimshaw, Esq., 
attorneys for Alliant Techsystems, Inc. In addition, Alliant supports its claim for fees by an 
affidavit of Charles R. Brown, Esq., an attorney who practices with the Salt Lake City law firm of 
Clyde, Snow, Sessions and Swenson and who was selected as Distinguished Tax Practitioner of 
the Year for 1995-1996 by the Tax Section of the Utah State Bar. 
Defendant, Salt Lake County Assessor, and Salt Lake County Board of Equalization 
argue the fees are grossly out of proportion for the amount of work done. Mr. Smith, in behalf of 
the Board, argues that this case involves two non-evidentiary hearings before the Utah State Tax 
Commission and this Court, no witness preparation, and no expert witness preparation. The 
Board challenges the summary block billing statements and argues that Alliant has not met its duty 
to categorize time and fees, to separate the recoverable from the non-recoverable, and to 
appropriately apportion fees. 
This Court is responsive to the block billing argument and the apportionment of fees 
argument. While issues and parties are intertwined, there appears to be no legitimate attempt at 
apportionment. 
At oral argument Mr. Smith, who argued in behalf of the Board, the ultimate payor, and 
the Assessor, conceded that $10,000-$ 15,000 would be reasonable for each hearing. 
The Court awards attorneys' fees in the sum of $30,000, finding that Alliant simply 
failed to meet its burden further. 
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Alliant Techsystems, Inc. is instructed to prepare Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law which merge its first proposed Findings and Conclusions together with its [Proposed and 
Revised] Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on Joint Motion to Approve 
Settlement, as discussed above. 
Dated this 7 ^ day of June, 2002. 
Craig Smith, Esq. 
Brett Rich, Esq. 
David Pearce, Esq. 
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TAX COURT RULING ON 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
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STRIKE AND DEFENDANTS' 
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JUDGE: LYNN W.DAVIS 
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Alliant Techsystems, Inc. filed a motion with this Court seeking to supplement the 
record with after-acquired testimony. The Utah State Tax Commission filed its Objection to 
Alliant Techsystems' Motion to Supplement Record with After Acquired Testimony. The 
memorandum is dated August 20,2001. 
Salt Lake County, Lee Gardner, Larry Richardson, Mary Callaghan, Randy Horiuchi, 
Brent Overson, Salt Lake County Commission and Salt Lake County Board of Equalization, 
hrough their counsel Mary Ellen Sloan and Bill Thomas Peters, filed their Objection to Motion to 
Supplement Record with After-Acquired Testimony together with a Motion to Strike and Motion 
or Sanctions on August 17,2001. 
Plaintiff then filed a Reply to Defendant Utah State Tax Commission's Objection to 
'laintiff s Motion to Supplement Record with After-Acquired Testimony, which is dated August 
24, 2001. On August 27,2001, defendants, Salt Lake County, Lee Gardner, Larry Richardson, 
Mary Callaghan, Randy Horiuchi, Brent Overson, Salt Lake County Commission and Salt Lake 
County Board of Equalization submitted Defendants' Reply in Support of the Objection to 
Supplement the Record, Motion to Strike and Motion for Sanctions. 
COUNSEL OF RECORD: 
Randy M. Grimshaw Alliant Techsystems, Inc. 
Maxwell A. Miller 
John McCarry, Assistant Attorney General 
Michelle Snow, Assistant Attorney General 
Bill Thomas Peters 
Mary Ellen Sloan, Deputy Salt Lake District 
Attorney 
J. Craig Smith 
Kelly Wright 
John E. S. Robson 
Utah State Tax Commission 
Salt Lake County, Lee Gardner, Larry 
Richardson, Mary Callaghan, Randy 
Horiuchi, Brent Overson, Salt Lake County 
Board of Equalization, Salt Lake County 
Commission at the Motion to Dismiss and 
Motion for Summary Judgment stage 
Salt Lake County, Salt Lake County Board 
of Equalization at the Motion to Approve 
Settlement Stage 
Salt Lake County Assessor 
Granite School District 
The Court has carefully reviewed the various memoranda of the parties and having been 
fully apprised in the premises, now enters the following: 
I. 
The procedural facts are not disputed in this motion: 
1. The plaintiff filed its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on or about August 
24,1999. 
2. The motion was accompanied by the affidavits of LCDR Robert E. Kaufman and 
Kim Abplanalp. 
3. Defendants Salt Lake County, Salt Lake County Board of Equalization, et al, 
filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
with affidavits in opposition to plaintiffs motion on or about September 27, 1999. 
4. Subsequent pleadings were filed by the parties related to the Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment including Motions to Strike certain affidavits. 
5. On May 4,2000, the Tax Commission's Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in 
support were filed with the Court. 
6. On May 4, 2000, the Tax Commission's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Memorandum in Support were filed with the Court. 
7. On May 17, 2000, Alliant Techsystems, Inc. filed, inter alia, its reply to Tax 
Commission's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss and Tax 
Commission's Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment. 
8. On June 1,2000, the Tax Commission filed its Reply Memorandum in Support of 
its Motion to Dismiss and its Reply Memorandum in Support of its Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
9. On June 6, 2000, the .Court heard argument on defendants' motions and various 
motions made by the other parties. 
10. Prior to ruling on the various motions, in December 2000, these parties entered 
into a settlement agreement, staying the necessity for the Court to rule on the 
underlying motions. 
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11. Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, plaintiff filed a Joint Motion to Approve 
Settlement and in Reply to the Assessor's Memorandum in Opposition to the 
Joint Motion on or about March 1, 2001. 
12. Arguments were entertained on March 13,2001, and the Motion to Supplement 
the Record was filed prior to this Court's ruling on the motion. 
n. 
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
Plaintiff seeks to supplement the record with the prior sworn testimony of Mr. Jeff 
Foote, a witness who testified before the Utah State Tax Commission on April 23, 2001 
respecting non-Alliant permanent employers at NIROP; that Alliant shares possession of NIROP 
with the United States Navy and with Lockheed Martin. More particularly, Alliant's position is 
set forth as follows: 
PARTY POSITION AND ARGUMENTS 
Alliant Background: Alliant motioned for partial summary judgment 
because it argues that it does not have exclusive use of NIROP and 
should qualify for the privilege tax exemption. 
-POINT ONE: Testimony given under oath, subsequent to 
submission of Alliant's Motion for Partial summary Judgment and 
Defendant's Motion to Strike, further establishes that Alliant does 
not have "exclusive possession of the premises" at NIROP, and is 
thus entitled to judgment against defendants as a matter of law on 
the Fourth Claim for Relief in its Amended Complaint. 
Mr. Foote, President of Alliant Aerospace Propulsion 
Company testifies at the Tax Commission hearing on 
April 23,2001: 
-Alliant's usage of NIROP is at the direction and 
control of the Navy 
-Lockheed-Martin has "approximately 20 persons" 
at NIROP who are "watching over our processes, 
our quality," and who buy off or accept the 
hardware, once it's completed a step." 
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-Lockheed-Martin's access to NIROP is granted 
directly by the Navy, not Ailiant, since Lockheed-
Martin is the prime contractor with the Navy and 
Ailiant is the subcontractor. 
THUS: A) Ailiant does not have "exclusive possession of 
the premises" required by UCA 59-4-101(3)(e). B) 
Defendants' imposition of a "privilege tax" upon Ailiant 
under the rationale that Ailiant has "exclusive possession" 
of NIROP distorts the plain meaning of "exclusive 
Possession." 
Defendants argue that the subject information was available to Ailiant at the time of the 
filing of the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, that the plaintiff has filed the Motion to 
Supplement for purposes of delay and Rule 56 (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure bars the 
supplement of a hearing transcript of Mr. Foote. Additionally, defendants argue that the motion is 
simply untimely. Finally, the State Tax Commission argues that the Commission has not yet ruled 
in the case involving Mr. Footes' testimony and that the granting of the motion would usurp the 
Commission's decision on its pending matter. The Assessor also argues that any attempt to 
include valuation testimony at this point is beyond the scope of settlement. Plaintiff, in its reply 
memorandum, persuasively counters each of these arguments except for the "beyond the scope of 
settlement'argument. 
Should the Court be inclined to grant the motion, the State Tax Commission requests 
that "the Court must also allow the opposing parties to file a response to the supplemental facts 
and to contest them, interpret them for the Court, and have oral argument." Likewise, the other 
defendants, if the motion is granted, "request that they be given an opportunity to address the 
substance of Foote's testimony in an additional pleading." 
RULING 
First of all, it is the opinion of this Court that it would be improper to allow the State 
Tax Commission additional time to "contest" the proposed supplemental facts. That is not 
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consistent with this Court's understanding of the proper role of the State Tax Commission as a 
party to this action, A contestation of the facts by the Utah State Tax Commission may cross the 
line into an advocacy role, may suggest partiality of the State Tax Commission, and would 
hopelessly weaken or destroy its jurisdictional arguments based upon an exhaustion of 
administrative remedies' theory. The Court certainly hopes that the request is simply a poor 
choice of words as opposed to evidence of partiality of the Utah State Tax Commission against 
Alliant Techsystems, Inc. 
It is the fear of this Court that if it were to grant this motion that another intractable and 
intolerable delay would result because of the need for additional briefing, deposition/discovery 
and oral argument in the case. Accordingly, plaintiffs Motion to Supplement is respectfully 
denied. 
The Court finds no basis to impose sanctions or award attorneys' fees and Defendants' 
Motion for Sanctions is denied. Defendants' Motion to Strike the proposed testimony is granted. 
Dated this / ~~day of September, 2001. 
BY THE COURT 
cc: Randy Grimshaw, Esq. 
Maxwell A. Miller, Esq. 
John McCarry, Esq. 
Michelle Snow, Esq. 
Bill Thomas Peters, Esq. 
Mary Ellen Sloan, Esq. 
J. Craig Smith, Esq. 
Kelly Wright, Esq. 
John E. S. Robson, Esq. 
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